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SETTING UP THE STRUCTURE OF A DANUBE RIVER FORUM



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SETTING UP THE STRUCTURE OF A DANUBE RIVER FORUM



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RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS



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FOREWORD

As we all know the Danube region has been transformed greatly due to the social, political and economic change during the past few years. The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) aims at the macro regional development of the countries and regions along the river basin of the Danube.

The Danube, as the most international river can connect the Member States of the EU and its neighbours, as well as the Black Sea Region, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia; therefore, it is the most important inland waterway for the countries in the region. However, the river is not only a huge benefit, but sometimes also a problem to be solved with hidden dangers. Since the river connects regions with significantly different economic background, organized crime has always been present on it, so it is essential to continuously develop the international criminal and law enforcement cooperation based on practical experiences.

With regard to freight and passenger traffic, human smuggling, illegal migration, goods smuggling and drug and arms smuggling in 2011 EUROPOL evaluated the Danube as a highly endangered area. Hungary has taken up the challenge within the EUSDR Priority Area 11 to lay the foundations of the law enforcement cooperation along the Danube in the framework of the DARIF project, but in order to be able to do so, the professional knowledge and experiences of all the ten member states of the project were crucial. This task was not simple at all, because cooperation should have been extended to several fields, such as border management, customs management, criminal risk analysis, disaster management and water policing.

I am convinced that the cooperation that emerged during the implementation of the project was a proper answer to the security challenges placed by the Danube and it considerably improved the common work of those who take part in inland navigation and its control. During the Joint Operations in Mohács Border Port the Temporary Coordination Centre also succeeded beyond the expectations. In the course of the actions the flow of information accelerated among law enforcement authorities, data gathered in real time contributed to the more effective control by the authorities concerned and also shortened the time of controls.

I am sure that the knowledge and preparedness of the participants of the DARIF and their work done in the project can guarantee a firm background for the continuation of the cooperation within the Danube River Forum at political as well as expert level and for the establishment of a Permanent Coordination Centre to facilitate the flow of information. These can together ensure the security of the Danube waterway, improve the security of the people living along the Danube and support the work of those in the inland navigation.

I hope that the present publication summing up and evaluating the whole project can contribute to this essential goal.



Dr. Krisztina BERTA

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ACRONYMS

ADN	The European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (ADN) was done at Geneva on 26 May 2000
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AQUAPOL	Association of maritime- and inland navigation related law-enforcement authorities from EU member-states and from Switzerland
CCPO	Common Contact Point Office
DARIF	Setting up the Structure of a Danube River Forum
DG HOME	European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs
EC	European Community
EMSA	European Maritime Safety Agency
ERI EG	Electronic Reporting International Expert Group
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EU DRS	European Union Strategy for the Danube Region
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUROPOL SOCTA	EUROPOL EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment
EUROPOL AWF	EUROPOL Analysis Work File
FP7EU	7th Framework Programme
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
HU Mol	Ministry of Interior of Hungary
Inland ECDIS EG	Inland Electronic Chart Display System Expert Group
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
INTERPOL SLTD	INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Documents

INTERPOL SV	INTERPOL Stolen Vehicles
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ISEC	Prevention of and Fight against Crime Specific Programme of the Europe Commission
NEBEK	International Law Enforcement Co-operation Centre of Hungary
NFM	Ministry of National Development of Hungary
NTS EG	Notices to Skippers Expert Group
OC	Organised Crime
PA	Priority Area
PAXLST	Passenger List Message
PCC SEE	Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe
PNR	Passenger Name Record
RIS	River Information Services
SELEC	Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre
SOC	Serious and Organised Crime
TEN-T	Trans-European Transport Networks
THB	Trafficking in Human Beings
UN	United Nations
UN ECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
VTs	Vessel Traffic Services
VTT EG	Vessel Tracking and Tracing Expert Group

INTRODUCTION



1. Project description

The project “*Setting up the Structure of a Danube River Forum*” (DARIF) was initiated by the Ministry of Interior of Hungary and implemented between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2015, also became the flagship project within the EUSDR Priority Area 11 with unanimous support. The DARIF is strongly related to the goals of the Priority Area 11 “*To work together to tackle security and organised crime*” and is also a part of the “*Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre*” initiative that was handed in earlier to the above mentioned Priority Area.

The project was implemented in 24 months and its estimated budget was 290 870 EUR out of which 261 783 EUR was provided by the European Commission through its Specific Programme ISEC under a restricted call for Framework Partners. The project proposal was handed in to the European Commission together with two partner organizations, the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Federal Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The **main aims** of the DARIF were the common strengthening of the security of the waterway on the Danube, the effective and harmonised action against criminal activities and organized crime related to the waterway and the establishment of a cross border professional law enforcement cooperation in order to make the Danube a modern and secure traffic corridor with regard to the transport of goods and passenger transport.

Leaders, liaison officers and experts of law enforcement organs, authorities and institutions cooperating in the field of border management, criminal investigation, water policing, disaster management and River Information Services took part in the Hungarian-led project from the member states: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

The DARIF aimed at the setting up of a Strategic Forum System as well as the establishment of a Coordination Centre operating during the period of the Joint Operations in Mohács Border Port.

The setting up of the **Forum System** provided the countries in the Danube Region with the opportunity to discuss the current questions related to the security of the waterway of the Danube, to get to know one another's problems, demands and to map out common strategies in order to facilitate security that can enhance the effectiveness of the cooperation not only in specific sections of the Danube, but on the whole length of the river. During their cooperation participating countries wanted to ensure the technical background for the common law enforcement activities and for the conduct of international actions that support the implementation of controls in the field of water policing and border management, alien policing, tax and customs management and disaster management. Furthermore, an important element was to support the tracing of passenger transport, vehicle traffic and transport of goods while obeying national and EU legislation to decrease duration of controls and to ensure that security requirements are fully met.

The **Coordination Centre** operating during the period of Joint Operations aimed at the acceleration of the flow of information among authorities and to make comprehensive analysis of phenomena endangering waterway transport on the Danube as well as to decrease overlaps, duplications and the number of uncovered areas that hinder efficiency, so to promote synergy among already existing bi- and trilateral cooperations.

During the project several meetings were organized. The **Kick-Off Conference** was held 17-19 September 2013 in Budapest and Mohács. High-level officials from the ten member states and representatives of AQUAPOL, the Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation, the Black Sea Cooperation Forum, the Danube Commission, the European Commission, the EUSDR Priority Area 11, EUROPOL, EUBAM and FRONTEX also took part in the conference. On the first day of the meeting participants had the chance to get familiar with the cooperation of the already existing Baltic Sea Forum and Black Sea Forum and the Danube Serious and Organised Crime Threat Notice of the EUROPOL as well as the main elements of the DARIF project. By closing the first day the participants adopted a **Joint Declaration** (*Annex No. 1*) in which they expressed their commitment and common will to cooperate in the project. On the second day after the introduction of the Expert



Kick-Off Conference • Budapest, 17-19 September 2013

Groups, delegations had the opportunity to visit Mohács Border Port, the venue of the future Joint Operations and the Temporary Coordination Centre, and also had the chance to get to know the work of the law enforcement organs and other authorities situated there.

During the project the work was done in five Expert Groups:

- ◆ Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group;
- ◆ Law Enforcement Control Expert Group;
- ◆ Safety and Security of Waterway Expert Group;
- ◆ Joint Operations and Trainings Expert Group;
- ◆ Information Exchange and River Information Service Expert Group.

The **1st Technical Workshop** of the Expert Groups was held 9-10 December 2013 in Budapest. More than 70 experts met from the ten member states of the DARIF in order to elaborate on the topics and implementation of the three Joint Operations that were due in 2014. The national experts from the fields of criminal risk analysis, customs, border management, water transportation and transportation of dangerous goods as well as information exchange discussed the main points and topics during the two days of the practical and technical implementation of the Joint Operations. The experts actively took part in the elaboration of the different topics and unanimously supported the idea of establishing common control mechanisms and unified documents in order to make the border control along the Danube quicker and more effective. They emphasized the importance of the setting up of common databases that facilitate the flow of information, simplifying bureaucracy also trying to decrease the administrative burden while the strict security measures are fully obeyed.



The 1st Technical Workshop • Budapest, 9-10 December 2013

Three **Joint Operations** were implemented. The first in 7-11 April 2014, the second in 21-25 July 2014 and the third in 10-14 November 2014. The Joint Operations were carried out with the coordination of the Ministry of Interior of Hungary as multipurpose operations. The member states implemented their controls choosing from the listed goals and tasks in the Framework Operational Plan while setting their national priorities that were based on demands, situation on the national Danube section, own risk analysis and national capabilities. For the details of their implementation a Framework Operational Plan was compiled, involving the Joint Operations and Trainings Expert Group, in which national subplans of the participating countries were annexes.

The goals of the operation were to detect human smuggling, trafficking in human beings, unlawful acts related to illegal migration, document forgery, and activities aiming at smuggling of drugs, tobacco and other goods, to implement general water police controls on ships and in ports, to apprehend wanted persons, to enhance control on illegal employment and to control transport of dangerous goods. Member states focused their international criminal investigations and law enforcement controls on the Danube and its banks and on important ports. The 1st Joint Operation did not include the Rhine–Main–Danube Canal, because it was closed in that period.



The 1st Joint Operation • Mohács, 7-11 April 2014

DARIF member states implemented their law enforcement operational activities in a harmonized manner in three operational days in places and time defined in their national operational plans. Passenger and freight ships (including transport of dangerous goods), pleasure boats and ports were controlled by the representatives of participating policing (criminal, border management, water police), customs and disaster management organs as well as human, phytosanitary and veterinary services, navigation (port) authorities and other contributing organs (e.g. environmental and labour services) in all the member states.

During the Joint Operations in order to enhance the flow of information and reaction capabilities, each participating country had a national contact point and delegated a liaison officer who actively took part in the work of the Temporary Coordination Centre in Mohács Border Port and were in constant touch with their national authorities. The Centre was coordinated by the Hungarian Expert

Group coordinator of the Joint Operations and Trainings Expert Group. FRONTEX, EUROPOL, EUBAM **took part in all the operations** and INTERPOL supported the implementation of the 2nd and 3rd Joint Operations. The tasks of the Centre were to maintain daily contact with the national contact points of the participating states, immediate and mutual information exchange, information gathering and forwarding the information about the state of the national operations as well as providing operational support with



2nd Joint Operation • Mohács, 21-25 July 2014

the help of EUROPOL and INTERPOL and the collection of necessary statistical data for the final report of the operation.

In the original project proposal two workshops were planned, but after the 1st Joint Operation and the evaluation of the preliminary results, the experts of the member states recommended organizing a so called **Extra Workshop**.

After the consultations with the European Commission and the modification of the Grant Agreement, the Extra Workshop was held in 13-14 May 2014.

The Extra Workshop gave the experts the possibility to discuss the results of the 1st Joint Operation and to exchange their experiences in order to better handle the possible difficulties that might emerge in the remaining period of the project. At the plenary session of the workshop the experts were introduced with the EUROPOL threat assessment of the Danube and also got a glimpse into the work related to inland waterways of EUSDR Priority Area 1a. During the parallel thematic workshops the five Expert Groups, similarly to the 1st Technical Workshop, continued the professional discussions about current questions and defined the main directions for the 2nd Joint Operation.



3rd Joint Operation, • Mohács, 10-14 November 2014



Extra Workshop, • Budapest, 13-14 May 2014

After the Joint Operations the **2nd** (and last) **Technical Workshop** was organized in 27-28 January 2015 in Budapest. During the plenary session participants could get acquainted with new technologies in navigation due to presentations held by experts in navigation technology development and they also could have an insight of the present issues related to the work of the Danube Commission. After that parallel thematic workshops were held in the five Expert Groups, participants discussed the achieved results and drew up recommendations for the future cooperation.

The **Final Conference** of the project was organized in 12-13 May 2015 in Budapest with the participation of high-level representatives of law enforcement authorities from the member states of the DARIF and those institutions and agencies of the European Union as well as other international organisations and NGOs that were present in the Kick-Off Conference too. During the two-day meeting the delegations had the opportunity to get to know the project activities and the work of the thematic Expert Groups, and they were presented the discussed topics and the results of the



Joint Operations. After the presentations based on the results achieved in the Expert Groups the delegations evaluated the outcomes of the pilot operational work and defined **Recommendations** for setting up the regular future cooperation.

In most of the project events the representatives of the Hungarian press and media were present and gave short news about the DARIF. Members of the project management regularly reported the state of play and the progress of the project at the Annual Forum of the EUSDR and at the Steering Group meeting of the EUSDR Priority Area 11 in order to ensure the visibility and promotion of the project widely. In addition to this, after the start of the project, the established microsite of the DARIF under www.bmprojektek.kormany.hu was constantly updated and short news have been available on it about all the events in Hungarian and English.

2. Legal background of the cooperation

In the Joint Declaration adopted at the Kick-Off Conference of the project held between 17 and 19 September 2013 the ten member state of the Danube Region expressed their strong commitment to support the project *“Setting up the Structure of a Danube River Forum”* and agreed to establish a regular Danube cooperation platform, and to set up a Temporary Coordination Centre for the support of the Joint Operations.

The aim of the Temporary Coordination Centre was the coordination of the performance of law enforcement tasks related to waterway transport (water and border policing, customs administration and disaster management) and to improve their efficiency by information sharing.

An overview of the possible international legal background of the further cooperation among the member states in the framework of the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre was also part of the project. The present cooperation forms in the field of law enforcement and criminal matters were reviewed with the aim of deciding which could serve as a basis of an international cooperation that includes all areas of the project and enables the exchange of both general and personal data in the future.

This overview was necessitated by the fact that during the project the law enforcement-related information exchange in the Joint Operations required the delegation of liaison officers from all member states to the Centre. Such requirement would negatively affect the cost-effectiveness of a permanent centre. Beside the exchange of criminal data among the member states the need for sharing law enforcement information supporting the work of the authorities that cannot be shared in the current legal framework was also expressed in the course of the discussions in the Expert Groups.

The overview of the legal framework of the cooperation revealed that all member states of the DARIF project are member states of the INTERPOL, the largest international police organization of the world that could be a good basis with regard to the number of participating countries. Cooperation with the INTERPOL and the use of its databases play an important role in the management of the criminal tasks of the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre. However, only criminal information exchange is possible in the framework of INTERPOL that excludes the exchange of law enforcement information and information related to customs checks and disaster prevention. Therefore, law enforcement information exchange cannot be solely based on the cooperation in the framework of the INTERPOL.

Further surveys came to a conclusion that the activities of the project are closely connected to the mandate of two EU agencies, namely EUROPOL and FRONTEX. Only EU Member States are participating in EUROPOL but the agency is able to enter into agreements allowing exchange of data including personal data with third countries. Among the non-EU countries of the project Serbia signed an operative agreement with EUROPOL that allows the exchange of personal data while

with Ukraine and Moldova EUROPOL entered into strategic agreements that do not allow such information exchange. However, EUROPOL also allows the exchange of criminal information only and solely in connection with specific crimes pertaining to the mandate of the agency, therefore, with regards to the subject matter of the cooperation that agency cannot provide a starting point either. The situation of the FRONTEX agency that supports the border management tasks of the EU Member States is similar to that of EUROPOL with the difference being that the mandate of FRONTEX is even more limited. Therefore, these two agencies do not cover the planned tasks of the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre neither separately nor together.

The analysis came to the conclusion that currently there is no multilateral international treaty regulating cooperation in the field of law enforcement and fight against crime that would include all states participating in the project either. Nevertheless, there are two regional cooperation platforms in the South-European region including some member states of the DARIF project that could serve as an example for the Danube initiative.

Most member states of the DARIF project are parties of the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe with the exception of Germany, Slovakia, Croatia and Ukraine while four countries that do not participate in the project are parties of this cooperation. The mandate of the PCC SEE includes law enforcement information exchange besides that of criminal information but it is only allowed among the criminal authorities of the participating countries and only with regard to the personal data determined in the Convention. No information can be exchanged among authorities dealing with disaster management or immigration control for example. Therefore, this cooperation cannot either be an appropriate basis for the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre, but the regulations of the Convention on data protection could provide an example for a future international treaty among the member states of the project allowing the exchange of personal data.

The other regional cooperation platform involving member states of the DARIF project is the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center. The member states of the DARIF and the SELEC only partially overlap: Germany, Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine are not members of the SELEC but members of the DARIF while Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey do not participate in the DARIF project. Furthermore, the SELEC is primarily a cooperation in criminal matters, with the support of investigations and crime prevention activities and the exchange of criminal intelligence being its most important tasks and this aim determines the types of personal data stored in its databases. To sum up, the SELEC is not a good starting point for the development of the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre, because of its participants and its mandate nevertheless, its rules regulating the protection of personal data could be useful for that.

The Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre was established by an agreement between two member states of the DARIF project: Hungary and Croatia signed in Mátraháza 11th of October 2012 (Agreement between the Government of Hungary and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the operation of the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre). Currently this agreement regulates the operation of the Centre setting up the institutional framework of the

cooperation among the parties the content of which is provided by the treaties on cooperation in police, customs administration and disaster management matters previously concluded among the parties. These treaties regulate the types of personal data that can be changed in the framework of the Centre and their protection. This agreement is open for accession by other interested states along the Danube.

As it can be concluded that currently there is no international agreement that would involve all member states of the DARIF project and all activities undertaken by the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre during the project the adoption of such an international agreement that would allow the exchange of personal data for law enforcement purposes among the member states with the necessary data protection regulations might be necessary in order to further continue the cooperation. The agreement between the Government of Hungary and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the operation of the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre could provide a good basis for this and its contents could be adjusted to the needs of the member states wishing to access the agreement in the future. The Baltic Sea Forum and the Black Sea Forum cooperations can also serve as examples for the further contents of the agreement.



CHAPTER I. **CRIMINAL AND RISK** **ANALYSIS EXPERT GROUP**



BACKGROUND

More intensive economic integration, enhanced commercial activities performed across borders and the termination of control at the internal borders of the Schengen Area involve the appearance of cross-border organised crime and within that scope, of trafficking activities, in which the river Danube plays a potential role in trafficking as a possible route for trafficking. At the moment, very little information is available regarding crime related to cross-border trafficking activities involving the river Danube, and this prevents, both on a national and on an international level, the compilation of a fair threat assessment. To facilitate effective steps against cross-border organised crime, the framework of international cooperation must be adapted to the current, day-to-day challenges presented by organised crime. To facilitate effective action, cooperation must be extended to non-EU countries beyond the Member States of the European Union.

THE GOALS OF THE CRIMINAL AND RISK ANALYSIS EXPERT GROUP

Developing regular and targeted risk-assessment activities aimed at broadening cooperation and improving its efficiency. Such activities will ensure success in combating organised crime, the introduction of preventive measures against crime and the revealing of criminal activities via the coordinated division of forces and tools. Compilation of a risk assessment based on information drawn from trends of current criminal offences related to the river Danube and of the methods applied, along with other phenomenon presenting risk would support the work of the bodies that perform water traffic control and would hence guarantee the revealing of offences and the safety of the member states.

ACTIVITIES OF THE EXPERT GROUP

To facilitate successful and fruitful activities of the Expert Group, in line with the needs defined at the Kick-Off Conference held in 17 and 19 September 2013 in Mohács, the member states involved in the project appointed experts possessing experience in acting against cross-border organised crime, international cooperation in criminal matters and the field of risk analysis.

1. Identification of target areas:

Regarding cross-border crime related to the river Danube, the Expert Group set the following priorities¹:

- ◆ revealing unlawful acts related to human smuggling, trafficking in human beings, and illegal migration;
- ◆ smuggling of counterfeit goods with an impact on public health, since their production violates security regulations;
- ◆ revealing smuggling of drugs, especially synthetic drugs;
- ◆ transport of dangerous goods and waste related criminal offences;
- ◆ detections of tobacco smuggling;
- ◆ detections of smuggling of other dangerous products on board (weapon, ammunition and explosive, radioactive material);
- ◆ organised theft from cargo vessels;
- ◆ detections of document forgery;
- ◆ detections of wanted persons in the crew or among the passengers;

¹ In identifying those, we used as a basis the SOCTA threat assessment prepared by EUROPOL and the experience presented by SELEC annual reports and by the contribution of the countries involved in the project.

- ◆ detections of illegal waste transport, controls on environmental protection;
- ◆ controls of destination ports (during uploading suspicious ships);
- ◆ controls on labour employment on members of crew;
- ◆ organised theft of water crafts, external engines, pleasure boats and other parts of crafts.

In addition to the above, the use of illegal methods of fishery was raised as a special offence on a national level, which also has international aspects (e.g. the sale of caught fish abroad) and also the abuses with grain shipments.

2. Identifying the bodies involved in acting against crime constituting the target area, and summing up their cooperation and the experience gained in the exchange of information. Assessing the current status of opportunities in cooperation and the exchange of information implemented via a framework of legislation that facilitates the exchange of crime-related information:

In order to get to know the legislative background making possible the criminal data exchange and the current state of play and the possibilities of the information exchange and cooperation through the used information channels, the Expert Group examined:

- ◆ the existence of common contact points between the countries;
- ◆ the use of police/customs liaison officers;
- ◆ the applicability of channels for cooperation on criminal matters;
- ◆ the existence of a legal background that ensures bilateral exchange of information regarding the combating of organised crime.

During the Joint Operations and their preparation it was already apparent that there is quite a wide range of bodies involved in policing of water transportation, thus, with regard to the Joint Operations performed as part of the project, the existing channels serving the exchange of information on international crime were applied as follows, in consideration of the national characteristics of the member states:

- ◆ using the contact points between neighbouring countries;
- ◆ with regard to non-neighbouring countries, using the channels of EUROPOL, SELEC and INTERPOL.

Regarding the performance of Joint Operations, the exchange of crime-related information during office hours was ensured by the liaison officers delegated to the Temporary Coordination Centre at the border port of Mohács in Hungary, as well as by the duty service of the International Law Enforcement Co-operation Centre of Hungary (NEBEK).

Experience showed that the exchange of information regarding cooperation in criminal matters was the most useful in the case of queries made via the Temporary Coordination Centre and NEBEK.

3. Summary of experiences gained via the Joint Operations and risk analysis, the elimination of deficiencies and the use of the experiences in new Joint Operations:

As part of the project, the basic goal was increasing the efficiency of the proposed Joint Operations via risk analysis. During the preparations for the 1st Joint Operation, an analysis based on risk profiles was not yet available, thus the operation was implemented as a multi-purpose operation. As a result, the

member states involved organised the checks in consideration of their own needs, of the situation that developed at their own section of the river Danube, their own risk assessment and their capabilities.

During the 1st Joint Operation, no major discoveries of offences were made; the exchange of information was concentrated in the field of law enforcement;² the exchange of criminal information was minimal. During the evaluation it was found that success was negatively influenced by the fact that, as the Rhine–Maine–Danube Canal was closed, vessel traffic was limited and the member states only used the opportunities presented by the Temporary Coordination Centre to a minor extent. The contributing countries had to learn what preliminary information they can obtain over the course of risk analysis (e.g. lists of passengers), had to promote more efficient control based on the risk profiles provided, via the combined and targeted use of the same, comparing the same with other information. Efforts must be made towards the more concrete definition of and the fast transfer of information.

The assessment of results and experiences provided a good basis for the implementation of the 2nd and 3rd Joint Operations as the member states, in consideration of the spheres of formerly identified priorities could consider new priorities with regard to setting up their own national action plans. In Germany, e.g. controls were extended to offences related to illegal employment and illegal transportation.

4. Preparing a draft comprising the required elements of risk analysis, containing identical aspects of evaluation and concepts³, risk profiles drawn up based on data regarding the current trends of relevant offences and the methods used in committing them:

Types and characteristics of SOC activities:

- ◆ type of SOC activity (e.g. transport of illicit commodities, human smuggling, trafficking in human beings (THB), environmental crime etc.);
- ◆ type of commodities (drugs and its types, counterfeit goods, cigarettes, weapons etc.);
- ◆ in case of THB or illegal migration: profile of victims (e.g. sex, age, nationality, place of origin, place of residence), excluding personal data of individuals;
- ◆ countermeasures known to be taken by OCGs along the route (e.g. armed guards, counter surveillance, using of cover loads etc.).

Main characteristics of criminals related to OCG:

- ◆ structure and composition of the OCG (e.g. loose networks or hierarchical structures, nationality of their members, multi-ethnic or homogeneous etc.);
- ◆ use of specialists (e.g. whether they use persons with special expertise for special tasks or whether they use external experts);
- ◆ use of legal business structures to cover illegal activities (e.g. shipping service companies, ship brokers, companies to facilitate storage, meetings, money laundering etc.);
- ◆ being involved in shipping companies or private ship owners which are not necessarily members of the OCG;
- ◆ involvement of crew-members in illegal acts.

² RO example during inspections, more than 3 000 persons were checked at the territories of the countries but only a total of 12(!) persons were queried in various databases via the EUROPOL Mobil Office at the operations centre.

³ Over the course of its elaboration the draft prepared by EUROPOL was also used.

Identification of risks, sources of risks:

- ◆ risks of the controlling technology;
- ◆ risks and limits of objective circumstances of the control;
- ◆ professional skills (e.g. knowledge of hiding places).

Relevant places and areas:

- ◆ start and destination harbour of vessels/goods;
- ◆ final destination of goods/commodities;
- ◆ transshipment points (including harbours, land roads, warehouses, etc.);
- ◆ other locations or reaches, which are relevant for the perpetrators' as well as the crimes' points of view.

Main characteristics of transportation:

- ◆ type of vessel (e.g. container transporter, cargo ship, tanker, Ro/Ro-vessel, cruise ship, pleasure boat etc.);
- ◆ country of origin of the vessel and shipping company and/or ship owner;
- ◆ the method of transportation (container, motor vehicle/lorry loads, passenger transport, personal baggage etc.).

5. Increasing efficiency of the Joint Operations based on risk analyses specifically prepared on the basis of criminal offences:

This goal appeared as one of the major milestones with regard to the activities of the Expert Group as experiences indicated that, in respect of water transport on the river Danube, no such analyses or guidelines are available that would promote the targeted performance of checks by the staff involved in control activities. As a result, risk analyses were prepared on human smuggling/illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, offences related to drugs and risk analyses affecting the security of containers (*Annex No. 2*)

The primary purpose of the risk analyses compiled was providing, within the scope of the project, a minimal knowledge for members of the bodies involved in water transport control regarding the prevailing trends of the given offences (methods used, routes, categories of citizenship, orientation etc.). The use of the risk indicators described assisted the organisation of targeted checks aimed at the revealing of offences committed within the scope of cross-border organised crime that can be attached to the river Danube.

These analyses were based on the EUROPOL SOCTA 2013, FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis, on the analyses prepared by SELEC, as well as on the evaluations of similar joint operations. As, in the period preceding the analysis, no criminal offence relevant to the subject matter was discovered on the river Danube, the analyses primarily contained the conclusions drawn from offences committed on the mainland. The statistics relevant to individual cases contain figures of the annual evaluation reports prepared by SELEC, pointing out the figures affecting the countries involved in the DARIF project. Similarly, the criminal methods applied, the routes and the categories of citizenship were collected concentrating on the member states countries of the DARIF project.

6. Best practices of the risk analysis performed on the basis of data derived from crime-related work, the exchange of information:

Over the course of preparing the 2nd and 3rd Joint Operation, the risk analyses focusing on criminal offences with various subject matters were sent out to the member states – these analyses, considering the information relevant to a given country – facilitated the targeted organisation of checks. On the first day of the Joint Operations, the briefing of the liaison officers delegated by the member states presented an opportunity for transferring specific information derived from criminal intelligence activities, in addition to general information.

RECOMMENDATIONS THAT CAN BE PRESENTED AS BEST PRACTICE:

Case:

Once, the authorities discovered 2,160.62 g Cannabis in the loading area at the port of Vienna, in a Serbian truck and its trailer.

Measure adopted via the Mohács Temporary Coordination Centre:

Offenders were queried in the INTERPOL databases and in the EUROPOL AWF, but no results were received.

Case:

Three Serbian and one Bosnian citizens were caught on the "RIVER DUCHESS" passenger ship as members of crew for illegal stay and employment.

Measure adopted via the Mohács Temporary Coordination Centre:

Queries of offenders were made in the INTERPOL databases and in the EUROPOL AWF. The EUROPOL AWF gave one result regarding the Serbian national intercepted, whose birth data did not match precisely. Facilitating the precise identification of the individual, the person was queried in the Serbian national databases via the Serbian liaison officer delegated to the Mohács Temporary Coordination Centre and was found to be recorded as the perpetrator of human smuggling in the EUROPOL database. The results of the checks were forwarded to the Austrian authority that conducted the inspection and that used the received information at the interviews.

Case:

The Vienna police caught five Moldovan nationals on the Danube who broke into a fishing boat.

Measure adopted via the Mohács Temporary Coordination Centre:

Queries were made about the criminals in INTERPOL databases and the EUROPOL AWF, but no results were received. In order to identify them the offenders were queried in national databases via the Moldovan liaison officer delegated to the Mohács Temporary Coordination Centre and were identified therein. The results of the queries were forwarded to the Austrian authority that conducted the inspection and that used the received information over the interviews.

Case:

The personnel and passenger lists of vessels crossing the Mohács water border-crossing point were queried in the INTERPOL databases and the EUROPOL AWF.

Measure adopted via the Mohács Temporary Coordination Centre:

The INTERPOL database of stolen travel documents gave two results from the records; on that basis, targeted checks were performed on the given ships. Further to such checks, it was ascertained that,

in either cases, the arrest warrant was not withdrawn. The owner got back the document previously lost, but failed to notify the authorities to that effect, thus the warrant remained in effect. The authorities of the countries affected were also notified about the results via their liaison officers delegated and, as a result, the incorrect warrants were withdrawn.

Case:

The query for a person on the passenger list of the passenger ship ARIANA, entering into the territory of Hungary at the Mohács Border Port gave a result in the EUROPOL AWF in relation to drugs.

Measure adopted via the Mohács Temporary Coordination Centre:

A measure was performed to check the person via the Slovakian liaison officer delegated to the Centre, at the following stop of the given ship in Slovakia, where the authorities performed a targeted check and recorded the present travel documents of the person. This constituted exemplary performance in terms of water transport control, as not only the specific crime was discovered but the result of the inspection performed following the result was also sent back to the authority that sent notification of the result.

SUMMARY

It was clearly ascertained from the experiences gained from the activities of the Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group that, primarily, a law enforcement type approach prevails regarding controls of water transport over the Danube. With regard to preparing and performing inspections, the information derived from criminal intelligence activities are not displayed. This was pointed out, with regard to the activities of the Expert Group, by the major recommendations of the threat assessment⁴ prepared and presented by the EUROPOL SCAN TEAM on criminal offences related to the river Danube.

Within the scope of the DARIF project, by way of the activities performed by the Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group in close cooperation with other Expert Groups, by presenting the available and via the use of the opportunities inherent in international cooperation, a more complex approach of control has been developed. Joint Operations implemented within the scope of the project meant a new, coordinated form of cooperation regarding controls. As opposed to everyday checks, a more comprehensive opportunity of control (use of forces and tools) opened up in the period of Joint Operations, thus, in the views of the parties involved, similar joint activities are also necessary to facilitate the development of a proper routine with regard to the coordinated functioning of the authorities.

The Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group facilitated, over the course of preparations for the Joint Operations and implementation, the more comprehensive checking of data in various databases as well as the use of an interdisciplinary approach based on the intelligence service. The gained experiences pointed out that the areas of cooperation must be broadened in order to improve the effectiveness of checks proposed within the scope of operations, in particular, via the involvement of the capacities of the bodies involved in efforts combatting cross-border organised crime (EUROPOL,

⁴ As the analysis working files of EUROPOL do not contain data relevant to crime committed in relation to the river Danube, thus it only contains generalities, therefore, it is not suitable for creating profiles that can be applied within the scope of checks.

INTERPOL). In this respect, with regard to the INTERPOL, we must mention the database of SLTD and SV and the registry of wanted persons as well as the checks in AWF operated by EUROPOL. The use of experiences of target groups (drug-related crime, illegal migration, container shipments etc.) operated with the purpose of monitoring cross-border organised crime, gained by SELEC, the assessment prepared by SELEC as well as the analyses focusing on the river Danube as potential area of crime appearance and route, could be just as efficient.

With regard to obstacles arising at the controls on the move, there are potential possibilities within the checks at the ports of departure and destination. To facilitate the above, new technologies, fit for resolving objective issues arising must be introduced and applied; this will permit the implementation of targeted checks coordinated by the nations affected, based on risk analysis. It must be pointed out that we are talking about a cooperation that is implemented not only between neighbouring countries. It should be kept in mind that should information related to a crime in connection with the Danube emerge in any member states the information shall be quickly transferred to and used in the target country.

CONCLUSIONS

With regard to the activities performed by the Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group as part of the project, it became clear that the awareness of the authorities involved in policing water transport, increased cooperation as well as the organisation of intelligence-led targeted checks is required.

Regular checks in criminal records and databases must be ensured, the continuous enlargement of these databases and records must be facilitated and targeted checks must be combined with additional measures.

The risk analyses and profiles compiled as part of the project must be updated on a regular basis. To that effect, a background analysis must be set up that is able to continuously monitor cross-border criminal offences within the scope of the Danube and to follow up the trends in and any changes to the characteristics of crime.

The possibility must be created for the processing of regularly updated risk analyses and profiles by the bodies involved and for the forwarding thereof, on a national level, to the competent bodies involved in policing water transport on the Danube, that is, to the staff that performs actual controlling activities.

To facilitate more efficient checks, the areas of cooperation must be broadened by involving the capacity of agencies combating organized crime (EUROPOL, INTERPOL and SELEC).

It is an important aspect to reduce to the minimum or to eliminate the risks associated with objective issues (containers, bulk cargo) arising during control activities. State-of-the art technologies must be identified and introduced that will help surmount the objective difficulties currently hindering the control of water transport on the river Danube (use of mobile scanners, x-rays, service dogs).

CHAPTER II.

LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTROL EXPERT GROUP



BACKGROUND

Waterway transport is one of the oldest ways of transportation, its origin is lost in the mists of the history of mankind. First the rivers, then the seas became the routes of water transport, and they facilitated the connection of places with considerable distances between them. The River Danube is transport corridor No. VII of the transport network of the European Union (TEN-T). In the European transport policy, it is a high priority to divert goods from road to rail and inland waterways, therefore it is extremely important to make sure that the Danube can operate as a modern and safe transport corridor for both passenger and goods transport. The changes already carried out and still in progress in the European Union and the accession to the Schengen Area do not only trigger changes in the national economies, the industry and the society of the states, but demand the transformation of the law enforcement area, too. In order to make transport by water attractive and reliable for the economic players, with the tracking of passenger and goods transport, the duration of the checking to be performed by various authorities needs to be shortened, but the national and community requirements still need to be observed.

THE GOALS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTROL EXPERT GROUP

The establishment of a unified controlling practice that meets the requirements of security and speed in border control and in-depth check, and coordinates the border control and customs administration activities related to water transport, and efficiently supports the official control with real-time information exchange and the establishment of a common database.

ACTIVITIES OF THE EXPERT GROUP

As the name of the Expert Group indicates, at the experts' meetings organized under the project, the Expert Group processed primarily border control and customs administration subjects that were related to the law enforcement control of passenger and goods transport by water. Therefore the experts delegated to the Expert Group were professionals with border and customs policing experiences.

As Slovakia did not delegate an expert, the statements of the Expert Group do not reflect the views of the country.

1. Identification of the scopes of documents to be checked during border control and the applied databases:

At the meetings of the Expert Group, it was agreed that in both the border policing and the customs administration areas, the member states would send the documents they require for the checking of ships to the coordinators of the Expert Group, so that each member state could see them when a common database is set up. Following the studying of these documents, a so-called minimum list will be worked out for each type of ships, and each vessel in water transport shall have those documents.

2. Identification of best practices for the examination of various types of ships at the border:

On the examination of the subject, the Expert Group came to the conclusion that it was impossible to work out best practices for the checking of goods of large volumes without proper technical and technological conditions. The safe and itemized checking of the goods is possible at the place of loading and unloading only, especially in the case of bulk products of large volume, such as grain or coal and other minerals. It is almost impossible to examine bulk goods on their way or in intermediate ports.

For the efficient and fast examination of these ships, the representatives of the member states considered it important that the basic information on detection is transferred quickly through the contact points. In the possession of up-to-date information, the controlling authority of another country is able to search the ship in a more targeted way, reduce the time spent on the searching, and concentrate on the principles of speed and efficiency. This information and similar information regarding specific vessels can be used well in the checking of other ships, too. For example, the possibility of creating a hiding place for migrants on a deck of similar design. It is also useful when new detections based on the use of the information received are fed back to the authority that provided the information.

3. Formulation of recommendations for bringing the border controls closer to each other:

On the examination of the methodology of border controls, and after the studying of the practices of the member states, it is reasonable to say that in most member states, the authorities involved in control activities carry out the checking required by their national and international obligations in a coordinated way, in parallel with each other.

However, the control would be greatly facilitated by an interface to be developed within the frames of the RIS, which would allow for preliminary check-in by the ships arriving in the ports, recording the time of arrival and the data regarding the crew and the passengers on board, and, in the case of cargo vessels, the data of the transported goods. Such preliminary information would make the border control processes faster and easier to plan for the authorities, as more time would be available for risk analysis, decision-making on the way of checking the ships, and for the necessary preparations for the implementation of the decision. This way more resources could be assigned to ships of high risk, while ships of low risk could proceed faster. This would increase the permeability of border ports, ships could get through faster and the average time of customs clearance would be shorter, too, and these factors would all contribute to the development of trade and tourism. This idea is not without precedent: a similar system (PAXLST) has been working in Mohács International Border Port in Hungary since the spring of 2014, and the experiences collected so far indicate that it has made the border control faster and easier to plan for both the shipping companies and the controlling authorities, as it is known how many members of the controlling staff would need to be involved at a certain point of time, and certain phases of the control can be performed before the arrival of the ship, for example inquiries in databases. It would be advantageous to implement this system in electronic form, possibly in a way that incoming data are automatically checked in various national and international databases.

4. Compilation of the list of documents checked during border control:

In the course of border controls, it is important to pay attention to the crew list, too, in addition to the passenger list, as the shipping company operating the ship is entitled by the law to change the crew several times.

Romania suggested that the document of the first crew list is stamped and certified by each country on the route of the ship, and then it is returned together with all the other lists to the authority of the country of departure. This kind of documentation of the changes in the crew may significantly reduce illegal migration and illegal employment.

Serbia suggested a minimum list of documents to be checked during the controls, and the experts accepted this with the condition that the list will be extended later with the documents used for customs clearance. With this in mind the following list of documents have been compiled:

Minimum documents for the control of cargo vessels:

- ♦ registration statement (arrival – departure report);
- ♦ travel documents of persons on board;
- ♦ crew list (one original and one copy).

Minimum documents for the control of passenger vessels:

- ♦ registration statement (arrival – departure report);
- ♦ travel documents of persons on board;
- ♦ crew list (three originals and one copy);
- ♦ passenger list (one original and one copy).

5. Collection of places suitable for hiding and smuggling by boat type:

During the examination of this subject, the member states agreed that the collection of places suitable for hiding and smuggling is difficult because of the large number of types of ships. Certain member states considered that small motorboats and yachts, used pleasure and sports boats represent a bigger threat and problem. It can be stated in general that double cabin walls, the engine compartment, the fuel tank and cabins not used by the staff are the most suitable places for smuggling.

The diversity of national regulations may also make successful detection more difficult. For example, in Germany, according to the national regulations, the premises used by the captain are qualified as a private house, so they can be examined only in the case of well-founded suspicion, with a judge's consent.

6. Possibilities of checking tax-free fuel usage, demand for stock declaration at the start of the control:

In the Hungarian practice, when motorboats are checked, the authorities check its gas oil forming part of the fuel stock, too. The design of the transporting containers used on boats and other conditions of their transportation – weather, qualified measuring instrument – together or separately may make it difficult for the controlling officials to precisely define the quantity of the cargo, and compare it with the quantity data on the documents. The quantity is usually defined by using the tonnage

table supplied for the ship and the dipsticks supplied for the tanks, but no regulation that would stipulate an obligation for getting them qualified. The fuel tanks of motor vessels operated on the Danube might be able to carry as much as 50-100 tons of gas oil. The settlement of fuel stocks is basically based on the documents kept on the ship, and not on measuring instruments, which may cause inaccuracy and give way to abuse, and in the case of untrue fulfilment of documents, makes detection impossible.

Pursuant to the 2011/544/EU Implementing Decision of the European Commission on establishing a common fiscal marker for gas oils and kerosene, gas oils marked with this fiscal marker and belonging to customs tariff number 2710 19 41, 2710 19 45 and 2710 19 49 are called gas oils.

The marked or tax-free gas oil may be used free of tax by ships of foreign or domestic register, or recorded in the list of Hungarian vessels, performing goods or passenger transportation, in their business activities, for use in their fuel tanks. It is forbidden to remove in any way, the marked gas oil from the fuel tank of the vessel, except when the vessel or its fuel tank is repaired or renovated, with a preliminary report to the customs authority.

In order to reduce abuses, it is the joint position of the experts that information exchange on a daily, weekly or monthly basis is necessary among the member states in the control of marked or tax-free fuels.

SUMMARY

On the whole, the Expert Group examined those possible problems which have a solution that can be supported by all the parties in a unified way. Most of the member states find it necessary to carry out controlling jointly by several authorities, but they also agree that these controls could be rationalized and speeded up. Fast, cultured border controls that are as short as possible in time are an essential requirement in today's business world, where the interests of tourism and trade have priority. However, it is a fundamental interest of states to guarantee their security, and to make sure that the people, the vehicles and the shipments that enter their countries meet the specified requirements and do not represent a threat to public security, public health and national interests.

River navigation spans several countries, so it requires an international cooperation that is more pronounced than ever before, therefore, today there is no up-to-date border control without data exchange, the provision of preliminary information and the sharing of experiences and best practices. Even with the best technology, the possession of information at the right time means a huge advantage for the authorities.

CONCLUSIONS

The experts of the Law Enforcement Control Expert Group delegated to the DARIF project pointed out that the common action of countries along the Danube is essential for the implementation of efficient controls, therefore, to the reduction of the time of controls.

The Expert Group is of the opinion that the possibility of continuing the cooperation and consultation among experts started in the DARIF project should be examined.

The Expert Group thinks that it is the fast and real-time exchange of information that can serve the efficient controls by the authorities in the most effective way. One way of that can be the permanent operation of the Temporary Coordination Centre set up at the Mohács Border Port during the Joint Operations.

By discussing possible future activities, the group agreed that a list of national contact points (contact network) should be set up as a first step. A website should be developed to include the list of contacts so it can be easily accessed by all participants. The Coordination Centre in Mohács is still a possible future solution for exchange of information, but for the time being the participating countries might have financial difficulties to send their experts to the Centre on a permanent basis.

The Expert Group suggests that in parallel with the establishment of the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre, the member states should urge the setting up of additional bilateral common contact points among the countries of the Danube region, and the development of a multilevel information exchange network.

The member states agreed that the unification and the simplification of the documents applied in navigation on the Danube are still necessary.

CHAPTER III.

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF WATERWAY EXPERT GROUP



BACKGROUND

With the opening of the Rhine–Main–Danube waterway, practically a „motorway” on water has been created between the Black Sea and the North Sea. Inland waterway transport is cheap and efficient, but also means a risk to the aquatic environment, the aquatic life as well as drinking water supply. As a result of the increase in vessel traffic the number of shipping accidents, the pollution of the inland waters and riverside areas of the member states have increased, the living and working conditions of the crews on board have deteriorated. Common action of the Danube countries is needed in order to minimise risks, to prevent damages and natural disasters, i.e. to establish the conditions of safe waterway transport.

THE GOALS OF THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF WATERWAY EXPERT GROUP

On the one hand, making a survey of phenomena threatening the waterway transport on River Danube, monitoring compliance with the international and national regulations and requirements for the crew and safety of vessels participating in the waterway transport on River Danube, for the prevention of environmental pollution, and for the living and working conditions on board.

On the other hand, by the analysis of standards regulating the water transport and water safety on River Danube, the establishment of such a unified law enforcement system, which promotes the creation and maintenance of the security of waterway transport, avoiding the overlaps between the already existing forms of cooperation.

ACTIVITIES OF THE EXPERT GROUP

It is not easy to identify the scope of activities of the Safety and Security of Waterway Expert Group because of the diverse fields and the large numbers of relevant organizations, therefore two sub-groups – Waterway Transport Sub-group and Disaster Management Sub-group – have been created by the separation of the fields of activity.

Since Austria, Slovakia and Moldova have not delegated any experts to the sub-expert groups, thus the findings of the Expert Group do not reflect the position of these countries.

WATERWAY TRANSPORT SUB-GROUP dealt with the safety of waterway transport among which the following topics were covered:

1. Mapping out the function of national law enforcement bodies and authorities responsible for the safety and control of the waterway transport on River Danube. Review of certain national and international regulations related to vessels participating in the water transport and the most frequent offences:

In order to control sailing, working, leisure, sport and other activities as well as the means of waterway transport used for these purposes and to carry out the related criminal, law enforcement and procedural tasks, similarly structured waterway law enforcement bodies have been established in Germany, Austria, Slovakia and Hungary.

Some of these tasks, such as the ones related to smuggling of goods and human smuggling, are carried out by the border surveillance bodies of the countries, while the navigation related tasks are performed

by the navigation authorities belonging to the civil transport sector in the other member states (Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine) of the Danube region. The list of contact of the details of organizations fulfilling the authorities' duties related to performing the water transport activity is available on the www.danubeportal.com website, except for Germany, Moldova and Ukraine.

In Hungary, navigation and waterway transport related activities are regulated by the agreements with the United Nations, the European Union and the Danube Commission as well as international bilateral and multilateral agreements, contracts and the Hungarian legislation, primarily Act XLII of 2000 on waterway transport and Decree 57/2011 (XI. 22.) of the Hungarian Ministry of National Development on the order of waterway transport as well as the Regulations of Navigation, published as its annex. Within the National Police, a law enforcement body with a jurisdiction and a sphere of competence of its own has been established in order to carry out waterway law enforcement tasks and to control navigation and compliance with the waterway transport related legislation on the entire Hungarian section of River Danube. Beside law enforcement controls, a great number of agencies and authorities (environmental protection, navigation, water management, labour inspection etc.) carry out controls on River Danube within their own spheres of activity. Documents for navigation and related activities, water craft and crew are issued by the Hungarian National Transport Authority. On the Mohács Border Port which is an external border port of the Schengen Area, the controls are carried out together by the Hungarian National Police (the Water Police and the Border Police), the customs services of the National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary, the disaster management as well as the phytosanitary and veterinary services. The most frequent water transport offences are: incomplete or invalid documents of vessels and crews, disregard of resting and working times, water pollution and disregard of the current waterway and transport conditions.

In Bulgaria, the most important regulations for water transport are the act on seas, inland waterways and ports of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Danube navigation regulations on Danube ports. The competent organization for the controls of the water transport is the national shipping authority. On the Bulgarian section of River Danube, the main characteristics are passenger and cargo transport; part of the latter is the transport of dangerous goods. There is no difference between vessels involved in national and international transport. Permissions and other, water craft and crew documents are issued and registered by the shipping authority. The most frequent waterway transport offences are: disregard of resting and working times (cargo vessels) and lack of registry documents and permissions (sport and pleasure crafts).

In Croatia, waterway transport safety controls are carried out by the Border Police – in coordination with other law enforcement organizations of the Ministry of Interior –, the Navigation Safety Inspection, the Customs and the Water Management Inspectorate. Issuing and registering the permissions and the other, water craft and crew documents is the responsibility of the harbour master. The most frequent waterway transport offences and crimes are: discharge of polluted (ballast) water from the vessels, illegal border crossing, non-registered water crafts, illegal fishing and pilferage of goods. The number of inland waterway transport accidents is rather low.

On the inland waterways of **Germany**, the competent authorities to carry out controls are the Bavarian Water Police and the German Waterway Transport Authority. Permissions and other,

water craft and crew documents are issued and registered by the German Waterway Transport Authority (inland), the Southern Branch of the General Directorate of Waterways and Navigation and the Regensburg Water Management and Navigation Office (for the Danube) as well as the Bavarian Water Police and the Federal Police (migration). The most frequent causes of accidents are: insufficient number of the persons within the crew, disregard of resting and working times, lack of transport knowledge and of the current waterway and transport conditions. The most frequent waterway transport related crime is the outboard engine theft, these are typically transported on motorways in trucks.

In the territory of **Romania**, the competent authorities to carry out controls are: the Ministry of Environment and Forests, the Disaster Management Inspectorate, the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure, the Naval Authority, the Romanian Inland Navigation Training Centre and the port authorities. Permissions and other, water craft and crew documents are issued and registered by the Naval Authority. The most frequent causes of accidents are: technical problems, hydro-meteorological circumstances and human error.

Serbia and Ukraine did not delegate navigation experts to the Expert Group, thus the findings of the sub-group do not reflect the position of the above-mentioned countries on waterway transport safety.

2. Overview of already existing forms of law enforcement cooperation:

Between **Hungary and Croatia**, due to the contact point in Mohács the waterway law enforcement cooperation and information exchange is efficient. In many cases, contacts have been made concerning vessels drifted away, persons missing and other navigation related incidents.

Between **Slovakia and Hungary**, joint duties are frequently carried out on the common river border section.

On the common section of River Danube between **Bulgaria and Romania**, the authorities of the two countries control the border by means of joint patrolling, the permanent contact is provided by the common contact point between Romania and Bulgaria established in Giurgiu, available 24/7.

Between **Germany and Austria**, a general exchange of information is available.

SUMMARY

At the Expert Group meetings within the framework of the project, it has been established that there are significant differences in the law enforcement control of navigation, which varies from country to country, concerning both EU Member States and non-EU countries. The reason for this is that there are contradictions in the provisions of the international and national legislation in certain areas, so the same standard may be interpreted differently by the states.

The migration of the labour force from East to West is a typical phenomenon in inland navigation. Seamen who cannot find work in Member States in the Middle and Lower Danube section area frequently use the northern and western inland waterways of Europe. Consequently, the knowledge

of the vessels' crews of the waterways of River Danube may be insufficient and sometimes there are difficulties in communication due to the low level of language skills which represents a serious safety and accident risk. In order to mitigate this latter risk, the Expert Group formulated a recommendation for the Danube Commission, recommending a Latin alphabet language as a second language to use when filling out „shipping documents” in the states using Cyrillic alphabet (*Annex No. 3*)

The risk of accidents is also increased due to the mechanical condition of the relatively old fleet and the mass of the re-registered vessels originating from the Rhine countries and operated on River Danube. As a consequence of the increasing life-cycle of the vessels, their reliability considerably decreases which hinders the operation of the ships which often leads to accidents.

There are considerable differences between the regulations of the Rhine and Danube countries concerning crew, working hours and resting period. These differences are connected to the different national laws and regulations as well as navigation related collective employment contracts. Employers usually apply the most advantageous regulations, therefore nearly half of the labour force in the field of inland navigation work as employees while the rest works as independent entrepreneurs. According to the provisions in force, the classification of the vessel and the daily sailing times determine the number and composition of the crew. It is of utmost importance to enforce the crew related regulations because experience from controls show that these regulations are often disregarded. During the controls, it has been established that work schedules that include extensive daily working hours are practically general in inland navigation. Crew members mostly spend specific time periods on board and some live there on a permanent basis with their families, often without surveillance for babies or minors of their families. The related provisions determine resting times, but the crew must be (occasionally) available even during resting times. During the controls, usually sailing times of the vessels are checked, while the actual working hours of the crews are not. The rather awkward situation on board in which work can hardly be separated from private life represents a particular difficulty.

A recommendation for the usage of the unified minimum requirements for the criteria of controls and for the deficiencies that justify the detention and prevention of proceeding of ships has been set up in each member state. (*Annex No. 4 and 5*)

DISASTER MANAGEMENT SUB-GROUP focused on the following questions related to transportation of dangerous goods:

1. Overview of certain national and international regulations related to transportation of dangerous goods on inland waterways:

Directive 2008/68/EC integrated the previous wide range of regulations on inland transportation of dangerous goods. The Regulation to the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (ADN), done at Geneva on 26 May 2000, contains the rules pertaining to the carriage of dangerous goods on the European rivers, thus for the entire length of the River Danube. The ADN regulation has been promulgated in all relevant countries as a national legislation. Furthermore, additional national legislation is in force in most of the relevant countries concerning transportation of dangerous goods on inland waterways and its control as well as sanctions for offences.

In each country, the national legislation – in line with the state and authority structure of the country concerned, as well as with the role of River Danube in the economic policy and geopolitics of the country concerned – contains divergent rules for carrying out the controls. Thus, for example, the transportation related offences are sanctioned in different ways and at different extent. In the Danube Countries, the official control of dangerous goods transportation on inland waterways is extremely heterogeneous, thus the seamen and other organizations involved in transportation of dangerous goods (participants according to the ADN) face different requirements and different actions of authorities in each country. To a certain extent, it makes difficult for the participants of dangerous goods transportation on inland waterways to prepare for the cooperation with the authorities in the control.

2. Making a survey of national law enforcement bodies and authorities responsible for the security of the transportation of dangerous goods on River Danube:

In each country, the supervision exercised by the authorities related to dangerous goods transportation on inland waterways is diverse in terms of both authorities and other bodies authorised to control and methodology, details and efficiency of the controls.

The overview of the subject matter has revealed that there are considerable differences in the delegated countries to the Expert Group regarding the organizational structure of national law enforcement bodies and authorities responsible for the safety of dangerous goods transportation and for the supervision on the River Danube. (*Annex No. 6.*)

In Hungary, in addition to the Danube Water Police and the Hungarian National Transport Authority, the Disaster Management is authorised to control dangerous goods transportation on River Danube and to carry out the related duties. A similar structure of the official supervision is implemented in Serbia, where the controls are carried out by the disaster management bodies and police forces under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, as well as by the customs authority under the supervision of a separate ministry, in addition to the directorate under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport. **In Germany** this activity is carried out by the Bavarian Water Police, **in Bulgaria** by the Maritime Administration under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport, and by the Naval Authority **in Romania**. In Croatia, controls are carried out by the Border Police

– coordinated with other controlling bodies of the Ministry of Interior –, the Navigation Safety Inspection, the Customs and the Water Management Inspectorate. **In Ukraine**, the control of dangerous goods transportation is supervised by the Ministry of Infrastructure.

In Serbia, the Ministry of Transport is the main competent authority for controlling the transportation of dangerous goods on inland waterways, but in case of explosives the control is the competence of the Ministry of Interior.

In Romania, transportation of dangerous goods is usually controlled in the ports during loading and unloading. Controls en route may also be carried out, but this method is only applied in case of emergency. Sanctions for offences may be detention, discontinuation of loading or unloading, or even a fine of 50.000 Euros.

In Croatia – similarly to the practice in Romania –, control en route may be carried out in case of a suspicion, if it is ordered by the Border Police. Such controls are typically carried out in ports, in cooperation with other bodies (Ministry of Interior, Customs etc.).

In Germany, the control of dangerous goods transportation – both en route and in the ports – is part of the daily duties.

In Bulgaria, the navigation authority coordinates the controls in which port operators and the customs are also involved.

In Hungary, controls are performed primarily by the Disaster Management, partly in a pre-planned way, and partly as a matter of urgency, either en route on the vessels in motion or at the ports and in places of mooring as well as on other sites involved in dangerous goods transportation on inland waterways. In addition the Hungarian Disaster Management operates a 24-hour permanent control service at the Schengen border port in Mohács where all leaving and arriving vessels are controlled.

3. The option of data exchange supporting the control of dangerous goods transportation jeopardising safety of River Danube waterways has been assessed:

During the analysis of the option of data exchange supporting the control of dangerous goods transportation among the member states at the meetings, the Expert Group has assessed the data relevant from law enforcement and disaster management aspects, which are currently available in the RIS system, the aspects of extending the scope of data – particularly for the „history” data of vessels transporting dangerous goods and those involved in the transportation –, and the possibilities of using the retrievable statistics. The analysed data included i.e. the vessel traffic data of the AIS system, data referring to the mechanical condition of the vessels and also the data of the certificate of approval.

At the meetings of the Expert Group, the need for the creation of a central database for data collected during the control of vessels transporting dangerous goods has been raised as a recommendation in order to ensure that the authorities of each member state have access to one another's control results and to the results of previous checks of the vessel being controlled. However, this opportunity cannot be legally provided in many member states at the moment, for data protection reasons.

4. Harmonising the regulations related to dangerous goods transportation of the member states and elaboration of a standardized control methodology and system of documents:

During the project the members of the Expert Group have reviewed the documents used in each country for controlling the vessels transporting dangerous goods and they have agreed to prepare a standardized sample document to be applied for controlling vessels transporting dangerous goods and to publish that electronically.

The sample document, which has already been used for controls for several years, elaborated by the Hungarian National Directorate General for Disaster Management, has been tested in several countries for controls carried out during the Joint Operations (*Annex No. 7*). In addition, in accordance with section 3 of Article 4 of the ADN Agreement Parties the compliance with prohibitions and conditions stipulated for the transportation of dangerous goods was monitored. In order to help the implementation of the above mentioned, during the 3rd Joint Operation, the currently non-binding sample documents elaborated by the UNECE according to section 1.8.1.2.1. of the ADN Regulation has also been applied as a test (*Annex No. 8*)

Within the framework of the project, three Joint Operations have been carried out with the assistance of the liaison officers delegated from the participating countries to the Mohács Temporary Coordination Centre. In the course of the Joint Operations, the law enforcement organizations and the authorities of all relevant countries have carried out coordinated controls simultaneously in their own area of competence, on the vessels on River Danube, at the ports, on the public transport roads along the river bank and on the sites involved in dangerous goods transportation by the inland waterways. During the Joint Operations, the control of dangerous goods transportation was of special importance in addition to the controls by the law enforcement organizations aimed at detecting crime cases. The number of vessels and the amount of dangerous goods controlled by the Hungarian National Directorate General for Disaster Management during the Joint Operations are in the *Annex No. 9*.

With regards to the conclusions of the actions, it has been established that in several cases the same vessel and its cargo are repeatedly controlled by several authorities in several countries or even in the same country. This involves an unnecessary detention of the vessels and may cause a significant financial loss to the companies. Based on the feedbacks, in addition to the diversity of the forms to be completed, sometimes the long waiting time causes disadvantages to the companies involved in transportation. The en route controls applied by the Hungarian and German authorities, as well, reduce the loss of time. The introduction of a standardized, harmonised check list and the electronic vessel control system as a perspective goal may provide a satisfactory solution.

The results of the Joint Operations show that, in addition to the control of vessels transporting dangerous goods on River Danube, special attention should be paid to the preparation of terminals for the transportations as well as the control of the process of loading and unloading of dangerous goods and oil products in the ports. The safety of transport is fundamentally determined by the appropriate preparation of the transportation, the availability of the specified shipping documents, as well as the loading and unloading of dangerous goods in accordance with the relevant provisions.

In addition, it should be checked whether the transport companies involved have a safety advisor for the transportation of dangerous goods, whether the advisor carries out the duties stipulated in the ADN Regulation, as well as whether the compulsory training courses stipulated by the ADN Regulation have been carried out for these companies.

SUMMARY

The system of control of dangerous goods transportation on River Danube and the scope of the organizations authorized to carry out controls are very diverse in each member state. It is necessary to combine this diversity with the common basic standards established during the controls. Its main tool is a standardized checklist to be created for the documentation of the controls. The standardized checklist sample document also projects the establishment of common basic standards and the control practice on River Danube for the official control of dangerous goods transportation.

In addition, the elaboration of a common methodology for control would facilitate the activity of the authority and also the tasks of the vessel crew being controlled to a great extent. This methodology would be available for the colleagues in a „Methodological Manual” in the form of guidance during the controls carried out by the authorities. Thus it would make the controls more efficient, more professional, safer and quicker, which is a priority for the customers, too.

The repeated control of the same vessel and its cargo could be avoided by the creation of a central database containing the data collected during the control of a vessel transporting dangerous goods and by providing access to it for the competent authorities in order to ensure that the authorities of each country have access to one another's control results. This requires regulation at an international level in order to overcome the current data protection barriers.

The permanent operation of the Temporary Coordination Centre established in Mohács Border Port may provide an opportunity for the authorities to directly share authentic data on the vessels transporting dangerous goods, on the qualification of their crew, on the dangerous goods being transported and their quantity as well as on the mode of transportation.

CONCLUSIONS

The experts of the Safety and Security of Waterway Expert Group delegated to the DARIF project pointed out that the common actions of the Danube Countries are essential in order to efficiently improve life and working conditions on board, to reduce the number of vessels on the Community waters, which do not meet the international requirements to avoid shipping accidents, natural disasters and pollutions, i.e. to create the conditions of the safety of waterway transport.

They consider it appropriate to elaborate a common methodology for the controls.

They propose to formulate recommendations in order to create the best practice for dangerous goods transportation within waterway transport.

In the opinion of the Expert Group, access should be provided for the law enforcement staff of all countries to electronic samples of national documents of vessels and crew used in navigation.

They deem it necessary to create standardized checklists for the control of vessels transporting dangerous goods.

In the opinion of the Expert Group, the possible use of the new, modern technical equipment, solutions, information systems and technologies for law enforcement and disaster management purposes that supports the daily work of the authorities of the Danube Countries should be examined. Such equipment are e.g. radiation control gates, on-board radiation detection systems, radar-thermocamera-infra surveillance systems, special action vessels and on board equipment as well as rapid tests for testing chemicals can be applied quickly and safely on the board of a vessel being controlled.

The Expert Group proposes to elaborate an international agreement and to create a standardized database in order to ensure the exchange of information among the Danube Countries.

CHAPTER IV.

JOINT OPERATIONS AND TRAININGS EXPERT GROUP



BACKGROUND

Organized crime is more and more flexible, and operates both inside and outside of the borders of Europe, and it is still an important risk factor for the internal security of EU, and may have a destabilizing effect on third countries, too. The European Commission has defined it in a separate report that the EU should continue to adjust to the situation, give more definite answers to these challenges, and harmonize its activities performed inside and outside the EU. The operational cooperation between the authorities of the member states is of key importance in these efforts, focusing on priorities accepted at EU level within the policy cycle regarding organized and serious crime. Mutual trust must be deepened, and the application of common investigation groups and other joint operations supported from EU funds and through agencies should be increased.

THE GOALS OF THE JOINT OPERATIONS AND TRAININGS EXPERT GROUP

Firstly, the objective is to plan and organize the Joint Operations performed on the basis of the requirements of the member states, under the DARIF project, to work out operational plans that facilitate coordinated and precise implementation, and to work out and apply the uniform data exchange form that is essential for the collection of information. Secondly, synchronize the joint law enforcement operations carried out simultaneously in the ten DARIF member states, and exchange information on the operations. Thirdly, by summarizing the results of the Joint Operations, supply data to the law enforcement bodies of the participating countries, contributing to the more exact analysis and evaluation of law enforcement risks involved in the navigation on the River Danube, and to the performance of more efficient border control, water police control, customs and disaster management controls.

In order to achieve the above objectives at the highest possible standard, the Expert Group agreed to produce a common Danube risk analysis material to make the work of the parties involved in the control of navigation on the Danube more efficient. This effort was in line with the efforts of the Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group to create risk profiles, and extended them.

In addition, it was one of the objectives of the Expert Group to make recommendations on the possibilities of the implementation of similar joint operations and trainings in the future, and the possible ways of maintaining the long-term cooperation, also on the basis of the experiences collected during the operations.

ACTIVITIES OF THE EXPERT GROUP

Each DARIF member state, EU Agencies such as EUROPOL, FRONTEX, AQUAPOL and the EUBAM delegated experts to the Expert Group, who completed the tasks on the basis of a jointly agreed work plan and code of procedures. INTERPOL was involved in the 2nd and 3rd operations.

Member states involved in the project and the already mentioned international organisations delegated experts who had experiences in the areas of organising and synchronizing joint law enforcement operations and actions.

At the thematic meetings of the Expert Group, the experts shared their experiences, opinions and proposals regarding law enforcement risk factors generated by ship traffic on their own national

Danube sections, the results of earlier performed national and international law enforcement actions and operations, and the practical issues of organising them.

1. Preparation of the Joint Operations:

The experts agreed that the coordinated checks performed so far on their Danube sections – although several authorities or even several countries were involved – either identified low risks in connection with the most significant forms of organised crime, or there was no reliable information available for risk assessment, therefore, some of these unlawful acts remained latent. The analysis also highlighted the fact that the region of the Black Sea – including the Danube delta – represents a higher risk factor regarding illegal migration, smuggling of excise goods. All these risks rarely show up on the middle and upper sections of the Danube. Considering the fact that there is not enough tangible evidence to prove the presence of organised crime carried out by using river transport, the experts of the member states agreed that the ports of destinations should be controlled more carefully in the future, and more emphasis is to be laid on checking the goods during loading and unloading.

As to illegal migration, it happened sometimes that Syrian citizens were smuggled from the region of the Black Sea to the area of the EU, and this information calls for a more thorough check of vessels. Based on the experiences, when these migrants reach Romania, they proceed towards the Hungarian land borders, and some data indicate that they use boats, too, mainly on the Romanian river sections. The Serbian-Hungarian land border is a region of high risk in the respect of illegal migration, but the illegal migration channel from Russia to Ukraine and Moldova and from there to the EU should also be taken into consideration in the checking of the River Danube for law enforcement purposes.

The experts delegated to the Expert Group found it important to make sure that the Joint Operations organised during the DARIF project are organised as multi-purpose operations, at least as long as no reliable information is available about the risk factors. Joint Operations should primarily focus on checking the travel and other documents of the seamen, the detection of acts related to illegal migration and wanted persons, the search of the ships, and the rules of transporting dangerous goods.

The members of the Expert Group agreed also that the first operation would be a test of coordinated cooperation, and that would provide information on the risk factors, and facilitate the preparations for the next Joint Operation with proper analysis. During the 2nd Joint Operation – in the peak of the tourist season – a large number of passenger cruise ships would travel on the river, therefore the focus should be on checking the passengers in EUROPOL and INTERPOL databases, and the examination of the legal employment of the crew. The experts pointed out that the ownership of pleasure boats (motorboats, yachts) should be carefully checked, too, as these are sometimes stolen in the area of the EU, smuggled outside the Schengen Area and sold there. In the 3rd and last operation, special attention should be paid to the unloading of some cargo vessels that represent a risk, i.e. to the organisation of the checking of the ports in the country of destination, and this should be supported with preliminary traffic analysis or with criminal information.

The experts stated that all available databases should be used for the successful performance of the operations, including the national databases of the member states, the second-generation Schengen

Information System, the INTERPOL and EUROPOL inquiry possibilities, the data accessible through the FRONTEX contact points, and the AQUAPOL inland shipping law enforcement document database. These can work efficiently if, during the operations, the liaison officers of the member states carry out prompt inquiries and controlled fast and documented exchange of criminal information, with the help of the guest officers of the international organisations.

The above objectives and the well-organised joint law enforcement operations cannot be carried out without precise planning, and for this purpose, a Framework Operational Plan shall be elaborated and approved before each operation, and it shall be filled with contents jointly by the member states. In the course of the operations, uniform data exchange and offence detection reporting forms need to be used. The preparations and the work of the authorities carrying out the operations shall be facilitated by a risk analysis chart that is compiled by the member states jointly, relying on the offences detected by them, and later, on the Danube, this may function as a „Database of Suspicious Vessels”, which supports situation-awareness and profile creation. EUBAM and FRONTEX provided samples of earlier operational plans to facilitate the preparations, and these served as a good basis for the precise and detailed planning of DARIF operations.

2. Implementation of the Joint Operations:

The organisation of the execution of the 1st DARIF Joint Operation started in January 2014. The coordinator of the Expert Group planned the technical equipment and furniture requirements of the Temporary Coordination Centre, and was involved in its setting up. Following that, the draft of the first version of the Framework Operational Plan was elaborated, which was discussed with the experts of the member states, too, through electronic coordination. As the Framework Operational Plan synchronized the key implementation issues only, it offered proper flexibility to the member states for the preparation of their own national operational plans. The clear and simple but professional language of the plan ensured its identical interpretation among the various member states, and its logical structure facilitated the transfer of key pieces of information, so that they could be incorporated into the briefing on national sub-operations.

The parts of the Framework Operational Plan were as follows: the „Introduction” that defined the basic objectives of the DARIF operation, the „Operation Code”, the „Purposes and Objectives” that contained the priorities, the „Territorial Scope” and the „Time Period”, as well as the key issues under the „Implementation and Synchronization of the Operation” subtitles. The plan described the details of the operation of the „Temporary Coordination Centre of Mohács”, the „Collecting information, forwarding the reports, evaluation” tasks and the method of „Criminal information exchange” in separate chapters, and discussed their financing, and contained the contact data of the organisational units responsible for the provision of information exchange as well. The annexes contained the sub-operational plans of the member states, the list of liaison officers delegated to the Centre, and the first version of the data exchange form. The Framework Operational Plan was approved by the experts of the member states. (*Annex No. 10*).

The **1st Joint Operation** – under the coordination of the Hungarian Ministry of Interior – was performed on 7-11 April, 2014, with the involvement of the authorities of Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Bavarian region of Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine, as

well as FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EUBAM. The member states carried out their controls on their national Danube sections – according to their demands, the current law enforcement situation, their own risk assessment and reinforcement sources –, selecting certain objectives and tasks listed in the plan, and defining their priorities. The key objectives of the operation included the detection of human smuggling and of trafficking in human beings, unlawful acts related to illegal migration, document forgery, and activities of drug trafficking, smuggling of cigarettes and other goods, the search for wanted persons, general waterway law enforcement checks, completion of strengthened labour controls, and the control of the transport of dangerous goods on ships and in ports.

In order to improve the flow of information and the ability to respond, each participating member state operated its own national contact point, and delegated a liaison officer to Mohács, Hungary, who actively participated in the work of the Temporary Coordination Centre set up there, and were in continuous contact with their own national authorities. The work of the Centre was managed by the Hungarian coordinator of the Expert Group, with the involvement of one liaison officer from each listed international agency. The working language of the centre was English, and its tasks included maintaining of daily contact with the contact points of the member states participating in the operation, the prompt and mutual data exchange, the collection and forwarding of information on the status of the sub-operations of the member states, operational support with the help of EUROPOL databases, and the collection and evaluation of the necessary statistical data. On the days of the operation, the Centre operated from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. in the office set up in the border port, but the liaison officers were accessible even after that period of time, allowing for continuous contact. In receiving the information coming into the Centre, the liaison officers took full advantage of the mobile communication possibilities, the fixed and wireless internet connection, laptops and service mobile phones, and forwarded the answers as soon as possible.

An essential condition of the successful performance of the Joint Operations was the joint elaboration and approval of the data exchange form that ensures the flow of information. For the purposes of the electronically completed form, an excel table of multiple sheets offering easy management of numbers proved to be the best solution. The final data exchange form is included in Annex 3 to the Framework Operational Plan. During the implementation of the operation, the national contact points of the member states fulfilled their statistical data supply obligations by completing this unified form and sending it daily after summarizing the events of the previous 24 hours, by 10 a.m. on the day following the day of the operation, by e-mail, to the Centre. There the liaison officers checked the data provided, and then the data was summarized and sent out to the member states. The well-elaborated data exchange form recorded exact data regarding the staff and the vehicles involved in the operation, the inspections of vessels carried out, and the exchanged information, as well as the unlawful acts detected. The member states published details of the most significant daily results on the second and third sheets of the excel table, without providing personal data, and this facilitated the analysing and evaluating work, as well as the extension of the „Database of Suspicious Vessels”.

More than 650 officials of the involved authorities of the member states participated in the implementation of the 1st Joint Operation, they performed their tasks with 25 duty boats on an average per day, and with the same number of cars, and they checked passenger cruise ships, cargo vessels, sporting and pleasure boats, containers and ports of unloading. The number of pieces of

information sent to the Centre was below 30 on the days of the operation. The flow of information was realized directly through the delegated guest officers.

Most of the measures were taken in Austria, against third-country national crew members of passenger cruise ships anchored in Vienna, who had valid passports, but in the lack of proper visas and residence permits, their stay and employment in Austria was not legal. In Bulgaria, in the port of Somovit, and in Hungary, in the port of Mohács, a smaller quantity of smuggled cigarettes was found on Romanian cargo ships. In addition, the Hungarian authorities found a wanted person, too, and imposed large amounts of labour-, administrative-, infringement and on-the-spot fines. The Bavarian police took a high number of measures because they detected administrative shortages related to river transport on ships on the Danube.

Following the **1st successful Joint Operation**, on 13-14 May 2014, an Extra Technical Workshop was held in Budapest, where the conclusions of the implementation of the 1st Joint Operation were discussed. In the course of this meeting, the representatives of the member states shared their opinions with each other on ideas about the more efficient organisation of the **2nd Joint Operation** in July 2014, what tasks should be carried out during the operation, and how the work of the Temporary Coordination Centre at Mohács could be improved, and the flow of information made more efficient. In addition, the participants discussed the further development of the Framework Operational Plan and its annexes, with special attention to the data exchange form. The Expert Group worked out constructive proposals for the more efficient implementation of the **2nd Joint Operation**.

The experts suggested that the objectives and tasks of the 2nd Joint Operation shall be defined in a wider sense, and the implementation shall cover the Rhine–Main–Danube Canal, too. Based on the experiences, it was decided that in the course of the controls, the member states would put more emphasis on the checking of illegal employment (labour exploitation) and the transported containers. This requires the provision of more human resources and technical equipment in the affected member states, and it might be useful to collect preliminary transport information, too. They considered it important to use the EUROPOL databases more efficiently for the checking of available preliminary passenger and crew lists, in a way that all the available lists received in the electronic system of the border port would be forwarded to the EUROPOL guest officer, and checked in EUROPOL databases within a short time and in large numbers. In order to extend the possibilities offered by the available databases and inquiries, the involvement of INTERPOL was considered necessary in the operations.

The information transfer by the Temporary Coordination Centre may be made more efficient by strengthening the Hungarian staff, as in the summer traffic, the large numbers of data inquiries from the databases may produce more hits, which requires fast and professional measures among the member states, and that certainly needs coordination. Another requirement identified was the faster summarizing and forwarding of daily results after their receipt. The experts suggested the amendment of the Framework Operational Plan by adding situational pictures of the river sections of the member states into the text. The minor changes suggested on the Data Exchange Form may make the collection of statistical data more precise. (*Annex No. 11*)

The **2nd Joint Operation** was carried out on 21-25 July, 2014. The annexes of the improved Framework Operational Plan were extended with an annex describing the geographical location, characteristics of the vessel traffic and criminal features of the individual river sections of the countries. (*Annex No. 12*) The data exchange form was divided into two parts, the first part served the purpose of statistical data collection, while the second part included a separate table of the most significant offences detected on ships, so that the data contents match the risk analysis chart.

Similarly to the first operation, the **2nd Joint Operation** was also implemented as a multi-purpose operation; its objectives and tasks were identical with those of the first operation, but the controls were extended to the Rhine–Main–Danube Channel, too. The DARIF member states performed their law enforcement operational activities on three operational days, 22-23-24 July 2014, on the locations and in the periods identified in their national plans, in a synchronized way.

During this operation – similarly to the first one – each participating member state delegated a liaison officer to Mohács, to the Temporary Coordination Centre. The work of the Centre was conducted by the DARIF project manager, with the involvement of the Hungarian coordinator of the Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group, and of the Joint Operations Expert Group, and, for the first time, the guest officer of INTERPOL, too. The extent of the exchange of operational information has significantly increased during the days of the operation, information was exchanged on particular crimes on several occasions. All the crews and passengers of cruise ships passing the external Schengen border, together with their documents, as well as yachts were checked in the databases of both INTERPOL and EUROPOL. Altogether three hits were detected, and the competent authorities carried out the necessary procedures in their own competence, based on the information of the Centre, according to their national legal regulations.

In the completion of the **2nd Joint Operation**, in three days, more than 860 border police, water police, customs, disaster management and other officials of the ten member states took part, with duty boats, cars and technical equipment, reinforced with drug and cigarette sniffer dogs. During the operation they checked the vessels and the ports at the locations specified in their national sub-plans, based on their risk assessment. Most offences were detected in Romania, in the port of Sulina, in connection with illegal migration, and in Austria, regarding illegal acts committed by third-country national crew members of ships anchored in Vienna, and regarding drug trafficking at the unloading area. In addition a large number of illegal activities were detected in Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine, too. During this successful operation, the guest officers of INTERPOL and EUROPOL made more than 4 000 inquiries each in their databases, for persons, documents and vehicles.

Prior to the **3rd Joint Operation**, the German and the Hungarian customs authorities carried out a preliminary operational phase in the week before the operation, with the purpose of collecting initial information on cargo transport entering the Schengen external border and navigating upstream to the Bavarian Danube section, and forwarding the information for the more targeted inspection of German ports. Based on the previous experiences, the organisation of the operation of 10-14 November 2014 did not run into any obstacle. Its objectives, tasks and territorial scope were identical with those of the previous operation. The DARIF member states carried out their specific operations on the Danube on 11-12-13 November 2014 in a coordinated way, at the locations and in the periods defined in their national sub-plans.

Similarly to the previous operations, the Temporary Coordination Centre at Mohács worked efficiently. Almost 900 officials of the ten member states took part in the controls with duty boats, cars and technical equipment, and reinforced with sniffer duty dogs. The traffic on the river was not as busy as in the summer, and vessels and ports were checked at the locations defined in the national sub-plans. Most people were apprehended in Austria and Slovakia, but it was obvious that unlike in the previous operations, procedures were initiated mainly because of the infringement of river traffic rules, although the illegal employment of the members of the crew was still frequent, and quite a few wanted persons were arrested on the board of ships or in the vicinity of ports. During the successful operation, the guest officer of INTERPOL made 2 000 inquiries, while the officer of EUROPOL made 800 inquiries, with one hit. Results of the Joint Operations are summarized in *Annex No. 13*.

SUMMARY

The members of the Joint Operations and Trainings Expert Group – in line with the timetable of the project – successfully planned and organised all three Joint Operations, on the basis of the proposals of the experts of the member states. They elaborated the Framework Operational Plans, and jointly worked out and approved the necessary Data Exchange Form. The members of the Expert Group actively participated in the coordination of the actual implementation of the operations, in the operational data exchange, and in the work of the Temporary Coordination Centre set up in the Border Port of Mohács.

The most important results of the Expert Group include the creation of the DARIF Risk Analysis Chart, which was already available for the member states before the second operation. The table contains the details of the most significant offences detected on board of ships in the past 3-5 years, the name of the detecting law enforcement authority, the name and the identification number of the ship, its flag and type, the date and time and the details of the offence detected, including the place of hiding, too, in the case of smuggling. This chart is an excellent example for an efficient cooperation among ten countries, its first version has already recorded 70 offences detected on ships, facilitating briefings of staff and profiling activities.

More efficient cooperation has been established among the law enforcement authorities of the Danube member states, they shared their operational experiences with each other during the completion of joint tasks, shared their information regarding the checking of vessels, got an insight into each other's work, and learned the criminal and law enforcement features of each other's Danube sections. As a result of the successful organisation and implementation of the three Joint Operations, ability has been evolved to organize similar large-scale inland waterway law enforcement operations, its methodology and the best practice of coordination has been worked out.

All in all, it can be stated that the Expert Group performed beyond the expectations in the area of the results, as they did not only organize and coordinate the large-scale river law enforcement operations, but made the flow of information more efficient, increased the standard of analysis and evaluation work and situation-awareness, and improved the precision of profile creation, too. Its activity was in line with the EU best practices and recommendations regarding the control of inland waterway shipping. The experiences gained in the operation of the Temporary Coordination Centre may contribute to setting up of the permanent Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre operating on a permanent basis in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

The Joint Operations carried out under the project pointed out that similar joint actions will be necessary in the future, too, in order to strengthen the security along the Danube and reduce smuggling and the increasing illegal migration. The Expert Group recommends organizing at least one short-term joint operation in every year with pre-operational phase. It could be organized by a coordination team leading by the Danube countries in yearly rotation. Teamwork linked to the objectives of the operations shall be maintained by setting up a “Danube Task Force”.

For the sake of a more efficient information exchange, it is necessary to develop a special IT application or platform that is suitable for real-time information transfer about the checked vessels, for the collection of statistical data and the support of risk assessment, for exchange of information of destination ports of cargo vessels and to create and share a situational picture along the Danube based on risk analyses produced by the member states.

In order to further increase the law enforcement cooperation, the Expert Group considers it important to organize joint training activities (professional trainings, study visit about new technologies and on sea coordination and information centres) in the member states. Short trainings on the spot – using the professional knowledge of the guest officers deployed during the operations – could also be useful.

In the opinion of the Expert Group, it is necessary to examine what types of crimes can be expected to appear in the area of navigation on the Danube, and how the continuous update of common risk profiles with the information gained from the current trends of cross-border organized crime, can increase the efficiency of joint controls and operations in the future.

The Expert Group is of the opinion that the ability of efficient cooperation should be maintained among the law enforcement bodies of the member states along the Danube – following of the project – so that they could use the established information channels and act in a fast and coordinated way in the case of the occurrence of series of important phenomena affecting the whole European waterway network and representing security risks, such as organized smuggling or trafficking in human beings on vessels.

In order to tackle crimes related to illegal employment committed on the vessels navigating on the Danube, a permanent task force should be established by the participating member states.

Finally, the Expert Group considers it necessary to maintain the Forum System established by the pilot project and to provide a legal framework in an international memorandum. Moreover, it suggests to set up a permanent Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre – similarly to sea centres – with having a single point of contact for the river in every country, and to work out all the related additional project proposals and ensure the necessary financial sources.



CHAPTER V.

INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND RIVER INFORMATION SERVICE EXPERT GROUP



BACKGROUND

The Danube, as a Trans-European transport corridor, is crossing heterogeneous countries with different legal and law enforcement systems and procedures. The DARIF cross border and transnational cooperation mainly aims to harmonise the procedures and strengthen cooperation among the competent law enforcement authorities of the Danube.

The Information Exchange and River Information Service Expert Group contributes to the DARIF project by supporting the harmonisation and development of modern and efficiently utilizable cross border information services for law enforcement authorities along the Danube.

THE GOALS OF THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND RIVER INFORMATION SERVICE EXPERT GROUP

One of the goals of the Expert Group was the analysis and mapping of the actual situation of RIS implemented according to the 2005/44/EC Directive and in parallel to that to overview the role of RIS in the Danube law enforcement work. Further goals were the analysis of law enforcement information and surveillance systems relevant for Danube navigation and communication with the European RIS Expert Groups (ERI EG, VTT EG, NtS EG, Inland ECDIS EG) responsible for harmonisation and standardisation and with RIS Providers and other international organisations.

The Expert Group aimed to analyse the development projects with relevance to law enforcement information systems and to act as an intermediary between users at law enforcement authorities and project partners in order to ensure that the implementation of the project is according to the needs of users at the authorities.

The possibilities of exchanging RIS and other information among the Danube countries for law enforcement purposes were also intended to be analysed and the legal and technical problems to be mapped in order to seek common solutions.

The Experts Group's aim was to provide opportunities to present new and modern law enforcement purpose technical devices, solutions, information systems and technologies (such as radar-thermo-infra surveillance systems, special action and control ships, ship equipment and the use of GNSS technology) supporting the daily work of the Danube authorities. Its further objective was to plan the collection of law enforcement relevant RIS data and statistics (such as the ship traffic data of the Danube AIS systems) and to provide it for further analysis to the other bodies of the Forum.

ACTIVITIES OF THE EXPERT GROUP

After the preparation and elaboration of the draft working plan of the Expert Group the details were presented during the second day of the DARIF Kick-Off Conference. The participants and experts got answers to their questions after the presentations and during the breaks.

During the First Technical Workshop of the Expert Groups the experts delegated from the Danube countries discussed the topics at parallel workshops.

1. Analysis of the possibilities of exchanging RIS and other information among the Danube countries for law enforcement purposes and the legal and technical problems in order to seek common solutions:

The main services of RIS and its overview table were presented. Following an expert recommendation the results of the FPL7 Platina project among the previous projects relevant to the subject were also used. The idea of collection of RIS statistics was agreed to be discussed with other DARIF Expert Groups in order to clarify the type of data required by the relevant authorities and the planned purpose of the use of the data.

2. Analysis of the development projects with relevance to law enforcement information systems

The Experts Group also dealt with the topics of the standardised electronic passenger list in details and the Joint Operations provided an excellent possibility to gain experience about the Hungarian software application used uniquely at Mohács Border Port.

Reduction of administration burdens was identified as an important issue and with this aim the participants undertook the analysis of overlapping documents and procedures. There was a short overview of relevant law enforcement systems and the importance of Passenger Name Record (PNR) was emphasized for the Danube cooperation as well. The legal basis of the information exchange shall be tackled by the legal experts of the interior ministries of the Danube countries. An idea to use the Salzburg Forum as a cooperation structure for the Danube cooperation was also mentioned.

3. Analysis of law enforcement information and surveillance systems relevant to the Danube inland navigation

The participants agreed to discuss the possibility of a common IT solution serving to notify each other and to create a forum for the extension of Danube law enforcement cooperation. The importance of the presentation of new and innovative technologies was emphasised during the workshop. Technologies like drones, solid state radars, decoded AIS and VTS tools shall be introduced and discussed in details. At the meeting Romania presented the latest developments and devices of their RIS system. In order to facilitate awareness of latest technologies it is necessary to organise presentations and exhibitions involving system and service suppliers for the authorities.

The participants were informed about the AG Donauregion cooperation platform on trafficking in human beings, established in 2005 mainly among Upper-Danube countries that can be relevant for the DARIF cooperation. The results of the Hungarian-Croatian ship joint patrol could be useful examples during the DARIF Joint Operations. It was agreed that it is practical to form an EG team with different special experts from various backgrounds.

It was identified that the lack of common language is one of the most relevant problems in the Danube law enforcement cooperation, therefore, the use of IT multilanguage solutions (e.g. categorized event notification) should be supported.

Germany stated that many legal problems came up at the law enforcement data exchange, therefore the experiences of the contact points such as Mohács COPO and Giurgiu COPO should be used in the DARIF cooperation.

In Romania there is an inland navigation official document validity service on a website, which is able to check the validity of a document based on its number. The expert group suggested the use of this service during the DARIF Joint Operations as well. As the EU Hull Database will be finalized in 2015, it can also be useful. The experts recommended the introduction of mandatory use of inland AIS for the whole Danube.

4. The presentation of new, modern law enforcement purpose technical devices, solutions, information systems and technologies

At the plenary session of the **Extra Technical Workshop** the coordinator of the EUSDR Priority Area 1a presented their results of the analysis of administrative documents as they were relevant to the work of the Information Exchange Expert Group. The participants agreed to elaborate DARIF templates based on the IMO maritime documents.

There were further discussions about data exchange issues and new technologies and projects. An overview on law enforcement use of RIS was elaborated together with the partners. The problem of how to control joint Danube sections was identified during the meeting and the use of gasoline reports that are unknown in the maritime sector.

It was suggested to invite private technology supplier companies for the DARIF expert group meetings to introduce new technologies and latest developments to the law enforcement authorities. The EG coordinator presented this proposal to the DARIF project management.

Further analysis of RIS statistics revealed that they can be relevant for law enforcement authorities in the field of:

- ◆ resource management based on ship traffic;
- ◆ risk analysis and
- ◆ controlling suspicious tracks.

Members of the Expert Group studied and evaluated the results of the three DARIF Joint Operations and made their suggestions including that for the use of the Romanian application enabling the check of the validity of a given document to the Joint Operations and Training Expert Group.

SUMMARY

During the fruitful discussions many topics were identified as relevant for the future cooperation. The document analysis was one of the key topics which proved to be a crucial issue for the inland navigation sector as well. The first steps were done by the experts but the process has to be continued for sure.

RIS as a key technology is really important to be discussed and utilised in the daily work of law enforcement authorities along the Danube. The inability to exchange RIS data slows down the daily work of the authorities.

Concerning the legal background of the data exchange between the Danube law enforcement authorities, the members of the Experts Group agreed that solutions should be sought at expert level. Technically the data exchange is not difficult; the legal issues are the real obstacles.

The Information Exchange and River Information Service Expert Group suggested applications to be used during the DARIF Joint Operations.

CONCLUSIONS

The use of RIS is indispensable for the daily work of the Danube law enforcement authorities. The use of RIS statistics would allow more effective resource management and risk analysis.

The introduction of mandatory AIS use on the whole length of the Danube in order to better identify and track ships is deemed necessary by the Expert Group.

The usage of harmonised document templates and the launch of electronic ship reporting would be also important.

The legal background of information exchange (including the exchange of RIS and other types of data) shall be mapped with the help of legal experts of Danube countries.

Events and forums providing opportunities to the exchange of the results of latest innovative technologies, developments and current project shall be organised among the Danube countries in order to enable their use in the daily work of the Danube law enforcement authorities.

It is suggested to design and implement an IT platform to be the basis of the DARIF cooperation forum.

Based on their experiences at Mohács experts suggested the use of a harmonised European electronic passenger list (PAXLST) along the Danube.



RECOMMENDATIONS



The Final Conference of the project entitled „Setting up the Structure of a Danube River Forum” (hereinafter: DARIF) implemented between 1st July 2013 and 30th of June 2015 with the coordination of Hungary in partnership with the Republic of Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Germany and with the financial support of the Prevention of and Fight Against Crime Programme (ISEC) of the European Union was held at Budapest on 12-13 May 2015.

The Final Conference was held with the participation of high-level representatives and experts of the Ministries of Interior and law enforcement agencies of the countries involved in the project. The representatives of the European Commission, EU Strategy for the Danube Region, EUBAM, EUROPOL, INTERPOL, AQUAPOL, Danube Commission and relevant Hungarian governmental and non-governmental bodies were also invited to the conference. The aim of the event was to enable the high-level representatives of the countries participating in the project to evaluate the experience of the pilot operation and to discuss the concept of future cooperation by virtue of overviewing the results of the project.

At the Final Conference the representatives of the ten member states of the DARIF project (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine)

- ◆ desiring to improve the safety and security of the Danube transportation corridor;
- ◆ being aware that effective cooperation among the law enforcement authorities of their countries is of utmost importance for combating crime related to waterway transport;
- ◆ having reviewed the results of the experts’ work and the Joint Operations undertaken during the project and the proposals of the experts’ working groups;
- ◆ recalling the Joint Declaration adopted at the Kick-off Conference held on 17-19 September 2013 at Budapest and Mohács that served as a basis of the cooperation in the project;
- ◆ declaring the successful implementation of the project entitled „Setting up the Structure of a Danube River Forum”;
- ◆ underlining the importance of the joint action of the countries along the Danube river against illegal migration, serious organized cross-border crime, economic crimes using the Danube as their means, and actions threatening the waterway transport of the Danube River, the quality of water and the safety of the residents along the banks of the river;
- ◆ acknowledging that their active participation in the implementation of the project may not generate any further obligations;

unanimously made the following recommendations:

1. The continuation of the successful international cooperation started and deepened in the project shall be promoted in the future with the regular cooperation platform entitled the Danube River Forum that enabled the discussion of issues arising in connection with the safety and security of the Danube River transport at strategic and expert level being a good starting point.
2. Cooperation should be enhanced by means of the setting up of national contact points responsible for the security of the waterway in the member states and in order to ensure the fast and realtime information exchange a permanently functioning Coordination Centre should be established.
3. The correction of deficiencies of international law hindering the deeper and more efficient cooperation and the information exchange among the member states and the harmonization of the implementation of their common international obligations shall be promoted. With this respect the possibility of concluding a new international agreement or memorandum of understanding or the more effective implementation of existing agreements shall be examined.
4. The organization of joint operations further strengthening the safety and security of the Danube water transport shall be supported in the future using the results of the three successful Joint Operations of the project. These can be complemented by trainings organized for the experts of the member states and the law enforcement officials participating in the joint operations and for other officials.
5. More efficient controls and the reduction of the time of controls at the Danube shall be set as a future goal with the standardization and simplification of the documents and procedures used during the law enforcement control of the inland navigation on the Danube, the continuation of the exchange of experiences, the development and sharing of best practices, the promotion of the use of modern technology and the examination of the possibility of establishing an IT system and database supporting the work of the controlling authorities as possible means.



PROJECT MANAGEMENT



PROJECT MANAGEMENT



Ms Mónika Herczeg is the professional project manager of the DARIF. After graduation from the college she became appointed by the Hungarian Police and the Hungarian National Border Guard where she served in several leadership positions. She has been working at the European Cooperation Department in the Ministry of Interior of Hungary as a border management senior officer since 2011. She has great expertise in the coordination of the land border crossing point and surveillance tasks, tackling illegal migration and implementation of immigration procedures. Ms Herczeg is the national representative of Hungary on meetings organized by the EU Council at Frontier and Visa Working Groups and she is the acting deputy delegate nominated to the Steering Group of the EUSDR Priority Area 11. In the DARIF project she coordinates the work and activities of the expert group coordinators and she is responsible for the successful professional implementation.



Ms Gabriella Kocsis is the financial project manager of the DARIF project. She graduated from International Relations and International Studies courses, a specialization in Europe. From 2005 she works for the Hungarian Ministry of Interior under the department dealing with European Union and other international funds related to the sector of home affairs. She has major experience in the field of designing and implementing projects, from drawing up budgets, through conducting procurement procedures, till compiling financial reports and closing projects. Currently she has the position of financial project manager in several international projects. In the DARIF project she prepared the budget and its modifications, she is responsible for the due usage of the sources, for the compilation of ordering documents, contracts, acceptance certificates. She monitors the payments and is in charge of drawing up the financial reports.

Mr Péter Polgár is the professional project assistant of the DARIF project. He completed his BA degree at the Corvinus University of Budapest in 2012, and right after that he started his MA studies at the Central European University (CEU) in the Department of International Relations and European Studies. After graduation in 2013 he started to work at the European Cooperation Department in the Ministry of Interior of Hungary where his main tasks are to take care of the various administrative activities of the project, to prepare and organize events, compiling invitations, list of participants and practical information. He provides the professional project manager with support in the circulation of materials and he is responsible for collecting documents generated in the course of the project.



Ms Beáta Deák is the financial assistant of the DARIF project. She graduated from Tessedik Sámuel College at Békéscsaba as an economist majored in finances. After that she studied international relations at the College of Nyíregyháza. She has been working for the Ministry of Interior of Hungary since 2007, she has experience in the field of protocol issues and event organising. She started working on European Union funded and international projects in 2012. Currently she is the financial project assistant of two international projects. She helps the work of the financial manager, she updates databases, prepares ordering documents, contracts, checks invoices, and keeps contacts with the project related institutions.



EXPERTS



Ms Anna Vörös-Gyöngy is the legal expert of the DARIF. She works as a legal expert in the Ministry of Interior of Hungary at the Border Management and International Agreements Unit of the European Cooperation Department at the Ministry of Interior of Hungary. In the Ministry of Interior her main tasks include the preparation of bi- and multilateral international treaties on behalf of the Ministry of Interior of Hungary especially in the field of police cooperation as well as the preparation of the necessary proposals and draft legislation. In the framework of the project she is responsible for the mapping out of the international legal background necessary for setting up the Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Forum, for the lawfulness of the documents prepared by the expert groups, for providing guidance on the provisions regulating information exchange among the project members in international and EU law and for making recommendations for the legal framework of long-term cooperation.



Mr Gábor Balog is the coordinator of the Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group of the DARIF project. He completed his MA degree at the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University. He participated in several international projects. Mr Balog is the Head of Sub-unit for Organized Immigration Crimes, at the National Bureau of Investigation in Hungary. His work is to conduct internationally-related investigations and criminal proceedings in the field of organized crime related to illegal migration. His work includes making criminal intelligence analysis, cooperating with EU and non-EU bodies, conducting cross-border operations, joint investigations and leading undercover operations. In the project his main task is to map out together with other experts of the participating countries the modus operandi of crimes and criminals related to the Danube. He is responsible for preparing the risk analysis profiles that are necessary for the implementation of the Joint Operations and presenting best practices based on the data from the criminal work.

Ms Gizella Vas is one of the coordinators of the Law Enforcement Control Expert Group of the DARIF project in the field of border management. She graduated at the József Attila University, Faculty of Law, where she became legal expert. She has great professional and leadership expertise in the field of border management and migration. During her work she has been taking part in and has led various bilateral and international projects. She worked as JHA counsellor at the Permanent Representation of Hungary in Brussels in the area of frontiers, migration and Schengen matters. At the moment Ms Vas is the Head of Border Policing Department of the National Police Headquarters of Hungary. Her main task in the project was to set up a common control practice together with the delegated experts in the expert group in the field of border management concerning the passenger and goods transport on the Danube during the border and in-depth checks that meet the requirements of security and quickness.



Mr Ákos Czuczor is one of the coordinators of the Law Enforcement Control Expert Group in the DARIF project in the field of customs management. He graduated from the Pannon Agricultural University in Kaposvár, Bsc in 1992 and Msc in 1995, and then he completed the Corvinus University of Budapest in 2004 as customs manager. In 1999 he joined the Hungarian Customs and Finance Guard. Until 2011 he had been working in the Central Patrol Service in various positions, he has expertise in law enforcement and river patrol services. Currently Mr Czuczor's position is deputy general director of the National Tax and Customs Administration. His main task in the DARIF is beside the shortening of time of the customs control of the passenger and goods traffic, making proposal for those possible best practices that can support the work of the authorities taking part in the control of trafficked goods and tax-free usage of fuels.





Mr István Barnácz is one of the coordinators of the Safety and Security of Waterway Expert Group of the DARIF project in the field of water transport. He has professional experience of decades in the area of water transport and water security. He has been nominated to a number of positions the Hungarian National Police since 1979; today he is the leader of the Danube Water Police Office. During the last years, he had the chance to go into details of the topics of the multimodal usage of the Danube, its natural values and the protection from the harms caused by the river. He has paid attention to the work of the International Maritime Organization, the European Maritime Safety Agency, the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine and the Danube Commission since 2006. He is a member of the

AQUAPOL. In the project Mr Barnácz is responsible for the management of the Water transport subgroup, the mapping out of the phenomena endangering security of transport on the Danube, and for the setting up of a unified law enforcement system that facilitates and maintains the security of water transport while avoiding overlaps of already existing forms of cooperation.



Mr Sándor Kozma is one of the coordinators of the Safety and Security of Waterway Expert Group in the DARIF project in the field of disaster management. He graduated from Veszprém University of Chemistry in 1991 and then he gained 10-year work experience with several chemical enterprises and environmental agencies in the area of transport of dangerous wastes, their disposal, waste water treatment, air pollution and the measurement and winding-up of soil pollution. Since 2001 he has been working for the National Directorate General for Disaster Management within the Ministry of Interior of Hungary, now he is the Head of Department for Dangerous Goods Transport. During his more than ten-year-long activity in disaster management he was involved in the surveillance of

Hungary's dangerous factories under the EU Seveso II Directive as well as in the creation of the independent jurisdiction for controlling dangerous goods transportation by all means of transport and a methodology of law enforcement tasks for disaster management authorities. Mr Kozma has been paying particular attention to the control of dangerous goods transportation on inland waterways and to the development of related legislations and to the changes in legal background. In the project he is responsible for the coordination of topics related to dangerous goods transport on inland waterways and for the setting up of a unified control on the Danube.

Mr Ádám Kalmár is the coordinator of the Joint Operations and Training Expert Group in the DARIF project. He graduated from the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University in 1997 and in 2006 he also completed an MA degree. Since 1997 he has been a nominated officer of first the National Border Guard and then the Hungarian National Police. He has served in various positions at the local level of border control, now he is the Head of Aliens Policing Division of the Baranya County Police Headquarters. Mr Kalmár is greatly experienced in the field of border management, migration, Schengen-evaluation and joint law enforcement operations. He took part in several international projects as an expert or project manager. In the project his main tasks are the planning and organization of the Joint Operations according to the demands of the member states, the harmonization of the joint law enforcement operations, the implementation of the operational information exchange, and the summing up of the results of the Joint Operations as well as the recommendations for the training for the law enforcement organs.



Mr Gergely Mező is the coordinator of the Information Exchange and River Information Services Expert Group in the DARIF project. Now he works for the National Association of Radio Distress-Signalling and Infocommunications (RSOE) in Budapest as a Project Manager and as the Head of Project Management. He has long-time experience in designing and implementing EU-funded cooperation projects in the Danube region and in River Information Services (RIS). He has been working in several projects dealing with harmonized cross border RIS developments and law enforcement RIS applications. In the project he is responsible for the coordination of the working group, the examination of the possibility for information exchange among Danube region countries for law enforcement purposes and the listing of possible legal and technical problems.





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JOINT DECLARATION

„SETTING UP THE STRUCTURE OF A DANUBE RIVER FORUM” KICK-OFF CONFERENCE

17-19 September 2013, Budapest/Mohács (Hungary)

JOINT DECLARATION

The kick-off conference of the project “Setting up the Structure of a Danube River Forum” was held on 17-19 September in Budapest and Mohács (Hungary). The purpose of the conference was to display the aim of the project and the steps of its implementation.

The conference was held with the participation of high-level representatives and experts of Ministries of Interiors and law enforcement agencies of the countries involved in Priority Area 11 “*To work together to tackle security and organized crime*” of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (PA 11 member countries). The representatives of the European Commission, EUSDR, EUBAM, Europol, Baltic Sea Forum, Black Sea Forum, Aquapol, EU SEE Programme, Danube Commission, and relevant Hungarian governmental and non-governmental bodies also attended the conference.

The representatives of PA 11 member countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine),

desiring to improve the safety and security of the Danube transportation corridor;

being aware that effective cooperation between law enforcement authorities of their countries is of utmost importance for combating crime related to waterway transport;

recalling the Danube Security Conference held on 6-7 May 2013 in Munich within the framework of the EUSDR, where the Ministers of Interior of participating countries affirmed that the further upgrade of the centre in Hungary (Mohács) as coordination centre is regarded as a strategic project with an added value;

have agreed to declare as follows:

1. PA 11 member countries expressed their strong commitment to support the project “Setting up the Structure of a Danube River Forum” during its two-year implementation period. The project is coordinated by Hungary, with the partnership of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Germany, and with the financial support of the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme (ISEC) of the European Union.

2. They took note that the main goal of this project is the establishment of a regular cooperation platform, the Danube River Forum (DARIF) by mid-2015. The DARIF will enable participating countries to discuss arising issues in connection with the safety and security of Danube river transport and to take harmonised actions for better cooperation. Cooperation in DARIF will be performed at two levels: strategic decisions will be made by the Steering Group consisting of the leaders of the national law enforcement authorities, and practical cooperation will be carried out by Thematic Expert Groups. The detailed tasks and operational rules of DARIF are to be determined by the participating countries at the end of the project.

3. PA 11 member countries acknowledged the importance of the second goal of the project, namely, the establishment of Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre in Mohács (Hungary). They encourage creating synergies between common contact points and coordination centres operating in Danube region's countries while avoiding overlaps. The Coordination Centre aims to coordinate the performance of law enforcement tasks related to waterway transport (water and border policing, customs administration and disaster management) and to improve their efficiency by information sharing. Participating countries may enable its operation by deploying law enforcement officers or by maintaining direct contact with the Coordination Centre.

4. In order to ensure the implementation of the project PA 11 member countries support the operation of five Expert Groups (Criminal and Risk Analysis Expert Group – CRIMINAL EG, Law Enforcement Control Expert Group – CONTROL EG, Safety and Security of Waterway Expert Group – SAFETY EG, Joint operations and Training Expert Group – OPERATIONS EG and Information exchange and River Information Service Expert Group – INFORMATION EG) by delegating representatives of their competent national authorities. Each Expert Group will have two meetings (in the end of 2013 and in the beginning of 2015), where the participants may exchange views and best practices, identify common interests and possibilities for improving cooperation. In 2014 three Joint Operations will be also organised.

5. PA 11 member countries underlined that their active participation in the implementation of the project may not generate any future obligation. The experience of pilot operation will be evaluated and the concept of future cooperation will be elaborated and discussed at the Final Conference in the second quarter of 2015.

RISK ANALYSIS

Illegal Migration

General overview:

Illegal migration is a global and complex phenomenon which heavily influences lives of many people both in the countries of origin, transit and destination. Organised crime groups (OCGs) increasingly offer facilitation services involving the abuse of legal channels, which enables illegal migrants to enter the EU or to legalise their residence status within the EU after the arrival. OCGs are adept at exploiting weaknesses and loopholes in asylum legislation and facilitators instruct the migrants to follow an established modus operandi.

From the point of view of law enforcement agencies and subsequent policing, illegal migration poses great challenges at different levels, from influencing police activities protecting external border of the EU (illegal entry) to fighting OCGs exploiting migrants in their attempts to reach the EU.

- ◆ Most of the illegal migrants (81% of the total migrants) have tried to cross the borders through the green/blue border, as to avoid checks;
- ◆ The migrants mainly crossed illegally the land borders by foot or by vehicles, while crossing the maritime borders used boats, yachts or the migrants were hidden among the cargo in the ships.
- ◆ The starting points for most of the detected illegal migrants: countries in **Africa and Asia**;

Routes:

- ◆ Due to their geographical position, **Turkey** and **Greece** has been crossed by several migration routes towards Southeast Europe that is largely a transit area for illegal migrants on their way to Western Europe,
- ◆ The illegal migrants preferred the route via **Turkey–Greece–Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia–Serbia–Hungary** in the direction of Western European countries; while those from **Asia** (Syria, Iran, etc) are in favour for the route **Turkey–Greece–Bulgaria–Romania–Hungary** in the direction of Western European countries.
- ◆ **Romania is an important link** of the Balkan routes for migrants smuggled from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Morocco, also the route through Turkey to the Central European countries, the direct route to Hungary from Turkey through Romania, over the Black Sea is of considerable importance; this route seems to make shorter the distance between non-EU and EU countries at least with one border.
- ◆ From Serbia, the migrants continue further to Hungary and to lesser extent Croatia.
- ◆ **Destination countries** – Western European countries targeted e.g. **Germany, Austria**;
- ◆ Apart from the route through Greece to the Western Balkan countries, the **direct route to Bulgaria from Turkey is of considerable importance**; this route seems to equally go further to/across Romania and/or Serbia.

- ◆ The majority of migrants and potential asylum seekers enter into Croatia from Serbia across the eastern borders. The main channel for transferring migrants is directly from Serbia to Hungary, but parts of them are trying to enter the EU via Croatian territory.
- ◆ As a new modus operandi – migrants gain false travel documents and try to travel from peripheral ports which have occasional or seasonal connection to European destinations, especially during summer time.
- ◆ The number of migrants decreased at land borders because of additional measures undertaken and probably it will increase the number of migrants at sea and river borders.
- ◆ The eastern land routes might be reactivated (including Moldova and Ukraine); on the other hand, and due to the undertaken measures in Greece a more intensive use of the route via Black Sea could be expected.
- ◆ Since March 2014 until the present day, additional to the illegal migration cases with small boats on the seaside, Romanian Border Police has met another type of migration: migrants that come to Romania as part of crews on different types of vessels, like cargo ships, livestock carrier and then they seek (request) asylum here. Romania is just a way of accessing the European Union and it is not the final destination. Those cases were as follows:
 - ◆ On **8th of March 2014**, in **Constanta** port, General Cargo ship **Lady Didem** (IMO:8516598), under Panama Flag, Ship-owner: TEAM CHARTERING ISTANBUL, TURKEY; after docking in Constanta Port, the captain of the ship, a Syrian citizen sought (requested) asylum in Romania and was disembarked from the ship;
 - ◆ On **7th of June 2014**, in Braila port, Livestock carrier **Lady Azza** (IMO:6518425), under Moldova Flag, Ship-owner: Mina Shipping Co; the workers from the Port Border Crossing Point Braila, had noticed that on the crew list, consisting of 15 members, there were six additional members written at the end of the list. These six persons did not met the conditions of being listed as part of the crew, as it was mentioned in the FAL Convention (1965 Convention of Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic); in the crew list in the "Rank" column, four out of these six persons were mentioned as being the daughters of the ship owner, and the other two as being the sister and brother of the owner. The first 15 members of the crew were written in the "Rank" column with their ranks on the ship.
 - ◆ On **20th of June 2014**, in Midia port, Livestock carrier **Omega** Livestock (IMO: 6401218), under Cambodian Flag; one person, listed as being the cook in the crew, Syrian citizen, left the ship without informing the captain and without having a visa for entering Romanian territory;
 - ◆ On **23rd of June 2014**, in Constanta port, General cargo ship **Captain Omar** (IMO: 7396654), under Togo Flag; Ship-owner: Nawal Imp Exp; in this case, two member of the crew, Syrian citizens, left the ship without having a visa for entering Romanian territory;
 - ◆ On **15th of July 2014**, in **Constanta** port, General cargo ship **Marzuk** (IMO: 7396666), under Tanzania Flag; Ship-owner: Marzuk Shipping Co. LTD. S.A.; one member of the crew left the ship without having a visa for entering Romanian territory;
 - ◆ On **20th of August 2014**, in **Midia** port, Bulk carrier **First Bridge** (IMO: 9197129), under Belize Flag; Ship-owner: Overseas Maritime Carrier S.A.; one member of the crew left the ship without meeting the conditions for entering Romanian territory;
 - ◆ On **23rd of August 2014**, in **Midia** port, Livestock carrier **Karazi** (IMO: 8215807), under Sierra Leone Flag; one member of the crew left the ship without meeting the conditions for entering Romanian territory;

- ♦ On **9th of September 2014**, in **Constanta** port, General cargo ship **Nadalina** (IMO: 8215754), under Sierra Leone Flag; on 10th of September 2014, Romanian Coast Guard had been contacted and informed by the *Regional Centre for Accommodation and Procedures for Asylum Seekers in Galati*, that a Syrian citizen had presented to them and sought (requested) asylum. He was a member of Nadalina vessel that was docked in Constanta port, 200 km distance from Galati;
- ♦ On **29th of October 2014**, in **Constanta** port, General cargo ship **Christina** (IMO: 7615036), under Moldova Flag; one member of the crew left the ship without meeting the conditions for entering Romanian territory. He was listed in the crew list as the cook.

General Data about cases

Port Name	No. of cases	No. of migrants
Constanta	5	6
Midia	3	3
Braila	1	6
TOTAL	9	15

A total of 15 migrants in a period of nine months, sought asylum in Romania after reaching the country on vessels as part of the crew. **All of them were Syrian citizens.** Five cases happened in Constanta, three in Midia, one in Braila, which is a port in the maritime part of the Danube.

All these vessels have regular routes to Romanian ports, especially the livestock carriers.

In large view the main migration route, in this case, is from Syria to Turkish ports or Greek ports and then to Romanian ports.

The occurrence of this kind of migration in the last period is due to social disorder and military clashes in some Arabic countries, like Syria. Some of the migrants that sought (requested) asylum in Romania were family members of the crew or the ship owner.

Main nationalities:

- ♦ Migrants are mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Eritrea, Pakistan, and Myanmar.
- ♦ In most of the cases the migrants claim to be Palestinians, in order to avoid their expulsion
- ♦ Regarding the citizenship of smugglers, most of them are citizens of Turkey, or from Serbia, Romania and Syria. There are also smugglers from Germany.

Modus Operandi:

Smugglers range from individuals to well-organized trans-border criminal networks. In Europe there are some particularities depending on the country of origin of the illegal migrants. The OCGs involved in the smuggling of migrants are part of larger international networks acting across the countries along the migration route.

They develop their activities usually having responsibilities within their national borders and work together with other smugglers from the neighbouring countries. They are mainly involved in logistical activities such as transportation of the migrants, assisting in illegal border crossings etc. and also provide migrants with false documents.

The OCGs in migration related crimes are well structured acting in very organized manner and have good knowledge of the local and foreign legislation and procedures. Most of them are taking some countermeasures against the efforts of the law enforcement authorities. They have flexible approach changing the modus operandi depending on the situation, exploiting some legislative loopholes.

Crossing the water border using different watercrafts:

- ◆ In Moldova, the facilitators transported the migrants at the border area where the facilitators organized the illegal border crossing by boat on MD-RO river border.
- ◆ In Romania in 2013 and 2014, there were detected attempts of illegal crossings of the maritime border by persons from Syria, Afghanistan or Pakistan transported by fishing or tourist boats from Turkey.
- ◆ Future risk is the high number of migrants of Asian and/or African origins located already on the south part of the Danube in Romania

Abuse of asylum procedure:

- ◆ A common method to secure legal staying in transit countries is the application for asylum. During the asylum procedures, the migrants try to cross the border illegally and to continue their migration.
- ◆ Regarding the top citizenships of the migrants who attempted to illegally cross the borders during the period of asylum procedure, were from Afghanistan, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Iraq, Sudan, Palestine and Eritrea.

Visa fraud:

- ◆ Forgery of supporting documents to obtain original visa and then overstay in EU is an increasing phenomenon. This is the so-called intellectual forgery.
- ◆ It is very difficult to identify the unlawful acts during the control, because there are no physical changes in the documents.
- ◆ The main nationalities involved in visa fraud are from Egypt, Eritrea, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Philippines, Nepal or Sri Lanka;

Marriage of convenience:

- ◆ Marriage statement on false loving base, for financial gain, before the authority, is extremely difficult to prove. Married migrants after obtaining residence permit disappear in the EU, and there is no information about their whereabouts. The fraudulently obtained family status exempts them from proof of conditions.

Hiding in means of transport:

Illegal migrants of various nationalities try to travel hidden in various vehicles, mainly in trucks and lorries, and vans with Turkish or EU plate numbers. Drivers of these vehicles usually facilitate the migrants and embark them to the vehicles, in specially constructed hidden compartments. However, there are cases that drivers are not really aware that illegal migrants are hidden inside their vehicles.

- ◆ Small numbers of migrants, one or two were transported hidden in cars with Turkish or EU plate numbers.
- ◆ In Croatia a group of 50 illegal migrants were detected hidden in a wagon of a cargo train. This shows the migration activity in Croatia.

- ◆ Detected migrants hiding in trucks from organizers without driver's knowledge and/or in cargo ships from organizers without ship master's knowledge.

Using of forged documents:

- ◆ The Albanian citizens use genuine passports to reach the Schengen area (look-a-like)
- ◆ Most of the fake documents used by the migrants are from Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden
- ◆ Lots of the false documents are genuine Bulgarian documents /ID cards/. The intention of the migrants was to use them on a look-a-like basis.
- ◆ In Moldova the migrants from Syria, Pakistan, and India were detected at border crossing points using counterfeited documents (Turkish and Israeli passports).
- ◆ Several cases have been detected when Romanian nationals informed the authorities about the lost/stolen ID card during their stay in Hungary, documents that were later altered with the photos of Moldovan nationals.
- ◆ There were detected official Bulgarian documents (ID card, passport, driving license) used by Turkish, Moroccan and Tunisian migrants in order to obtain residence and work permission.

RISK INDICATORS AND IDENTIFICATION:

Controlling of water traffic between countries:

- ◆ Enhanced control of the **use of small inflatable or cheaper wooden boats** passing the border over Danube River **on the BG-RO, and RO-SRB border section along the Danube River.**
- ◆ Enhanced control of suspicious **fishing boats or tourist vessels** mainly on the south part of the Danube River in Romania with **Asian and/or African-looking passengers.**
- ◆ Enhanced controls of vessels that cross the Danube river from Serbia to Croatia, especially in the section from 1339 rkm to 1347 rkm

CONTROLLING OF PASSENGER SHIPS:

Suspicious circumstances:

- ◆ Unusual and nervous behaviour of the staff
- ◆ More passports than passengers
- ◆ Passports kept by the staff
- ◆ Staff talks instead of passengers
- ◆ Differences between the crew list and the number of crew members
- ◆ Passports are from migration source countries (*Syria, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Eritrea, Pakistan, and Myanmar*) or the most forged EU documents are used (*ID cards, passport of Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden*)
- ◆ Enhanced control of Turkish and Israeli passports
- ◆ Enhanced control of ships departing from peripheral ports which have occasional or seasonal connection to European destinations
- ◆ Enhanced control of ships that have direct connection to Black Sea maritime traffic (*including Moldova, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria*).
- ◆ Careful controlling of ships with passengers who identify themselves with humanitarian cards near the state border. (*Afghanistan, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Iraq, Sudan, Palestinian and Eritrea*)

- ◆ Enhanced control of workers from third countries such as *Egypt, Eritrea, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Philippines, Nepal or Sri Lanka* with Schengen visa;
- ◆ Detailed checking of entry conditions (*travel document, visa/residence permit, financial means, proof of reasons for entry, support documents, no hits on database*) passengers with valid visa (*Egypt, Eritrea, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Philippines, Nepal or Sri Lanka*)
- ◆ Enhanced control of third country nationals who request for entry based on marriage certificate.

Controlling of cargo ships:

- ◆ Enhanced control of Ro-Ro transport vessels carrying on board trucks and lorries.
- ◆ Enhanced control of cargo ships that have connection with start and transshipment point source (*Syria, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Eritrea, Pakistan, and Myanmar*) or transit country (*Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Hungary*) in terms of migration.
- ◆ **Ships from abovementioned countries, or about those transshipments consignments ships.**
- ◆ Enhance control of crew members' documents (specialization certificate, certificate of competence)

Proposed additional measures:

- ◆ Control of all travel documents in INTERPOL SLTD (*Stolen and Lost Travel Document*) database via the liaison officer delegated to Mohács.
- ◆ Control of all suspicious persons (staff or passenger) in EUROPOL AWF (Analytical Work Files) via the liaison officer delegated to Mohács.
- ◆ Control of all suspicious pleasure boats in INTERPOL SV (*Stolen vessels*) database via the liaison officer delegated to Mohács.

Trafficking in Human Beings

General overview:

The current prolonged economic crises, unemployment and the illegal labour market, the rising desire for migration toward richer countries and taking advantage from the opportunities of the legal/illegal labour market with the purpose of getting higher wages in the destination countries are very important factors, which determine the stability of the phenomenon of trafficking in human beings (THB).

The definition contains recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, the abuse of power, the position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person to be controlled, for the purpose of exploitation.

Women more often undertake prostitution work to complete their incomes, to substitute their lost jobs or to pay back their debts. This leads to the increasing of the number of victims, which makes the recruiting phase easier for the traffickers.

Primarily the sexual exploitation is specific, but also forced labour and exploitation for committing street crimes are the main exploitation areas for victims, but there were also cases of child pornography, forced marriage, trafficking of organs and tissues.

Routes/Destinations:

- ◆ The main destination countries for sexual exploitation are usually Western European countries, where prostitution is legal. (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and in some cases Poland, Cyprus and Greece)
- ◆ The traditional destinations of labour exploitation were: Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Spain
- ◆ The main destinations for the victims from the Republic of Moldova (while at the same time Moldova is a region in Romania) are Russia, Cyprus and Turkey.
- ◆ The trafficking for pick-pocketing and begging purposes aims as destination the countries of Western Europe (mostly France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria)
- ◆ Criminal gangs operated on various routes: Romania–Poland, Romania–Germany (for sexual exploitation), the Netherlands, South Korea, Serbia and Greece.
- ◆ At the Schengen border, Hungary is primarily a transit country and then a source country for women and children trafficked for sexual exploitation.

Main nationality of the victims:

- ◆ The highest number of identified victims were from Romania (896, among them 300 minors) Bulgaria (538) and Moldova (262) in 2013;
- ◆ In Greece there were a significant number of adults from Bangladesh.
- ◆ A rising number of boys (Bulgarian citizens) were involved in begging exploitation
- ◆ Albanian girls are exploited for prostitution; the main manner of their recruitment is offering jobs as dancers in different clubs.

Modus Operandi:

- ◆ Primarily the sexual exploitation is specific, but also forced labour and exploitation for committing street crimes are the main exploitation areas of victims.
- ◆ The modus operandi of the exploitation of forced prostitution is maintained in its classic form: false promises regarding paid jobs abroad as waitresses, exotic dancers, babysitters, hostesses etc.
- ◆ There were also identified cases of child pornography, forced marriage, trafficking of organs and tissues.
- ◆ Regarding the labour exploitation, in most of the cases victims seem to be exploited mainly in the agriculture, construction and forestry field, or illegally employed on the board of the ship.
- ◆ Regarding the traffic of pregnant women for selling the new-born babies to the organized crime groups (OCGs) appear to be organized on the base of the family/clan principals;
- ◆ The offenders/OCGs use “refined” methods (e.g. physical manipulation, financial forms, etc.) more often than violence;
- ◆ An increasing number of women are involved in THB, and their role is of growing importance in the recruitment, transfer and surveillance of victims;
- ◆ The control of the victims starts with retaining of their travel documents
- ◆ The traffickers target minors mainly for sexual exploitation, but also for begging or for other street crimes.
- ◆ The young girls (minors according to the law) are exploited mainly for sexual purposes, while the children more often for begging.
- ◆ Young girls were tricked for marriage abroad, touristic trips or better life.

RISK INDICATORS AND IDENTIFICATION:

Controlling of passenger ships:

- ◆ Enhanced control of passenger ships with Austrian, Dutch and German destinations
- ◆ Enhanced control of ships that have direct connection (not only waterway) to other destination countries (Belgium, France, Spain, Switzerland and Germany)
- ◆ Enhanced control of the staff of the ship in order to detect the illegally employed persons on the board of the ship, focusing on Indonesian and Philippine nationality.

Risk categories of passengers:

- ◆ Romanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Moldovan and Albanian origin, unaccompanied young girls with poor financial conditions and with a low level of education.
- ◆ Victims of other nationalities in Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Moldova and Bulgaria can be subjects of operation in Hungary, before trafficking in Austria, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Switzerland and the United States. Men from Iraq, Bangladesh and Afghanistan are trafficked through Hungary to the European Union countries and the United States for forced labour.
- ◆ Bulgarian unaccompanied young boys
- ◆ Young women from Bangladesh

Suspicious circumstances:

- ◆ Rude and nervous behaviour of the staff
- ◆ More passports than passengers or sailor certificates (without qualification or any task on board)
- ◆ Passports kept by the staff or someone else
- ◆ Transport vectors (vessels, boats and passenger ship) under flag of origin country: Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Moldova and Bulgaria on the list of suspicious ships at Black Sea and on the Danube;
- ◆ Using passports stolen from previous victims, whose photo resembles to the present user and falsified visa.
- ◆ Staff talks instead of passengers
- ◆ The presence of a woman holding a leadership role (others are afraid of her)
- ◆ Questions addressed to a female passenger are answered by someone else
- ◆ Victims are less or not cooperative with law enforcement personnel
- ◆ Passengers are shy and suspicious with authorities



Drug trafficking

General overview:

About one third of all organised crime groups (OCGs) in the EU are involved in the production and distribution of illicit drugs. Drugs production and trafficking are among the most profitable types of organised crime. Synthetics and new psychoactive substances (NPS) are produced in complex processes lacking control mechanisms; low quality products are used as precursors for synthetics. Cannabis (marijuana and hashish) remains the first ranked drug in terms of cases and quantities seized, compared to other type of drugs.

Routes:

More than 2000 kilograms of heroin and 260 kilograms of cocaine were directly related to trans-border trafficking. More than 70% of the total quantity of seizures was made at the border crossing points.

- ◆ Bulgaria is the most targeted EU entry point for heroin. Bulgaria is both a transit country and a depot and distribution centre.
- ◆ Cocaine arrives by sea via the port of Varna, and land routes mainly from Greece.
- ◆ Black Sea is a main transit points for maritime shipments from Latin America, and after the Balkan routes dominate as an entry point to the EU.
- ◆ Slovakia is a main transit country of heroin towards to EU Member States.
- ◆ Hungary is both a target and transit country trafficking of heroin and cannabis.
- ◆ An identified route of synthetic drug trafficking was Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria-Germany.
- ◆ Romania is a transit country for cocaine and heroin, the drugs arrive in Romania directly via port of Constanta and over the Danube from Bulgaria (through border crossing points [BCPs] and not only) (e.g.: 55 kg heroin seized in BCP Giurgiu – Ruse 16 may 2014, approx. 1.4 million euro).
- ◆ Turkey continues to play a major role in the transit of heroin coming from Afghanistan towards South East and Western Europe
- ◆ 79% of cocaine quantities were related to maritime transport
- ◆ The offenders change the routes and BCPs according to their links and benefits.
- ◆ Ecstasy, ethnobotanics/synthetic drugs, cannabis and marijuana is trafficked from: the Netherlands and Belgium, through Bulgaria and Turkey along the “Balkan Route” and from China to Western Europe.

Significant nationalities:

- ◆ Albanian speaking groups are active in trafficking of heroin, cocaine, and synthetic drugs.
- ◆ Vietnamese groups are active in trafficking of cannabis and synthetic drugs.
- ◆ Turkish groups dominate in trafficking of heroin and synthetic drugs with Bulgarian nationals. A significant number of traffickers has double citizenship (Bulgarian and Turkish).
- ◆ West African criminal groups are active in trafficking of cocaine
- ◆ Slovak nationals of Roma origin and Bulgarian citizens work together Turkish, Romanian and Albanian nationals.

- ◆ Related to heroin trafficking OCGs are composed of Czech citizens of Roma and Vietnamese origin.
- ◆ Most of the heroin and cocaine trafficking offenders are Greek, Albanian, Croatian, Bulgarian, Romanian citizens, the average age of the drug offender is 35-40 years, and they are males.
- ◆ The main organizers of trafficking synthetic drugs are OCGs consisting of Turkish citizens, located in the source countries, e.g. the Netherlands and Belgium. Couriers are used mainly by Turkish, Dutch or Bulgarian citizens.

Modus operandi:

- ◆ The most frequently used mode is “in transport”, meaning that drugs were hidden in the construction hollows or in specially built-in concealment of vehicle.
- ◆ Traffickers smuggle heroin hidden in their personal luggage.
- ◆ New trend is the engagement of Bulgarian nationals as couriers by West African OCGs trafficking heroin and cocaine to the Western European markets.
- ◆ There were cocaine seizure in Bulgaria, Varna West container Port; 12 cocaine packages were detected in container freight, hidden in two jet skis inside the container.
- ◆ There were cocaine seizure in Greece, Thessaloniki Port, there were more than 120 kilograms of cocaine hidden among legal banana cargo. (*departure country was: Ecuador, and the route was Panama-Malta-Greece-Belgium*)
- ◆ In 2013 Serbia reported the biggest seizure of cannabis in 2013, respectively 908.364 kilograms. A Macedonian lorry was loaded with kitchen furniture. Behind declared goods, in 17 big wooden boxes and in 4 small wooden boxes, the drugs were found. The cannabis was in packages covered with brown and silver scotch tape. The destination was Switzerland.
- ◆ In 2014 Romania reported that cocaine was seized in the port of Constanta that would have had to be transported by ship to Lebanon where it was to be sold for consumption. Its value was about 3 million Euro and the amount would have been increased. It was cocaine hidden in the paint cans.
- ◆ The method for trans-border transportation of herbal cannabis, in terms of encountered cases, was mainly passenger cars, buses and trucks, but in 12 cases (in Albania) fishing boats and speed boats were used.

RISK INDICATORS:

The possible types of concealment:

- ◆ “**in transport**” – the drugs are hidden in the construction hollow spaces or in specially built-in concealment of ship, sometimes supposed to be in fuel tankers;
- ◆ “**in freight**” – the drugs are hidden among the legal cargo, sometimes in containers;
- ◆ “**in luggage**” – the drugs are hidden inside the luggage;
- ◆ Enhanced control of suspicious fishing boats/speed boats/tug boats and barges passing the border on the Danube River between Bulgaria and Romania, and Hungary and Slovakia;
- ◆ Enhanced control of suspicious tug boats and barges which sail along the Danube coming from Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Hungary; information exchange is maintained through cooperation centres.

Controlling of passenger ships:

- ◆ Enhanced control of passenger ships that have direct connection (not only waterway) to Western Europe focusing on detection synthetic drugs.

Risk categories of passengers/staff:

- ◆ Passengers of Albanian origin or staff as couriers (*heroin, cocaine, and synthetic drugs*)
- ◆ Vietnamese crew or passengers as couriers (*cannabis and synthetic drugs*)
- ◆ Bulgarian and Turkish passengers especially those, who have double citizenship (*heroin and synthetic drugs*)
- ◆ Passengers of Western African origin as couriers
- ◆ Slovak and Czech nationals of Roma origin together with Albanian nationals
- ◆ Turkish citizens with relation (residence permit) to the Netherlands and Belgium.
- ◆ Average age of the drug offender is 35-40 years, and they are males
- ◆ Enhanced control of their personal luggage in order to detect hidden drugs.
- ◆ Low economic and social status of passengers are factors for being vulnerable to recruitment

Controlling of cargo ships:

- ◆ Enhanced control of container and cargo ships that have direct connection to Greek or Black Sea maritime traffic mainly to Varna, because the cocaine is mainly shipped from South American countries such as: Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Ecuador.
- ◆ Enhanced control of cargo ships that have direct connection to Black Sea maritime traffic mainly to Constanta.

Proposed additional measures:

- ◆ Usage of specially trained sniffer dogs on board of every suspicious vessel;
- ◆ Usage of special technical devices

Container Security

General overview:

Container shipping is the most important way of transportation of commercial goods from one place to another all over the world. Unfortunately, using the same routes, containers can be used to transport also illegal commodities such as drugs, smuggled cigarettes, counterfeit goods, hazardous waste, weapons, dual use commodities etc. The number of imported/exported/trans-shipped containers has an increasing trend because of the demand for imported goods and the financial growth.

90% of the world's cargo is transported in maritime containers, but only 2% is physically inspected by customs authorities, opening the possibility for illicit activities. The evaluation of the threats concealed in containers in South East Europe indicated that wide range of illicit commodities was transported using the container traffic. The most frequently seized illegal goods concealed in containers were counterfeited goods (17%), followed by cigarettes (15%) and drugs/precursors (14%).

Constanta port still holds the first place in the container market with, 684 059 TEU in 2012, followed by Novorossiysk, with 623 700 TEU.

Danube River is not always a better connection. Thresholds on the Danube waterway failure conditions in dry and cold winters, and lack specialized terminals on it hampers traffic to the port of Constanta.

Routes:

Romania is the gateway of goods from Asia to EU and container terminals are flooded with illegal shipments. The main supplier of counterfeit goods is China. Every week border guards and customs officers discover hidden container products in Constanta smuggled into the country. About 90% of the control actions, respectively unsealed containers lead to the discovery of smuggled goods. Also Belgrade and Budapest are hubs for containers on the Danube.

In direct service line ports Giurgiu, Turnu Severin, and Russe and other ports on the Danube to Belgrade and Budapest can serve as river transport container routes, following the express request of the customers. The advantage of using inland container transport is the lower price compared to other ports in Belgrade and Budapest and also in Rijeka, Thessaloniki, Bar ad Koper; and by offering a direct connection line between China and the Black Sea.

Modus operandi:

The most common method of transportation is "lining" container that is similar in appearance and weight of the officially declared products. Criminals take into account the risk that the cargo can be revealed, so usually send several containers of contraband to the same destination. About 50 000 pairs of shoes can be put into one container, with a market value of about 120 000 Euro. According to experts, it is not necessary that all container smugglers cross the intact control. If the container is

capitalized on the market, smugglers can take their money out. An EU report shows that Romania is among the top ten countries by volume of counterfeit goods.

Controlling of cargo ships:

- ◆ The highest risk origin areas affecting container security are: Asian and South American countries.
- ◆ Enhanced control of container and cargo ships that have direct connection to Greek or Black Sea maritime traffic mainly to Varna.
- ◆ There are three auto – scanners (mobile laboratory for customs control with X-rays, gamma rays), all works throughout the Romanian Customs: Giurgiuleşti customs office, Iron Gates 1 customs office and customs office Constanta South Agigea. Those can be used for container scanning after disembarkment.
- ◆ Enhanced control of container and cargo ships at the destination port.

Proposed additional measures:

- ◆ In order to detect illegal freights in containers different additional measures must be taken as acquiring sniffer dogs, providing special trainings for the personnel, gaining other portable devices and intrusive equipment (mobile X-ray units) and gathering intelligence information to detect illegal cargos.
- ◆ To set up a scanner system, which provides a three-dimensional X-ray analysis of the container within few minutes
- ◆ Enhanced control in the proximity of maritime or river ports where the containers are deposited.
- ◆ It is very important to control the containerised cargo through information-based risk analysis.

For the above mentioned considerations the following is required:

- ◆ Enhanced international cooperation facilitating intelligence sharing
- ◆ Fast communication networks through cooperation centres
- ◆ More accurate and reliable trade data in the pre-departure/pre-arrival proceedings
- ◆ Lower number of selected containers for submission to physical and technical (scanning) inspection
- ◆ Pre-arrival data provides customs administrations with the ability to “push the border out” virtually and decide whether to facilitate or intercept cargo or people before they reach the physical border.

RISK INDICATORS:

Checking containers is a challenge for law enforcement bodies involved in water traffic control. Therefore special emphasis should be put on the points of vulnerability, namely place of loading and unloading, and at the point of transfer or re-packing of the container.

Surveillance and physical (eye) control in port environment:

- ◆ Casing (photos/notes of movements)
- ◆ Following employees
- ◆ Studying routes
- ◆ Corporate espionage/theft

Suspicious circumstances:

- ◆ Lost/stolen uniforms
- ◆ Lost/stolen employee IDs
- ◆ Missing high security seals
- ◆ Collecting used seals
- ◆ Missing branded boxes/packaging material
- ◆ Attempting to pick up container without proper documentation
- ◆ Empty container with suspicious background
- ◆ Creating fake shipping documents/ghost company
- ◆ Shipping cargo to a fake address
- ◆ Monitoring response times to an incident
- ◆ Shipping unrelated un-manifested items
- ◆ Unanticipated problems on a routine basis
- ◆ Changes in behaviour and appearance
- ◆ Unusual requests and breaking from routine
- ◆ Paying in cash
- ◆ Weights, values, quantities do not support manifested cargo

Suspicious People

- ◆ First-time shipper
- ◆ Individuals who do not belong to staff
- ◆ Behaviour does not relate to location/area
- ◆ Types of questions asked
- ◆ Anyone asking a lot of questions, especially concerning routes or loads or drop-off times.
- ◆ Anyone watching company activities
- ◆ Trying to be unusually friendly with employees
- ◆ Testing the security system
- ◆ Posing as employees/vendors
- ◆ Enquiring about a vessel's security plan, schematics, and load plan
- ◆ Studying entrances and exits
- ◆ Acquiring information on dock worker movements and schedules



LETTER TO THE DANUBE COMMISSION




Mrs. Biserka BENISHEVA

**President of the Danube Commission
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Bulgaria to Hungary**

Budapest

Benczúr utca 25
1068

Dear Mrs. President,

Budapest, 6 May 2014

As we all know it, the Danube region went through considerable changes during the last few years. However, the significant increase in the field of the tourism and cargo transportation that took place on the Danube in the last twenty years is also implying the risk of the increasing organized criminality and serious crimes (smuggling, trafficking of human beings, black market activities) in the region.

The Hungarian Ministry of Interior, having assessed the risks, has worked out a project proposal entitled “Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Center” with the support of Priority Area 11 of the Danube Region Strategy of the European Union. The aims of this project are to increase the safety and security of the river Danube as a waterway, to take efficient and coordinated actions against criminality and organized crime connected to the waterway and to create a cross-border law enforcement cooperation. In the project, we have initiated the establishment of a platform system of cooperation for the national and international authorities involved in waterway transport (border police, river police, criminal investigation, disaster and civilian crisis management, transport authorities etc.) and, in order to coordinate our joint international activities, the setting up of a Coordination Center in the town of Mohács.

Within the framework the project “Setting up the structure of a Danube River Forum” (DARIF) related to the creation of a Danube River Forum, a kick-off conference was held in Budapest on 17-19 September 2013 with the participation of law enforcement agencies from ten Danube countries and various international organizations, including the Danube Commission.

Then we have continued our activity on 9-10 December 2013 with the 1st Technical Workshop for expert groups. One of the aims of the “Safety and Security of Waterway” Expert Group is to create a standardized system and practice of control requirements by the authorities during their law enforcement controls, including the standardization of certain



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documents and forms in order to decrease the administrative burden of the companies operating their vessels on the Danube.

During the meeting, the experts of the Member States have informed us about a problem they have been facing since last year controlling vessels flying the flag of Ukraine and Bulgaria: the sailing documents of the competent authorities are only filled out with Cyrillic writing and the notes are also made with Cyrillic writing. Therefore the controls have caused considerable difficulties to the authorities and the time of delaying the vessel has often increased.

In order to solve the above problem, the experts have unanimously initiated "a proposal by our Expert Group for the Danube Commission to issue a recommendation to get the vessel documents issued in a language using Latin script besides the one according to the flag so that issuing the documents in two languages using Cyrillic script can be avoided in the future."

Concerning the navigation on the Danube, the experts certainly accept the vessel certificates specified in the international Convention signed in Belgrade on 18 August 1948 and in the international legislation. However, this change would make the practical work of the authorities remarkably easier.

Considering the above mentioned facts, as the coordinator of the "Safety and Security of Waterway" Expert Group, I propose you to put our proposal concerning issuing vessel certificates and its verifiability in issue at the next meeting of the Danube Commission and to make a recommendation – similarly to the one concerning the identification marks of the vessels – to get the notes in the vessel certificate made with both Latin and Cyrillic writing.

As a confirmation of the above mentioned facts, may I ask you to take it into consideration that according to Section (3) Article 2 of the Directive 2009/100/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on reciprocal recognition of navigability licenses for inland waterway vessels, the vessel certificate must be issued in one of the official languages of the European Union.

I would like to avail myself of the opportunity to express my highest esteem and consideration to you and your colleagues and to wish you further success in your work.

Thank you very much for your support and cooperation in advance.

Yours sincerely



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coordinator

of the "Safety and Security of Waterway" Expert Group
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Co-funded by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union.

RETENTION OF VESSELS

Vessels, the condition of which does not allow for safe operation and sailing must be retained. In order to decide whether the deficiencies established on the vessel are serious enough to justify detention, the controlling authorities must assess the safety of the vessel, the prevention of pollution as well as the living and working conditions on board.

Serious deficiencies revealed during controls that justify the retention of a vessel:

1. lack of the following items on board:
 - a. valid documents;
 - b. specified composition and number of crew members complying with the compulsory resting times;
 - c. equipment specified for safe operation;
 - d. reserves sufficient for the planned route.

Retention of a vessel justified by several deficiencies established at the same time:

2. During the route, the vessel and / or the crew is unable:
 - a. to sail safely;
 - b. to handle and transport of the cargo safely and to monitor its condition;
 - c. to operate the machine-room equipment safely;
 - d. to maintain necessary the motor power and steering gear effect in order to keep the vessel moving;
 - e. to extinguish fire in any part of the vessel;
 - f. to abandon the vessel safely and fast and to take salvage measures;
 - g. to prevent environmental pollution;
 - h. to maintain the appropriate stability of the vessel;
 - i. to keep the vessel free from water appropriately;
 - j. to communicate in emergency cases if necessary;
 - k. to ensure and maintain safe and healthy circumstances on board;
 - l. to provide maximum information in case of accident.

Deficiencies that may justify the retention of a vessel:

3. Vessels that:
 - a. collided, stranded, ran aground or leaked on their course;
 - b. criminal procedure in progress against a crew member in connection with the vessel;
 - c. disregard of regulations related to discharge of toxic materials, sewage-water.

NAVIGATION SAFETY CONTROL

The aim is to achieve a high level of waterway transport safety and environment protection, according to which all parties involved in Danube transport are responsible for making sure that used vessels comply with the related rules and requirements. Controls are carried out differently in the Member States, so harmonization is a necessity.

Therefore, the professional rules which are necessary for the controls must be created and applied in all Member States in a standardized way, specifying minimal requirements or the controls. By a standardized use of the specified minimal requirements, the efficiency of the controls must be ensured in order to increase the safety of the vessels and to prevent environmental pollution by the vessels.

As a part of the control, it's a sine qua non to have access to the vessels and to the navigation documents after the control, regardless of the flag the vessel is flying.

Recommendations for the creation of the system of control criteria:

1. Control of the vessel documents;
2. Control of personal qualifications;
3. Control of suitability for sailing (alcohol and drug consumption, exhaustion);
4. Control of compliance with the resting times;
5. Control of the technical status of the vessel;
6. Control of the safety equipment;
7. Environmental control, illegal waste transport;
8. Water craft theft and smuggling (related fencing);
9. Cargo theft, pilferage;
10. Actions against illegal migration and human smuggling;
11. Actions against drug related crime, counterfeit goods, smuggling, custom fencing.

AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS

Romania	Romanian Naval Authority; 1, Constantza Port Precinct 900900 Constantza Romania
	Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure 38 Dinicu Golescu Blvd., Sector 1 RO-010873 Bucharest, Romania
Ukraine	Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine Department Safety and Security Division of Traffic Safety and Dangerous Goods Transportation 14, Peremohy avenue 01135 Kyiv, Ukraine
Germany	Wasserschutzpolizei-Zentralstelle Bayern / Central office of Bavarian River Police Friedrich-Ebert-Straße 10 91126 Schwabach, Germany
Croatia	Ministry of Interior Border Police Directorate Vukovarska 33, 10000 Zagreb Croatia
	Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Transport and Infrastructure Internal Navigation Sector Prisavlje 14, 10 000 Zagreb Croatia
Bulgaria	Ministry of Interior Chief Directorate Border Police
	Sofia 1000 29, Shesti Septemvri Str. Bulgaria

Serbia	<p>Department for Control of Trade and Transport of Dangerous Goods Ministry of Interior of Serbia</p> <p>Blvd. Mihaila Pupina 2 11070 Novi Belgrade Belgrade Serbia</p> <p>Ministry of Infrastructure, Sector for Water Transport and Safety of Inland Navigation, Harbour Master's Office at Novi Sad Beogradski kej 11, 21000 Novi Sad, Serbia</p>
Hungary	<p>Ministry of Interior – National Directorate General for Disaster Management, Department for Dangerous Goods Transport 1149 Budapest, Mogyoródi út 43. Hungary</p>

INSPECTION REPORT

on the inspection of vessels transporting dangerous goods

No.:/.....

(MASTER DATA)

1.	Inspection site:		river km:
2.	Date of inspection: Day Month 20	3.	Time of inspection: from AM/PM AM/PM
4.	Subject: Conducting an inspection in accordance with Article 5/A(1) and (2) of Act XLII of 2000 on water transport, during procedures by the professional civil protection body pursuant to the provisions of Government Order No. 312/2011. (XII. 23.) on the rules applicable to a single procedure to control the transport of dangerous goods by rail and inland waterway and to impose fines, and on the amount of fines applicable for individual irregularities and the general rules on the exercise of official authority connected with fining.		
Inspection authority: Directorate for Civil Protection			
name		position	rank
5.

6.	The representative of the Inspection Authority shall warn the client(s) and other parties involved in the procedure* of its rights and obligations set out in Article 5(1) of Act CXL of 2004 on the general rules of public administrative procedures		

DATA ON MOTOR VESSEL

7.	Distinguishing sign of the State:	8.	Name or number:	9.	Registration number:
10.	Number of ADN approval certificate:	11.	Type:		
12.	Number of staff:	13.	Number of other persons on the vessel:		
14.	Number of vessels towed, pushed or moved alongside by the motor vessel:	15.	Number of vessels towed, pushed or moved alongside transporting dangerous goods:		
16.	Are there dangerous goods in the cargo of the motor vessel?	<input type="checkbox"/> yes		<input type="checkbox"/> no	
17.	It has fulfilled its obligation to register in the RIS system:	<input type="checkbox"/> yes		<input type="checkbox"/> no	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

DATA ON THE VESSEL MASTER IN CHARGE

18.	Nationality:	19.	Name:	
20.	Date and place of birth:	21.	Number of ADN certificate:	
22.	Number of vessel master certificate:	23.	Number of identify card/passport:	
24.	Address (postal code, country, location, address):			

DATA ON TRANSPORT				
25.	Transport organization:			
26.	Seat/address (postal code, country, location, address):			
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF QUALIFICATIONS				
27.	Certificate supporting the qualification for the position of the staff::	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
28.	Expert qualification (ADN 8.2.1.3):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
29.	Expert for the carriage of gases (ADN 8.2.1.5):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
30.	Expert for the carriage of chemicals (ADN 8.2.1.7):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
31.	Document supporting the number of minimum safe staff:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
32.	Number of minimum safe staff:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
DOCUMENTS AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE VEHICLE/CONVOY				
33.	Ship's log:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
34.	ADN Regulation:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
35.	Written instructions:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
36.	Measurement log:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
37.	Emergency flooding alert plan:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
38.	Flammable gas detector certificate:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
39.	Blue cone (blue lamp):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
40.	Important grounds and findings established during the inspection by the person conducting the inspection (such as detailed facts, experiences and non-compliances, and list of deficiencies):			
41.	Statement of the client:			
42.	Statements of other persons presents:			
43.	Documents used and reviewed during the inspection:			

Making a copy of the documents reviewed: (When making an official copy, the "true and complete copy" inscription, a signature and stamp should be applied on the copy.)			
	Name of the document	ID (serial number)	Number of copies
44.

45.	Photo of the inspection	<input type="checkbox"/> taken	<input type="checkbox"/> not taken
	Photo ID		

46.	Video of the inspection	<input type="checkbox"/> taken	<input type="checkbox"/> not taken
	Video ID		

47.	Other: (such as name and list of seized documents or other items of evidence, reference to the correction of deficiencies or replacement on the site, retention measures and sampling):		
		
		
		

Attached to the Report:	Photos or videos	(pc)
	Copy of other documents number of documents/ (oldal)
	Supplementary data sheet to record the data on dangerous goods and the vessel:pc	ID:

I have read this Report and I agree with it, I acknowledge it and sign it as approval.

..... (place) (date)

For the inspection authority:
For the client:
Other person(s) present:

CLAUSE FOR THE REPORT: **

I have received a copy of the Report on the official inspection and (name of the document) .

....., Day..... Month 201.....

.....
Signature of the Client

Note:* In case an interpreter is used, as set out in Article 60 of the Act on the general rules of public administrative procedures and services, the person engaged as an interpreter shall be advised of the rights and obligations of interpreters, and this shall be recorded in the Inspection Report together with the statement of the person engaged as an interpreter.

Note:** If the Client or its representative inspected are at the inspection site, the authority shall hand over the Report on the site, while in all other cases it shall send the Report (the Clause for the Report will not be filled out) to the Clients involved in the inspection.

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA SHEET

Data on the inspection of vessels transporting dangerous goods and on the cargo*

No.:/.....

MOTOR VESSEL/TRAILER NO... **

DATA ON THE VESSEL				
48.	Distinguishing sign of the State:	49.	Name or number:	50. Registration number:
51.	Number of AND approval certificate:	52.	Type:	
53.	Number of staff:	54.	Number of other persons on the vessel:	
DATA ON TRANSPORT				
55.	Name of the vessel master:			
56.	Address (postal code, country, location, address):			
57.	Name of the recipient:			
58.	Address (postal code, country, location, address):			
59.	Place of loading:	Place of transhipment:	Place of unloading:	
60.	Mass of dangerous goods on the transport unit:			
61.	UN number of goods delivered:	Name of goods delivered:	Quantity of goods delivered:	
	
	
DOCUMENTS ON THE VESSEL AND THE CARGO				
62.	(Provisional) Approval certificate:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
63.	Certificate of Inspection of electrical equipment:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
64.	Certificate of Inspection of fire extinguishers and nozzles:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
65.	Vessel Classification Certificate:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
66.	Transport document(s):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
67.	ADN inspection list:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
68.	Loading plan for dangerous goods:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
69.	Certificate of container loading:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
70.	Heating instructions:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable

THE CARGO				
71.	Method of transportation:	<input type="checkbox"/> tanker	<input type="checkbox"/> transport in bulk	<input type="checkbox"/> transport of loads packages: <input type="checkbox"/> package <input type="checkbox"/> dry goods container <input type="checkbox"/> MEG-container <input type="checkbox"/> tank container <input type="checkbox"/> mobile tank <input type="checkbox"/> road vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> railway vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> other
72.	Authorization of transport of goods by waterway:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
PROVISIONS ON MARKING AND LABELLING				
73.	Administrative authorization (ADN 5.1.5):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
74.	Marking of packages and packaging (such as UN number or label):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
75.	Provisions on supplementary markings:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
76.	Marking of road or railway vehicle, containers, MEG-containers, tank containers, mobile tanks (large labels, orange plates):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
PROVISIONS ON TRANSPORT, LOADING AND UNLOADING				
77.	Handling and storage of goods:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
78.	Leaking or damaged packages:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
79.	Leaking or damaged tanker:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
80.	Arrangement of cargo:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
81.	Mixed loading prohibition:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
82.	Observing the ban on smoking and use of open flame:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
PROVISIONS ON PACKAGING AND TANKS				
83.	Provisions on the compliance and inspection of packaging, large packaging and large packages:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
84.	Provisions on the compliance and inspection of tanks:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
85.	Provisions on the use of grouping packing:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
86.	Provisions on mixed packing:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
87.	Provisions on the compliance and inspection of containers for goods in bulk:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable

EQUIPMENT AND PROVISIONS ON USE

88.	Fire extinguisher(s):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
89.	Fire extinguishing equipment:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
90.	Water spraying system:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
91.	Ropes (steel wire ropes):	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
92.	Individual protection equipment:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
93.	Special equipment:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
94.	Recipient(s) for the storage or collection of dangerous goods:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
95.	Material-specific absorbents and neutralizing substances:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
96.	Provisions on use in Section 9 of the ADN:	<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	<input type="checkbox"/> not applicable
Results of the inspection:		<input type="checkbox"/> inspected	<input type="checkbox"/> non-compliant	

I have read this Supplementary Data Sheet and I agree with it, I acknowledge it and sign it as approval.

..... (place) (date)

For the inspection
authority:

For the client:

Other person(s)
present:

Note: * To be filled out for each motor vessel (if transporting dangerous goods) and trailer inspected.

** Delete as appropriate.

CHECK LISTS

Standardisierte Schiffskontrolle gemäß 1.8.1.2.1 ADN für Trockengüterschiffe

Standardized vessel check in accordance with 1.8.1.2.1 of ADN for dry cargo vessels

Стандартизованная проверка сухогрузных судов в соответствии с 1.8.1.2.1 ВОПОГ

Contrôle standard des bateaux à marchandises sèches conformément à l'ADN 1.8.1.2.1

Kontrollierende Behörde / Controlling authority / Орган, проводящий проверку / Autorité effectuant le contrôle	
1. Name / name / фамилия / nom:	2. Liste Nr. / list No. / список № / liste No:
3. Anschrift / Address / адрес / adresse:	
4. Tel.Nr. / Tel. No. / № тел. / no de téléphone:	5. E-Mail / e-mail / e-mail / e-mail:
Ort und Zeit der Kontrolle / Location and time of the check / Место и время проведения проверки / Lieu et date du contrôle	
6. Datum / date / дата / date:	7. Uhrzeit / time / время / heure:
8. Wasserstraße / waterway / водный путь/ voie navigable: km/км:	9. Ortslage / location / место / lieu:
Schiffsdaten / Vessel data / Сведения о судне / Données relatives au bateau	
10. Amtl. Schiffsnummer / official vessel number / официальный № судна / no officiel du bateau:	11. Schiffsname / vessel name / название судна / nom du bateau:
12. Schiffstyp / type of vessel / тип судна / type du bateau <input type="checkbox"/> Motortrockengüterschiff / motorized dry cargo vessel / самоходное сухогрузное судно / bateau automateur à marchandises sèches <input type="checkbox"/> Trockengüterschubleichter / dry cargo barge / сухогрузная толкаемая баржа / barge de poussage à marchandises sèches <input type="checkbox"/> Schubschiff / pusher / толкач / pousseur <input type="checkbox"/>	13. Nummer des ADN-Zulassungszeugnisses und ausstellende Behörde / number of the ADN certificate of approval and issuing authority / номер свидетельства о допущении ВОПОГ и выдавший его орган / numéro du certificat d'agrément ADN et l'autorité l'ayant délivré:
14. Eintragungen im Zulassungszeugnis / entries in the certificate of approval / записи в свидетельстве о допущении / inscriptions dans le certificat d'agrément <input type="checkbox"/> 7.1.2.19.1 <input type="checkbox"/> 7.2.2.19.3 <input type="checkbox"/> Doppelhüllenschiff / double hull vessel / судно с двойным корпусом / bateau à double coque	
15. <input type="checkbox"/> Einzelfahrer / single vessel / одиночное судно / bateau isolé <input type="checkbox"/> Verbandsführendes Fahrzeug / vessel leading a convoy / судно, ведущее состав / bateau conduisant un convoi <input type="checkbox"/> Im Verband mitgeführtes Fahrzeug / vessel moved in a convoy / судно, включенное в состав / bateau compris dans un convoi Amtl. Schiffsnummer und Name des verbandsführenden Fahrzeugs / official number and name of the leading vessel / официальный номер и название судна, ведущего состав / N° officiel et nom du bateau conduisant le convoi:	
16. auf der Fahrt von / coming from / рейс из / en provenance de:	17. nach / to / до / à:
18. Beförderer / carrier / перевозчик / transporteur:	
19. Beförderte gefährliche Güter (UN-/Stoffnr.) / dangerous goods carried (UN-/substance No.) / перевозимые опасные грузы (№ ООН для веществ) / marchandises dangereuses transportées (No Onu/d'identification): <i>oder Kopie Beförderungspapier / or copy of transport document / или копия транспортного документа / ou copie du document de transport</i>	

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
Dokumente / documents / документы / documents						
20.	Hauptverantwortlicher Schiffsführer besitzt eine gültige ADN-Sachkundebescheinigung / responsible master has a certificate of special knowledge of ADN / несущий общую ответственность судоводитель имеет действительное свидетельство о владении специальными знаниями в области ВОПОГ / le conducteur de bateau assumant la responsabilité générale est titulaire d'une attestation d'expert ADN					1.6.8 7.1.3.15 7.1.5.4.2 8.1.2.2 (b) 8.2.1.2 8.6.2
21.	Lichtbildausweis für jedes Mitglied der Besatzung (sofern zutreffend) / means of identification for each crew member (if applicable) / удостоверение личности с фотографией для каждого члена экипажа (в соответствующих случаях) / document d'identification comportant une photographie pour chaque membre de l'équipage (le cas échéant)					1.10.1.4 1.10.4 8.1.2.1 (i) 8.1.2.8
22.	Beförderungspapier(e) / Transport document(s) / транспортные документы / Document(s) de transport					5.4.1 5.4.5 8.1.2.1 (b)
23.	Gültiges Zulassungszeugnis (für alle Schiffe in einem Schubverband oder gekuppelte Schiffe) vorhanden? / is there a valid certificate of approval (for all vessels in a pushed convoy or side-by-side formation) on board? / Действительное Свидетельство о допущении имеется на борту (для всех судов в толкаемом составе или счаленной группе)? / Le certificat d'agrément valide (pour tous les bateaux des convois poussés et formations à couple) existe-t-il à bord ?					7.1.2.19 8.1.2.1 (a) 8.1.2.6 8.1.2.7 8.1.8 8.1.9 8.6.1.1 8.6.1.2
24.	Stauplan / loading plan / Грузовой план / plan de chargement					7.1.4.11 8.1.2.2 (a) 8.1.2.8
25.	Weitere Dokumente vorhanden / other documents on board / Другие документы имеются на борту / Autres documents se trouvant à bord [siehe optionale Anlage / see optional annex / см. факультативное приложение / voir annexe optionnelle]					8.1.2

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / n'appliquable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
Beförderungsbestimmungen / transport regulations / правила перевозки / opération de transport						
26.	Beförderung zugelassen / transport permitted / Перевозка разрешена / Le transport est-il permis					1.5 3.2.1 Tab. A (8) 7.1.1.11
27.	Freistellungen zutreffend / exemptions applicable / применимые исключения / exemptions applicables					1.1.3
28.	Höchstmengen eingehalten (ausgenommen Doppelhüllenschiffe) / limitation of quantities (except double hull vessels) / Соблюдены максимальные количества (кроме судов с двойным корпусом) / limitation des quantités transportées (à l'exception des bateaux à double coque)					7.1.2.0 7.1.4.1
29.	Bei Containern auf Doppelhüllenschiffen: Stabilitätsbestimmungen eingehalten / in case of containers on a double hull vessel: stability requirements fulfilled / При перевозке контейнеров на судах с двойным корпусом: требования по остойчивости соблюдены / Lorsque des conteneurs sont transportés à bord de bateaux à double coque, les règles en matière de stabilité sont-elles observées [z.B. 1.07 der Verkehrsvorschriften / i.e. 1.07 of the traffic regulations / например, статья 1.07 Правил плавания / ex. art. 1.07 du Règlement de navigation]					9.1.0.94.2
30.	Zusammenladeverbote beachtet / prohibition of mixed loading obeyed / Запрет на совместную погрузку соблюден / interdiction de chargement en commun appliquée					7.1.4.2 7.1.4.3 7.1.4.4 7.1.4.10
31.	Nur autorisierte Personen an Bord / only authorized persons on board / только авторизованный персонал на борту / seules les personnes autorisées à bord					8.3.1
32.	Feuerlöscheinrichtung vorhanden / fire-extinguishing system available / система пожаротушения имеется / Système d'extinction disponible					1.6.7.2.1.1 9.1.0.40.1
33.	Feuerlöscheinrichtung im Maschinenraum / fixed fire-extinguishing system in the engine room / стационарная система пожаротушения в машинном отделении / système d'extinction fixé à demeure dans le compartiment des machines					1.6.7.2.1.1 9.1.0.40.2
34.	Elektrische Einrichtungen im geschützten Bereich an Deck mindestens „begrenzte Explosionsgefahr“ (z.B. Rettungsringleuchten, Beleuchtung) / electrical equipment in the protected area on the deck of at least limited explosion risk type / Электрическое оборудование в защищенной зоне на палубе по крайней мере с „ограниченной опасностью взрыва“ (например, подсветка спасательных кругов, освещение) / Equipement électrique dans la zone protégée du pont au moins avec « danger d'explosion limité » (ex. éclairage des bouées de sauvetage, installation d'éclairage)					1.2.1 9.1.0.52.1

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
Beförderungsbestimmungen / transport regulations / правила перевозки / opération de transport						
35.	Zutrittsverbotszeichen / notice boards prohibiting admittance on board / табличка „запрещен вход на борт“ / panneaux interdisant la montée à bord					8.3.3 9.1.0.71 9.2.0.71
36.	Rauchverbotszeichen / notice boards prohibiting smoking / табличка „курить запрещено“ / panneaux « interdit de fumer »					8.3.4 9.1.0.74 9.2.0.74
37.	Abdeckung der Laderäume / protection of holds / защита трюмов / protection des cales					7.1.3.22
38.	Lüftung der Laderäume / ventilation of the holds / Вентиляция трюмов / ventilation des cales					3.2.1 Tab. A (10) 7.1.1.12 7.1.4.12 7.1.6.12 9.1.0.12
40.	Stoffe mit HA10 an Deck im geschützten Bereich gestaut / substances with HA10 stowed on deck in the protected area / на палубе в защищенной зоне размещены вещества с HA10 / des matières contenant HA10 sont entreposées dans la zone protégée du pont					3.2.1 Tab. A (11) 7.1.6.14
41.	Versandstücke korrekt gestaut und gesichert / packages correctly stowed and secured / Упаковки правильно уложены и закреплены / emballages correctement stockés et fixés					7.1.4.14
42.	Kennzeichnung und Bezettelung von Versandstücken (Stichproben, Sichtprüfung) / marking and labelling of packages (sample, visual inspection) / маркировка и знаки опасности на упаковках (выборочная проверка, внешний осмотр) / marquage et étiquetage des colis (vérification par sondage, examen extérieur)					3.4 3.5 5.2 5.3
43.	Keine beweglichen elektrischen Leitungen im geschützten Bereich außer eigensichere Stromkreise und Kabel zum Anschluss von Signal- und Landstegbeleuchtung, Containern, Lukendeckelwagen, Tauchpumpen und Laderaumventilatoren / no movable electric cables in the prohibited area except intrinsically safe electric circuits and electric cables for connecting signal lights, gangway lighting, containers, hatch cover gantries, submerged pumps and hold ventilators / В защищенной зоне нет переносных электрических кабелей, кроме принципиально безопасных электрических цепей и кабелей для подсоединения сигнальных огней и ламп для освещения сходного трапа, контейнеров, рам люковых закрытий, погружных насосов и трюмовых вентиляторов / Dans la zone protégée il n'existe pas de câbles électriques portables en dehors de circuits électriques et de câbles de contact en principe sûrs pour les feux de signalisation et les lampes d'échelle de coupée, de conteneurs, de cadres d'écotilles, de pompes d'avitaillement et de ventilateurs de cale					7.1.3.51.2

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / n'applique	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
Beförderungsbestimmungen / transport regulations / правила перевозки / opération de transport						
44.	Bezeichnung / marking / маркировка / signalisation					3.2.1 Tab. A (12) 7.1.5.0
45.	Während des Ladens und Löschens: Evakuierungsmittel vorhanden (ab 1.7.2015) / during loading and unloading: means of evacuation available (from 1.7.2015) / Во время погрузки и разгрузки: имеются средства эвакуации (после 1.7.2015 г.) / au cours du chargement et du déchargement il existe de moyens d'évacuation (à partir du 1er juillet 2015)					14.3 7.1.4.77
Ausrüstung / equipment / оборудование / équipements						
46.	Persönliche Schutzausrüstung PP für jedes Besatzungsmitglied / personal protection PP for each crew member / Персональное защитное оборудование PP имеется для каждого члена экипажа / des équipements de protection personnelle PP existent pour chaque membre d'équipage					1.2.1 3.2.1 Tab. A (9) 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
47.	Geeignetes Fluchtgerät EP für jede Person an Bord / suitable escape device for each person on board / для каждого человека на борту имеется соответствующее спасательное устройство EP / des dispositifs de sauvetage EP existent pour chaque personne se trouvant à bord					1.2.1 3.2.1 Tab. A (9) 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
48.	Gasspürgerät EX mit Gebrauchsanweisung / flammable gas detector EX with instructions for its use / индикатор легковоспламеняющихся газов EX с инструкциями по его эксплуатации / détecteur de gaz inflammable EX avec sa notice					1.2.1 3.2.1 Tab. A (9) 7.1.2.5 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
49.	Toximeter TOX mit Gebrauchsanweisung / toximeter TOX with instructions for its use / токсиметр TOX с инструкциями по его эксплуатации / toximètre TOX avec sa notice					1.2.1 3.2.1 Tab. A (9) 7.1.2.5 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
50.	Geeignetes umluftabhängiges Atemschutzgerät A / breathing apparatus ambient air-dependent A / подходящий фильтрующий дыхательный аппарат A / appareil de protection respiratoire A					1.2.1 3.2.1 Tab. A (9) 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
51.	Zwei zusätzliche Handfeuerlöscher / two additional hand fire-extinguishers / два дополнительных переносных огнетушителя / deux extincteurs portables additionnels					8.1.4 8.1.6.1 9.1.0.40.3

Anlage zur standardisierten Schiffskontrollliste gemäß 1.8.1.2.1 ADN für Trockengüterschiffe Annex to the standardized vessel checklist in accordance with 1.8.1.2.1 of ADN for dry cargo vessels

Приложение к стандартизованному перечню проверок сухогрузных судов в соответствии с 1.8.1.2.1 ВОПОГ

Annexe à la liste de contrôle standard des bateaux à marchandises sèches conformément à l'ADN 1.8.1.2.1

Optionale Kontrollliste für Dokumente in Ergänzung zu Z 25 der standardisierten Schiffskontrolle

Optional checklist for documents in addition to No. 25 of the standardized vessel check

Факультативный перечень проверок документов в дополнение к пункту 25 стандартизированной проверки судов

Liste optionnelle de contrôle des documents en addition au point 25 du contrôle standard des bateaux

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
25.1	Großcontainer-, Fahrzeug- und Wagenpackzertifikate / large container, vehicle and wagon packing certificate / Свидетельство о загрузке большого контейнера, транспортного средства и вагона / certificat d'empotage du grand conteneur, du véhicule et du wagon					5.4.2 8.1.2.1 (b)
25.2	Schriftliche Weisungen / instructions in writing / письменные инструкции / consignes écrites					5.4.3 8.1.2.1 (c) 8.1.2.4
25.3	Abdruck oder elektronische Version des ADN mit der beigefügten Verordnung in der jeweils gültigen Fassung / paper copy or electronic version of the ADN with the latest version of its annexed Regulations / печатная или электронная версия ВОПОГ с прилагаемыми Правилами в действующей в соответствующее время редакции / un exemplaire sur papier ou une version électronique de l'ADN avec la dernière version en vigueur de son Règlement annexé					8.1.2.1 (d) 8.1.2.8
25.4	<i>(Deleted)</i>					
25.5	Gültige Prüfbescheinigung für Feuerlöschschläuche / valid inspection certificate for fire-extinguishing hoses / действительное свидетельство о проверке пригодности для пожарных гидрантов / certificat de vérification des dispositifs d'extinction d'incendie et des tuyaux valide					8.1.2.1 (f) 8.1.2.8 8.1.6.1
25.6	Prüfbuch für Gasmessungen, wenn in 3.2.1, Tabelle A, Spalte 9 ein Gasspürgerät (EX) oder ein Toximeter (TOX) gefordert wird / record of measurements if a flammable gas detector (EX) or a toximeter (TOX) is required in 3.2.1 table A column 9 / журнал проведения проверок состава газа, если в 3.2.1, таблица А, графа 9 требуется индикатор легковоспламеняющихся газов (EX) или токсикометр (TOX) / enregistrement des mesures si un détecteur de gaz inflammables (EX) ou un toximètre (TOX) est requis dans 3.2.1, tableau A, colonne 9					7.1.3.1.3 7.1.3.1.4 7.1.3.1.5 7.1.6.12 7.1.6.16 8.1.2.1 (g)

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
25.7	Abdruck der bi- oder multilateralen Vereinbarungen, die bei einem Transport in Anspruch genommen werden / copy of the bi- or multilateral agreements which are used for a transport / распечатка двусторонних или многосторонних соглашений, которые используются для перевозки / copie des accords bilatéraux ou multilatéraux appliqués pour le transport					1.5.1 8.1.2.1 (h) 8.1.2.8
25.8	Für Doppelhüllenschiffe: Lecksicherheitsplan / for double hull vessels: damage control plan / для судов с двойным корпусом: план борьбы за живучесть судна / pour les bateaux à double coque: plan de sécurité en cas d'avarie					8.1.2.2 (c) 8.1.2.8 9.1.0.93 9.1.0.95 9.2.0.93 9.2.0.95
25.9	Für Doppelhüllenschiffe: Stabilitätsunterlagen / for double hull vessels: documents concerning stability / для судов с двойным корпусом: документы об остойчивости судна / pour les bateaux à double coque: documents relatifs à la stabilité					8.1.2.2 (c) 9.1.0.93 9.1.0.94 9.1.0.95 9.2.0.93 9.2.0.94 9.2.0.95
25.10	Für Doppelhüllenschiffe: gültiges Klassifikationszeugnis / for double hull vessels: valid classification certificate / для судов с двойным корпусом: действительное классификационное свидетельство / pour les bateaux à double coque: attestation de classification valide					1.6.7.3 8.1.2.2 (c) 8.1.2.8 9.1.0.88 9.2.0.88
25.11	Prüfbescheinigungen über die fest installierten Feuerlöscheinrichtungen / inspection certificates concerning the fixed fire extinguishing systems / свидетельства о проверке пригодности для стационарных установок пожаротушения / attestations d'inspection relatives aux installations d'incendie fixées à demeure					1.6.7.2.1.1 8.1.2.2 (d) 8.1.2.8 9.1.0.40.2.9

TANK VESSEL CONTROL LIST

Standardisierte Schiffskontrolle gemäß 1.8.1.2.1 ADN für Tankschiffe

Standardized vessel check in accordance with 1.8.1.2.1 of ADN for tank vessels

Стандартизованная проверка судов в соответствии с 1.8.1.2.1 ВОПОГ для танкеров

Contrôle standard des bateaux conformément à l'ADN 1.8.1.2.1 pour les bateaux-citernes

Kontrollierende Behörde / Controlling authority / Орган, проводящий проверку / Autorité effectuant le contrôle	
1. Name / name / фамилия / nom:	2. Liste Nr. / list No. / список № / liste No:
3. Anschrift / Address / адрес / adresse:	
4. Tel.Nr. / Tel. No. / № тел. / no de téléphone:	5. E-Mail / e-mail / e-mail / e-mail:
Ort und Zeit der Kontrolle / Location and time of the check / Место и время проведения проверки / Lieu et date du contrôle	
6. Datum / date / дата / date:	7. Uhrzeit / time / время / heure:
8. Wasserstraße / waterway / водный путь / voie navigable: km/км:	9. Ortslage / location / место / lieu:
Schiffsdaten / Vessel data / Сведения о судне / Données relatives au bateau	
10. Amtl. Schiffsnummer / official vessel number / официальный № судна / no officiel du bateau:	11. Schiffsname / vessel name / название судна / nom du bateau:
12. Schiffstyp / type of vessel / тип судна / type du bateau <input type="checkbox"/> Motortankschiff / motorized tank vessel / самоходный танкер / bateau-citerne motorisé <input type="checkbox"/> Tankschubleichter / tank barge / наливная толкаемая баржа / barge-citerne	13. Nummer des ADN-Zulassungszeugnisses und ausstellende Behörde / number of the ADN certificate of approval and issuing authority / номер свидетельства о допущении ВОПОГ и выдавший его орган / numéro du certificat d'agrément ADN et l'autorité l'ayant délivré:
14. Eintragungen im Zulassungszeugnis / entries in the certificate of approval / записи в свидетельстве о допущении / inscriptions dans le certificat d'agrément	
14.1 Tankschiff des Typs / type of tank vessel / тип судна-танкера / type du bateau-citerne: <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> N	
14.2 Ladetankzustand / cargo tank design / конструкция грузовых танков / construction des citernes à marchandises: <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Drucktank / pressure cargo tanks / танк для перевозки грузов под давлением / bateau-citerne pour le transport de marchandises sous pression <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Ladetank, geschlossen / closed cargo tanks / закрытый грузовой танк / bateau-citerne à marchandises fermé <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Ladetank, offen mit Flammendurchschlagsicherung / open cargo tanks with flame arresters / открытый грузовой танк с пламегасителями / bateau-citerne à marchandises ouvert avec coupe-flammes <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Ladetank, offen / open cargo tanks / открытый грузовой танк / bateau-citerne à marchandises ouvert	
14.3 Ladetanktyp / type of cargo tank / тип грузовых танков / type des citernes à marchandises: <input type="checkbox"/> 1. unabhängiger Ladetank / independent cargo tanks / танк грузовой вкладной / citerne à marchandises indépendante <input type="checkbox"/> 2. integraler Ladetank / integral cargo tanks / танк грузовой встроенный / citerne à marchandises intégrée <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Ladetankwandung nicht Außenhaut / cargo tank wall distinct from the hull / стенки грузового танка не являются наружной обшивкой судна / les parois de la citerne à marchandises sont distincts de la coque extérieure	

15. ☐ Einzelfahrer / single vessel / одиночное судно / bateau isolé
☐ Verbandsführendes Fahrzeug / vessel leading a convoy / судно, ведущее состав / bateau conduisant un convoi
☐ Im Verband mitgeführtes Fahrzeug / vessel moved in a convoy / судно, включенное в состав / bateau compris dans un convoi

Amtl. Schiffsnummer und Name des verbandsführenden Fahrzeugs / official number and name of the leading vessel / официальный номер и название судна, ведущего состав / N° officiel et nom du bateau conduisant le convoi:

16. auf der Fahrt von / coming from / рейс из / en provenance de: 17. nach / to / до / à:

18. Beförderer / carrier / перевозчик / transporteur:

19. Beförperte gefährliche Güter (UN-/Stoffnr.) / dangerous goods carried (UN-/substance No.) / перевозимые опасные грузы (№ ООН для веществ) / marchandises dangereuses transportées (No Onu/d'identification):
oder Kopie Beförderungspapier / or copy of transport document / или копия транспортного документа / ou copie du document de transport

		(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	
	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
Dokumente /documents / документы / documents						
20.	Hauptverantwortlicher Schiffsführer besitzt eine gültige ADN-Sachkundebescheinigung / responsible master has certificate of special knowledge of ADN / несущий общую ответственность судоводитель имеет действительное свидетельство о владении специальными знаниями в области ВОПОГ / le conducteur de bateau assumant la responsabilité générale est titulaire d'une attestation d'expert ADN					1.6.8 7.2.3.15 7.2.5.4.2 8.1.2.3 (b) 8.2.1.2 8.2.1.5 8.2.1.7 8.6.2
21.	Lichtbildausweis für jedes Mitglied der Besatzung (sofern zutreffend) / means of identification for each crew member (if applicable) / удостоверение личности с фотографией для каждого члена экипажа (в соответствующих случаях) / document d'identification comportant une photographie pour chaque membre de l'équipage (le cas échéant)					1.10.14 1.10.4 8.1.2.1 (i) 8.1.2.8
22.	Beförderungspapier(e) / Transport document(s) / транспортные документы / Document(s) de transport					5.4.1 5.4.5 8.1.2.1 (b) 8.1.2.9
23.	Gültiges Zulassungszeugnis (für alle Schiffe in einem Schubverband oder gekuppelte Schiffe) vorhanden? / valid certificate of approval (for all vessels in a pushed convoy or side-by-side formation) on board? / Действительное Свидетельство о допущении имеется на борту (для всех судов в толкаемом составе или счаленной группе)? / Le certificat d'agrément valide (pour tous les bateaux des convois poussés et formations à couple) existe-t-il à bord ?					8.1.2.1 (a) 8.1.2.7 8.1.8 8.1.9 8.6.1.3 8.6.1.4
24.	Aktuelle Schiffsstoffliste vorhanden / up-to-date vessel substance list on board / На борту находится актуализированный список веществ, допускаемых к перевозке / La liste des matières transportables actualisée existe-t-elle à bord					8.1.2.1 (a) 1.16.1.2.5 7.2.2.0.1

25.	Weitere Dokumente vorhanden / other documents on board / Другие документы имеются на борту / Autres documents se trouvant à bord [siehe optionale Anlage / see optional annex / см. факультативное приложение / voir annexe optionnelle]					8.1.2
	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применима / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверено / non contrôlé	
Dokumente / documents / документы / documents						
26.	Während des Ladens und Löschens: Prüfliste vollständig ausgefüllt / during loading and unloading: checklist completed / Во время погрузки и разгрузки: перечень обязательных проверок заполнен полностью? / au cours du chargement et du déchargement: la liste de contrôle est-elle complètement remplie ?					1.4.3.3 1.4.3.7.1 7.2.4.10 8.6.3
Beförderungsbestimmungen / transport regulations / правила перевозки / opération de transport						
27.	Produkt(e) in der Schiffsstoffliste enthalten / product(s) listed in the vessel substance list / Включен ли продукт в судовой перечень веществ / Le produit est-il inclus dans la liste de bord des substances					1.16.1.2.5 7.2.2.0.1
28.	Vorbehalte aus der Schiffsstoffliste für das beförderte Produkt berücksichtigt / reservations in the vessel substance list regarding the transported goods observed / Учтены ли оговорки из судового перечня веществ для перевозимого продукта / Les exemptions de la liste de bord des substances ont-elles été observées					1.16.1.2.5
29.	Ladefall und Ballastfall gemäß Stabilitätshandbuch bzw. zugelassenem Ladungsrechner zulässig / loading and ballast condition allowed in accordance with the stability booklet on the approved loading instrument / Допустим ли данный вариант загрузки и балластировки согласно информации об остойчивости или утвержденным расчетам остойчивости при загрузке / Conditions de chargement et de ballastage autorisées conformément au livret de stabilité et aux calculs de stabilité approuvés lors du chargement					1.6.7.2.2.2 1.6.7.2.4 9.3.x.13.3
30.	Nur autorisierte Personen an Bord / only authorized persons on board / только авторизованный персонал на борту / seules les personnes autorisées à bord					8.3.1
31.	Feuerlöscheinrichtung vorhanden (und während des Ladens und Löschens in Einsatzbereitschaft) / fire-extinguishing system available (and ready for operation during loading and unloading) / система пожаротушения имеется (и готова к использованию во время погрузки и разгрузки) / Système d'extinction disponible et prêt à fonctionner lors du chargement/déchargement					1.6.7.2.2.2 7.2.4.40 9.3.x.40.1
32.	Feuerlöscheinrichtung im Maschinenraum / fixed fire-extinguishing system in the engine room / стационарная система пожаротушения в машинном отделении / système d'extinction fixé à demeure dans la salle des machines					1.6.7.2.2.2 9.3.x.40.2

33.	Dusche und Augen- und Gesichtsbath an einer direkt vom Bereich der Ladung zugänglichen Stelle / shower and eye and face bath at a location directly accessible from the cargo area / Душевая и умывальник для ополаскивания лица и глаз в доступном прямо из грузовых отсеков месте / douches et installation pour le rinçage des yeux et visage avec accès direct depuis les compartiments à cargaison					7.2.4.60 9.3.x.60
	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
Beförderungsbestimmungen / transport regulations / правила перевозки / opération de transport						
34.	Sichtprüfung der Lade- und Löschleitungen einschließlich der Ventile / visual inspection of the loading and unloading piping / внешний осмотр грузовых трубопроводов погрузки и разгрузки, включая вентили / inspection visuelle des tuyaux de chargement/déchargement (soupapes y comprises)					1.6.7.2.2.2 9.3.x.25
35.	Sichtprüfung Flammendurchschlagsicherungen und Hochgeschwindigkeitsventile (sofern zutreffend) / visual inspection of flame arresters and high velocity vent valves (if applicable) / внешний осмотр пламегасителей и быстродействующих выпускных клапанов (в соответствующих случаях) / inspection extérieure des coupe-flammes et soupapes de dégagement à grande vitesse					7.2.1.21 7.2.4.22 9.3.x.22.4
36.	Elektrische Einrichtungen im Bereich der Ladung mindestens „bescheinigte Sicherheit“ (z.B. Rettungsringleuchten, Beleuchtung) / electrical equipment in the cargo area on deck at least of certified safe type / Электрическое оборудование в пределах грузового пространства по крайней мере „гарантированного типа безопасности“ (например, подсветка спасательных кругов, освещение) / équipement électrique dans la zone protégée du pont au moins avec « danger d'explosion limité » (ex. éclairage des bouées de sauvetage, installation d'éclairage)					1.2.1 1.6.7.2.2.2 9.3.x.52.1
37.	Zutrittsverbotszeichen / notice boards prohibiting admittance on board / табличка „запрещен вход на борт“ / panneau interdisant la montée à bord					8.3.3 9.3.x.71
38.	Rauchverbotszeichen / notice boards prohibiting smoking / табличка „курить запрещено“ / panneau « interdit de fumer »					8.3.4 9.3.x.74
39.	Verschluss der Ladetanks und anderer Räume / cargo tanks and other rooms closed / грузовые танки и другие помещения закрыты / les citernes à cargaison et les autres locaux sont fermés					7.2.3.22 7.2.4.22
40.	Füllungsgrad von Ladetanks / degree of filling of cargo tanks/ степень загрузки грузовых танков / degré de chargement des citernes à cargaison					3 . 2 . 3 . 2 Tab.C (11) 7.2.4.21
41.	Bezeichnung / marking / маркировка / signalisation					3 . 2 . 3 . 2 Tab. C (19)

42.	Bei Schiffen in Fahrt: alle Abschlussvorrichtungen der Lade- und Löscheinrichtungen (d.h. Ventile und Blindflansche) geschlossen, alle Schrauben eingesetzt / for vessels under way: all shut-off devices and openings of the loading and unloading cargo piping closed, all screws fixed / для судов на ходу: все запорные устройства грузовых трубопроводов (то есть вентили и концевые фланши) закрыты, все болты использованы / pour les bateaux faisant route: tous les dispositifs de coupure des tuyauteries à cargaison (soupapes et brides) sont fermés, toutes les vis sont fixées					7.2.4.25.3
	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
Beförderungsbestimmungen / transport regulations / правила перевозки / opération de transport						
43.	Kofferdämme leer / cofferdams empty / кофердамы пусты / les cofferdams sont vides					7.2.3.1.1
44.	Keine Leckagen in Pumpenräumen unter Deck / no leaks in the cargo pump-rooms below deck / нет утечки в подпалубных отделениях грузовых насосов / il n'y a pas de fuite dans les compartiments des pompes à cargaison situées sous le pont					7.2.3.2.1
45.	Keine Lagerung von Versandstücken im Bereich der Ladung / no carriage of packages in the cargo area / упаковки в пределах грузового пространства отсутствуют / il n'y a pas d'emballages dans la zone à cargaison					7.2.4.1.1
46.	Keine Motorboote oder Personenkraftwagen im Bereich der Ladung / no carriage of passenger cars or motor boats in the cargo area / моторные лодки или легковые автомобили в пределах грузового пространства отсутствуют / il n'y a pas de canots à moteur ou de voitures dans la zone à cargaison					7.2.3.31.2
47.	Restebehälter und Slopbehälter / receptacles for residual products and receptacles for slops / емкости для остаточных продуктов и сосуды для отстоев / récipients pour des restes de cargaison et pour des slops					7.2.4.1.1 9.3.3.26
48.	Während des Ladens und Löschens: Evakuierungsmittel vorhanden (ab 1.7.2015) / during loading and unloading: means of evacuation available (from 1.7.2015) / Во время погрузки и разгрузки: имеются средства эвакуации (после 1.7.2015 г.) / au cours du chargement et du déchargement il existe de moyens d'évacuation (à partir du 1er juillet 2015)					1.4.3 7.2.4.77
Ausrüstung / equipment / оборудование / équipements						
49.	Persönliche Schutzausrüstung PP für jedes Besatzungsmitglied / personal protection PP for each crew member / Персональное защитное оборудование PP имеется для каждого члена экипажа / des équipements de protection personnelle PP existent pour chaque membre d'équipage					1.2.1 3.2.3 Tab. C (18) 8.1.5 8.1.6.3

50.	Geeignetes Fluchtgerät EP für jede Person an Bord / suitable escape device EP for each person on board / для каждого человека на борту имеется соответствующее спасательное устройство EP/ des dispositifs de sauvetage EP existent pour chaque personne se trouvant à bord					1.2.1 3.2.3 Tab. C (18) 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
51.	Gasspürgerät EX mit Gebrauchsanweisung / flammable gas detector EX with instructions for its use / индикатор легковоспламеняющихся газов EX с инструкциями по его эксплуатации / détecteur de gaz inflammable EX avec sa notice					1.2.1 3.2.3 Tab. C (18) 7.2.2.5 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle		(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
Ausrüstung / equipment / оборудование / équipements						
52.	Toximeter TOX mit Gebrauchsanweisung / toximeter TOX with instructions for its use / токсикометр TOX с инструкциями по его эксплуатации / toximètre TOX avec sa notice					1.2.1 3.2.3 Tab. C (18) 7.2.2.5 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
53.	Geeignetes umluftabhängiges Atemschutzgerät A / breathing apparatus ambient air-dependent A / подходящий фильтрующий дыхательный аппарат A / appareil de protection respiratoire A					1.2.1 3.2.3 Tab. C (18) 8.1.5 8.1.6.3
54.	Zwei zusätzliche Handfeuerlöscher / two additional hand fire-extinguishers / два дополнительных переносных огнетушителя / deux extincteurs portables additionnels					8.1.4.8.1.6.1 9.3.x.40.3
55.	Ergänzende Angaben zu Verstößen / supplementary information on infringements / дополнительные сведения о нарушениях / informations complémentaires concernant les infractions					

Anlage zur standardisierten Schiffskontrollliste gemäß 1.8.1.2.1 ADN für Tankschiffe

Annex to the standardized vessel check in accordance with 1.8.1.2.1 of ADN for tank vessels

Приложение к стандартизованному перечню проверок судов в соответствии с 1.8.1.2.1 ВОПОГ для танкеров

Annexe à la liste de contrôle standard des bateaux conformément à l'ADN 1.8.1.2.1 pour les bateaux-citernes

Optionale Kontrollliste für Dokumente in Ergänzung zu Z 25 der standardisierten Schiffskontrolle

Optional checklist for documents in addition to No. 25 of the standardized vessel check

Факультативный перечень проверок документов в дополнение к пункту 25 стандартизированной проверки судов

Liste optionnelle de contrôle des documents en addition au point 25 du contrôle standard des bateaux

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôle	
25.1	Schriftliche Weisungen / instructions in writing / письменные инструкции / consignes écrites					5.4.3 8.1.2.1 (c) 8.1.2.4 8.1.2.9
25.2	Abdruck oder elektronische Version des ADN mit der beigefügten Verordnung in der jeweils gültigen Fassung / paper copy or electronic version of the ADN with the latest version of its annexed Regulations / печатная или электронная версия ВОПОГ с прилагаемыми Правилами в действующей в соответствующее время редакции / un exemplaire sur papier ou une version électronique de l'ADN avec la dernière version en vigueur de son Règlement annexé					8.1.2.1 (d) 8.1.2.8
25.3	Gültige Prüfbescheinigung für elektrische Einrichtungen / valid inspection certificate for electrical installations / действительное свидетельство о проверке пригодности для электрического оборудования / certificat de vérification des installations électriques valide					8.1.2.1 (e) 8.1.2.8 8.1.7
25.4	(Deleted)					
25.5	Gültige Prüfbescheinigung für Feuerlöschschläuche / valid inspection certificate for fire-extinguishing hoses / действительное свидетельство о проверке пригодности для пожарных гидрантов / certificat de vérification des dispositifs d'extinction d'incendie et des tuyaux valide					8.1.2.1 (f) 8.1.2.8 8.1.6.1
25.6	Prüfbuch für Gasmessungen, wenn in 3.2.3.2, Tabelle C, Spalte 18 ein Gasspürgerät (EX) oder ein Toximeter (TOX) gefordert wird / a control book if a flammable gas detector (EX) or a toximeter (TOX) is required in 3.2.3.2 Table C column 18 / журнал проведения проверок состава газа, если в 3.2.3.2, таблица C, графа 18 требуется индикатор легковоспламеняющихся газов (EX) или токсикометр (TOX) / carnet de controle si un détecteur de gaz inflammables (EX) ou un toximètre (TOX) est requis dans 3.2.3.2, tableau C, colonne 18					7.2.3.1.4 7.2.3.1.5 8.1.2.1 (g) 8.1.2.8

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
25.7	Abdruck der bi- oder multilateralen Vereinbarungen, die bei einem Transport in Anspruch genommen werden / copy of the bi- or multilateral agreements which are used for a transport / распечатка двусторонних или многосторонних соглашений, которые используются для перевозки / copie des accords bilatéraux ou multilatéraux appliqués pour le transport					1.5.1 8.1.2.1 (h) 8.1.2.8
25.8	Stauplan / loading plan / Грузовой план / plan de chargement					7.2.4.11.2 8.1.2.3 (a) 8.1.2.8
25.9	Lecksicherheitsplan / damage control plan / план борьбы за живучесть судна / plan de sécurité en cas d'avarie					1.6.7.2.2.2 8.1.2.3 (c) 8.1.2.8 9.3.x.13 9.3.x.14 9.3.x.15
25.10	Unterlagen für die elektrischen Anlagen / documents concerning the electrical installations / документы на электрическое оборудование / documents relatifs aux installations électriques					8.1.2.3 (d) 8.1.2.8 9.3.x.50
25.11	Gültiges Klassifikationszeugnis / valid classification certificate / действительное классификационное свидетельство / attestation de classification valide					1.6.7.2.2.2 1.6.7.3 8.1.2.3 (e) 8.1.2.8 9.3.x.8
25.12	Bescheinigung über die Gasspüranlagen (sofern zutreffend) / flammable gas detector certificate (if applicable) / (в соответствующих случаях) свидетельство для индикаторов легковоспламеняющихся газов / attestation relative aux détecteurs de gaz inflammables (le cas échéant)					8.1.2.3 (f) 8.1.2.8 9.3.x.8.3 9.3.3.8.4 9.3.x.52.3
25.13	Gültige Prüfbescheinigung für die für das Laden und Löschen benutzten Schlauchleitungen / valid inspection certificate for hose assemblies used for loading and unloading / действительное свидетельство о проверке пригодности для грузовых трубопроводов погрузки и разгрузки / attestation relative au contrôle des tuyauteries flexibles utilisées pour le chargement et le déchargement valide					1.6.7.2.2.2 8.1.2.3 (h) 8.1.2.8 8.1.6.2
25.14	Ladeinstruktionen (sofern zutreffend)? / loading instructions (if applicable)? / Инструкции по загрузке имеются на борту (в соответствующих случаях) ? / Les instructions de chargement (le cas échéant)? [Nr. 10 des Zulassungszeugnisses / No. 10 of the certificate of approval / пункт 10 Свидетельства о допущении / point 10 du certificat d'agrément					8.1.2.3 (i) 8.1.2.8 9.3.2.25.9 9.3.3.25.9

	Gegenstand der Kontrolle / topic of the check / Объекты проверки / Objet du contrôle	(a) in Ordnung / in order в порядке / en ordre	(b) nicht in Ordnung / not in order не в порядке / pas en ordre	(c) nicht anwendbar / not applicable не применяется / inapplicable	(d) nicht geprüft / not checked не проверялось / non contrôlé	
25.15	Heizinstruktion bei der Beförderung von Stoffen mit einem Schmelzpunkt $\geq 0^{\circ}\text{C}$ / heating instruction in the event of carriage of goods having a melting point $\geq 0^{\circ}\text{C}$ / Инструкция по подогреву груза при перевозке веществ с температурой плавления $\geq 0^{\circ}\text{C}$ / instructions de chauffage lors du transport de matières dont le point de fusion $\geq 0^{\circ}\text{C}$					8.1.2.3 (k) 8.1.2.8
25.16	Gültige Prüfbescheinigung für Über- und Unterdruckventile (ausgenommen Typ N offen und N offen mit Flammendurchschlag-sicherung) / valid inspection certificate for pressure relief valves and vacuum relief valves (except type N open and type N open with flame arresters) / действительное свидетельство о проверке пригодности для предохранительных клапанов повышенного и пониженного давления (кроме типа N открытого и открытого типа N с пламегасителями) / attestation relative au contrôle des soupapes de surpression et de dépression (à l'exception du type N ouvert et du type N ouvert avec coupe-flammes)					8.1.2.3 (l) 8.1.2.8 8.1.6.5
25.17	Reiseregistrierung wenn das Fahrzeug für UN 1203 BENZIN oder OTTOKRAFTSTOFF zugelassen ist / register of operations, if the vessel is accepted for the carriage of UN 1203 MOTOR SPIRIT or GASOLINE or PETROL / регистрация рейса, если судно допущено к перевозке UN 1203 БЕНЗИН ИЛИ ТОПЛИВО ДЛЯ ДВИГАТЕЛЕЙ ВНУТРЕННЕГО СГОРАНИЯ / document d'enregistrement d'opérations relatives au transport du No ONU 1203 ESSENCE OU COMBUSTIBLE POUR LES MOTEURS A COMBUSTION INTERNE					7.2.4.12 8.1.2.3 (m) 8.1.2.8 8.1.11
25.18	Kühlinstruktion bei der Beförderung von Stoffen in gekühlter Form / refrigeration instruction in the event of carriage of refrigerated substances / инструкция по охлаждению при перевозке веществ в замороженной форме / instructions de réfrigération en cas de transport de matières réfrigérées					7.2.3.28 8.1.2.3 (n) 8.1.2.8
25.19	Bescheinigung über die Kühlanlage / certificate concerning the refrigeration system / свидетельство для системы охлаждения / certificat relatif à l'installation de réfrigération					8.1.2.3 (o) 8.1.2.8 9.3.1.27.10
25.20	Prüfbescheinigungen über die fest installierten Feuerlöscheinrichtungen / inspection certificates concerning the fixed fire extinguishing systems / свидетельства о проверке пригодности для стационарных установок пожаротушения / attestations d'inspection relatives aux installations d'incendie fixées à demeure					1.6.7.2.2.2 8.1.2.3 (p) 8.1.2.8 9.3.x.40.2.9

RESULTS OF JOINT OPERATIONS 2014

(Disaster Management, Hungary)

NUMBER OF CONTROLLED VESSELS (ADN VESSELS ARE ALSO INCLUDED)		
Nationality		Total
EU member country	Not EU member country	
205	58	263
NUMBER OF CONTROLLED ADN VESSELS		
Nationality		Total
EU member country	Not EU member country	
27	32	59

CARRIED DANGEROUS GOODS BY CONTROLLED VESSELS

(Disaster Management, Hungary)

UN NUMBER	PROPER SHIPPING NAME	QUANTITY	
		kg	litre
1170	Ethanol (Ethyl Alcohol)	1 002 509	-
1202	Gas Oil	10 784 008	9 155 586
1203	Gasoline	3 864 512	4 643 852
3077	Environmentally Hazardous Substance, Solid, N.o.s.	6 000	-
3082	Environmentally Hazardous Substance,	-	500 000
9006	Environmentally Hazardous Substance, Liquid, N.o.s. (Base Oil)	5 028 987	-
Total amount		20 686 016	14 299 438

FRAMEWORK OPERATIONAL PLAN

“1st DARIF JOINT OPERATION”

7-11. APRIL 2014.

“FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT USE ONLY”

1. INTRODUCTION

The participating Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine) of Priority Area 11 (*“To work together to tackle security and organized crime”*) of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region and other contributory international organisations (FRONTEX, EUROPOL, AQUAPOL and EUBAM), aiming to improve the safety and security of the Danube River, have agreed to organize and conduct joint law enforcement operations in 2014 in the framework of the project “Setting up the Structure of a Danube River Forum” (DARIF Project).

These synchronized actions also strengthen internal security of the Danube Region Member States. Hungarian project management intends to carry out operations in a complex way, in order to create a good practice on which not only trainings, technical developments and exchange programs can be based later on, but also Danube Law Enforcement Coordination Centre will be able to establish in the future.

The present operational plan serves as a base of implementation of the first Joint Operation. The participating Member States – above the present framework plan – draw detailed national operational plans on the implementation of the operation at their own Danube section. During the operation Temporary Coordination Centre will be operating in Mohács, Hungary.

2. OPERATION CODE

Recognizing the advantages of synchronized activities of Danube waterway law enforcement organizations, in order to cooperate on a European level, with regards to the objectives stated in Point 3, the project management is initiating the implementation of the joint operation named 1st DARIF Joint Operation.

3. PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES

The 1st DARIF Joint Operation should be multi-purpose operation because there has not been any reliable data of risk factors yet.

The participating Member States should perform their controls – according to their demands, their own risk assessment, current situation on the national Danube sections and reinforcement sources – choosing purposes and tasks from the following list, and setting priorities. (It is not necessary to concentrate on all tasks.)

1. Facilitation of illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, actions against illegal immigration;
2. Counterfeit goods with an impact on public health and safety;
3. Synthetic drugs production and poly-drug trafficking in the EU;
4. Transport of dangerous goods and waste related offenses, environmental crime;
5. Detections of tobacco smuggling;
6. Detections of smuggling of other dangerous products on board (weapon, armament and ammunition, radioactive materials);
7. Organised theft from cargo vessels;
8. General waterway law enforcement on vessels, in ports, on bridges and navigation structures (e.g. dams, ferry-crossings etc...);
9. Detections of document forgery;
10. Detections of wanted persons in the crew or in passengers;
11. Detections of illegal waste transport, controls on environmental protection;
12. Search of cargo ships and shipload with sniffer dogs (particularly the container and/or truck carriers);
13. Controls of destination ports (during unloading suspicious ships);
14. Controls on labour employment on members of crew.

The participating Member States may differ from the above listed tasks depending on the operational situation.

4. TERRITORIAL SCOPE

International criminal and law enforcement controls should be concentrated on the River Danube and its riverbanks, important ports by the authorities of Project DARIF Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine). DARIF Member States independently make a decision on the exact locations of the operational activities during three joint operational days specified in Point 5 according to their possibilities.

The territorial scope of the 1st Joint Operation does not include the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, which will be closed in that time.

5. TIME PERIOD

The whole operation will be held between 7th of April 2014 and 11th of April 2014. First and last days are travel days for liaison officers delegated by the Member States (including FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EUBAM officers deployed):

7 April Monday	8 April Tuesday	9 April Wednesday	10 April Thursday	11 April Friday
Arrival, briefing in Budapest	Joint Operational Day In Each Ms	Joint Operational Day In Each Ms	Joint Operational Day In Each Ms	Transport to Budapest
Transport to Mohács				Travel to Ms back

DARIF Member States independently make a decision on the time period of the operational activities according to their possibilities during the operational days (8-10 April). Planned activities shall be carried out in period of time specified in the national operational plans.

6. IMPLEMENTATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE OPERATION

In order to achieve the objectives, increased control measures shall be taken at their own river section by the respective authorities of each participating Member States.

Participant authorities at the national river sections would be the border- and water police forces, customs, disaster management organizations, human health and phytosanitary authorities, navigation (port) authorities and representatives of other cooperative organizations (for example: environmental protection and labour inspection) and other partners as reinforcement (these may vary from country to country). Each countries' domestic organisations and their partners involved will be listed in their national operational plans.

These authorities and other partners shall perform their duties within their own competences in accordance with their respective national legislation. National operational plans specify tasks of the authorities, in different time periods and places. Sub-plans – as extracts of the national plans – sent by the Member States can be found in annex No 1.

During the operation, besides increased controls on the Danube and the maritime end points, special attention shall be paid to the water traffic at the external Schengen border crossing point of the EU (at the town of Mohács, Hungary), particularly in order to detect wanted persons, illegal migrants, smuggling of drugs, tobacco or any other kind of illegal goods, forged documents. Participating authorities at the Hungarian section of the Danube shall be the border- and water- and criminal police, customs with active involvement of the disaster management organization, human health and phytosanitary authority, navigation authority, environmental protection and labour inspection authority and immigration authority.

Ministry of Interior of Hungary is responsible for the synchronization of implementation among participating Member States.

The Member States are requested to confirm their participation in this operation to the Ministry of Interior of Hungary and to determine in which periods of the operational days they will carry out their actions. They are also requested to give the contact details of their liaison officers delegated for the operation. Participating Member States – which have not done yet – send their sub-plans to the coordinator of the “EG Operations and Training of Project DARIF” not later than 26th of March 2014 to kalmara@baranya.police.hu email address.

In Hungary water police (Budapest Police Headquarters, Danube Water Police Office) is responsible for the planning, synchronization and conduct of implementation of the national part of the operation.

During the operation – in order to facilitate information flow and reaction capabilities – each participating Member States sends one liaison officer to Mohács, Hungary to take part actively in the daily work of the Temporary Coordination Centre.

Participating Member States shall assign an authority or law enforcement body responsible for the implementation of the operation, set up a national contact point (NCP) and ensure that its officer liaises continuously with it.

7. TEMPORARY COORDINATION CENTRE OF MOHÁCS

Temporary Coordination Centre will be set up in the building of the Border Port of Mohács, during the operational days (8-10 April) between 08:00 and 16:00. Liaison officers delegated to the Centre after the above mentioned office working hours ensure their availability towards their national contact points via mobile phone.

Staff of the Temporary Coordination Centre includes one designated Hungarian coordinator and liaison officers of Member States and FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EUBAM guest officers. List of experts delegated by countries and international organisations can be found in the annex No 2.

Tasks of Temporary Coordination Centre:

- ◆ keeping daily contact with the contact points of the participating Member States of the operation;
- ◆ liaison officers delegated to the Temporary Coordination Centre by Member States provide mutual assistance to each other in connection with data requests;
- ◆ collecting and forwarding information on the actual state of the sub-operations in Member States;
- ◆ operational support given by EUROPOL officer (queries will be available via EUROPOL database);
- ◆ exchange of operational experience;
- ◆ keeping the contacts with other focal point offices by FRONTEX guest officer;
- ◆ collecting statistical data for the final report of the operation.

Statistical data of the Joint Operation shall be sent in a daily basis until 10:00 AM of the next day – including all relevant data of 24 hours of the previous operational day – electronically to the email address of the Centre (to: fpomohacsrk@baranya.police.hu) with proper form usage. Statistical data form can be found in the annex No 3.

Working language of Temporary Coordination Centre is English.

Ministry of Interior of Hungary is responsible for setting up and running the Centre. Wired or WIFI internet connection will be available free of charge for the liaison officers in the Coordination Centre for their daily work.

Nevertheless nominated liaison officers and guest officers are requested to carry their own devices to Mohács for keeping contact with their respective authorities (duty cell phone, laptops, mailing software...).

Staff of the Centre shall wear civilian clothes. Liaison officers must not wear their national uniform, weapons and ammunition. They must not take any law enforcement measures, they are allowed to perform their tasks only with information exchange.

8. COLLECTING INFORMATION, FORWARDING THE REPORTS, EVALUATION

This activity – except provisions listed in Point 9 – shall be carried out by the following organizations:

- ◆ on international level: the Temporary Coordination Centre of the Hungarian Police in Mohács, Hungary;
- ◆ on national level: Member States' contact points (NCP's) designated for this operation, which can contact with the Coordination Centre via their liaison officers delegated to Mohács.

In Hungary – as NCP on national level – Budapest Police Headquarters' Danube Water Police Office shall be available 24 hours / day during the operation. All information comes from Hungarian participating authorities shall be forwarded to the operational duty officer of the Danube Water Police Office.

NCPs shall also be available 24 hours / day in all participating Member States during the operational days (8-10 April).

The operation will be followed by a summary and evaluation of the results. It will be based upon the statistical forms – filled by the Member States – and other information collecting by the Centre and criminal contact bodies during the operation. The final report will be elaborated by the coordinator of the "EG Operations and Training of Project DARIF" and submitted to project management. Results of the first Joint Operation in Project DARIF, necessary analysis and evaluation after the operation, also working out conclusions will be done during the next project workshop.

9. CRIMINAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE

During the operation usual criminal information exchange channels should be used for this regard according to the specialities of countries:

In case of criminal information exchange between neighbouring countries contact points set up for this aim should be used. Only the fact of giving criminal information shall be indicated in the statistical form of the operation.

In case criminal information exchange does not concern any neighbouring country – regarding the specialities of the sender / requesting Member State – EUROPOL or SELEC or INTERPOL channels should be used and the fact of giving criminal information shall be indicated in the statistical form of the operation.

Criminal information exchange via SELEC liaison officers, or via EUROPOL or INTERPOL national offices:

- ◆ receiving request of criminal information from liaison officers/national offices of the participating Member States;
- ◆ forwarding requests or information to liaison officers/national offices of the participating Member States;
- ◆ sending feedbacks to the requesting Member States' liaison officers/national offices regarding the criminal information and data gained.

In order to provide exchange of criminal information concerning Hungary, duty officers will be available in the International Criminal Cooperation Centre of Hungarian Police (NEBEK), which ensures criminal contact between the Hungarian Party and the participating Member States during the operation:

- ◆ it receives requests from the participating Member States during the operation and forwards it depending on its features towards the competent authority;
- ◆ it forwards the requests or information concerning any Member State – depending on its features – via the proper channel (EUROPOL or SELEC, or INTERPOL);
- ◆ it performs the necessary checks in the national databases according to the request.

10. FINANCING OF THE OPERATION

Budget of the Project DARIF shall cover costs of participating countries, FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EUBAM liaison officers regarding meals, accommodation and transportation during the operation.

11. CONTACTS

NATIONAL CONTACT POINT (HUNGARIAN NCP):

Budapest Police Headquarters' Danube Water Police Office

Phone: +36 1 203 9132

E-mail: dunaivizirendeszetirk@budapest.police.hu

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONAL COORDINATION:

Temporary Coordination Centre of Mohács

Address: H-7700, Mohács, Budapesti út 14/B.

Mobile phone: +36 30 936 8985 (Hungarian coordinator)

Email: fpomohacsrk@baranya.police.hu

CRIMINAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE:

International Criminal Cooperation Centre of Hungarian Police (NEBEK, Hungary), International Information Division:

Phone: +36 1 443 5557

Fax: +36 1 443 5815

E-mail: intercom@nebek.police.hu

Annexes:

Annex 1: Sub-plans sent by the Member States

Annex 2: List of liaison officers delegated to the Temporary Coordination Centre

Annex 3: Form for statistical data exchange

DATA EXCHANGE FORM

DAILY SUMMARY

Date		
Country		
SUMMARY OF INVOLVED PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES		
Number of authorities involved		
Total number of officials involved		
Duty boats involved		
Duty cars involved		
SUMMARY OF CHECKS CARRIED OUT		
Number of searches carried out		
	passenger cruise ships	
	tugboats, freight ships	
	barges	
	boats	
	containers	
	cars	
	destination ports – unloading	
	Total searches	0
Number of persons and documents checked		
	Number of information sent to the Temp. Coordination Centre	
	Number of criminal information sent	
INFORMATION EXCHANGE		
	Number of information sent to the Temp. Coordination Centre	
	Number of criminal information sent	
SHORT SUMMARY OF DAILY RESULTS		

DETAILS OF DETECTIONS

No.	Country/ Authority	Type of detected offence	Name and flag of the ship	Type of ship (passenger or freight ship)	Place of detection (city)	Date of detection	Description of detection (amount of smuggled goods or number and nationality of apprehended people)	Hiding place or any remark
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								

FEATURES OF THE RIVER DANUBE

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF THE RIVER SECTION BY COUNTRIES

The Danube is the second longest river in Europe, classified as an international waterway. It originates in the town of Donaueschingen – which is in the Black Forest of Germany – at the confluence of the rivers Brigach and Breg. The Danube then flows southeast for 2,872 km (1,785 mi), passing through four capital cities before emptying into the Black Sea via the Danube Delta in Romania and Ukraine.

Country	Right riverbank		Left riverbank		Most important settlements	Ports
	<i>fluvial km</i>	<i>length (km)</i>	<i>fluvial km</i>	<i>length (km)</i>		
DE	2414-2223,20	190,80	2414 - 2201,77	212,23	Regensburg, Deggendorf, Passau	Nürnberg (MDK), Kelheim, Regensburg, Passau, Straubing, Deggendorf
AT	2223,20-1872,70	351	2201,77-1880,26	322	Linz, Ybbs, Melk, Krems, Tulln, Wien, Hainburg,	Linz, Ennshafen, Ybbs, Melk, Krems, Korneuburg, Wiener Hafen
SK	1872,70-1850,20	22	1880,26-1708,20	172	Bratislava, Komarno, Sturovo	Bratislava, Komarno, Sturovo
HU	1850,20-1433,00	417	1708,20-1433,00	275	Győr, Komárom, Vác, Budapest, Dunaújváros, Paks, Kalocsa, Baja, Mohács	Győr-Gönyű, Budapest, Adony, Dunaújváros, Baja, Mohács
HR	1433,00-1295,50	138	none	none	Vukovar, Ilok	Osijek, Vukovar
RS	1295,50-845,65	450	1433,00-1075,00	358	Apatin, Bogojevo, Bezdan, Backa Palanka, Novi Sad, Belgrade, Kovin, Smederevo, Veliko Gradiste, Kladovo	Apatin, Bogojevo, Backa Palanka, Novi Sad, Belgrade, Pancevo, Smederevo, Prahovo,

Country	Right riverbank		Left riverbank		Most important settlements	Ports
	<i>fluvial km</i>	<i>length (km)</i>	<i>fluvial km</i>	<i>length (km)</i>		
RO	374,10-0,00 64,4-0,00 (Danube-Black Sea channel)	374 64,4	1075,00-134,14 79,63-0,00 64,4-0,00 (Danube-Black Sea channel)	1020 64,4	Moldova Veche, Orșova, Drobeta-Turnu Severin, Calafat, Corabia, Turnu-Măgurele, Zimnicea, Giurgiu, Oltenița, Călărași, Fetești, Cernavodă, Brăila, Galați, Tulcea, Sulina	Moldova Veche, Orșova, Drobeta Turnu Severin, Calafat, Giurgiu, Cernavodă, Medgidia, Murfatlar, Constanta Sud, Tulcea, Sulina
BG	845,65–374,10	472	none	none	Vidin, Lom, Nikopol, Svistov, Rousse, Silistra	Vidin, Somovit, Belene, Svishatov, Rousse, Tutrakan, Silistra,
MD	none	none	134,14–133,57	0,6	Giurgiulesti	Giurgiulesti
UA	none	nincs	0-174	174	Vilkovo, Kiliya, Ismail, Reni	Reni, Ismail

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAFFIC AND THE CRIMINAL FEATURES OF THE RIVER SECTIONS BY COUNTRIES


Country	Main characteristics of the vessel traffic	Main criminal features of the river sections
DE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic all year – significant cruise ship traffic between April and December each year, mainly with EU, Japanese nationals and USA passengers, mixed crews; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – illegal employment – crimes against safety of the water traffic – theft of small boats and external engines – forged documents (crew qualifications, navigation documents, rarely passports)
AT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic all year; – significant cruise ship traffic in summer season, mainly with EU, Japanese nationals and USA passengers, mixed crews; – Twin city liner (between Vienna and Bratislava) – liner connections; – small boats / sport crafts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – forged documents (crew qualifications, navigation documents, passports and travel documents); – illegal stay; – illegal employment; – crimes against environment; – smuggling of goods (cigarettes, drugs); – theft of boats and external engines
SK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic (10-13 vessels a day, carrying mainly heavy industry material, grain, etc.) – two-three cruise ships, during the summer season this number rises (Twin city liner cruise ship between Vienna and Bratislava daily five times) – small boats/ sport crafts mainly near bigger settlements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – no forged documents detected yet – environmental crime quite frequent (mainly water contamination) – two significant cases of the fuel stealing from vessels (damage in thousands of Euro) – poaching is very frequent – less important offences/crime (pickpocketing of the tourists)

Country	Main characteristics of the vessel traffic	Main criminal features of the river sections
HU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic all year – mainly bulk carriers (ore, coal, natural phosphate, timber, agricultural goods) and tankers traffic – significant cruise ship traffic between April and October each year, mainly with EU nationals and USA passengers, mixed crews; – Schengen external border with Croatia and Serbia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – crimes against safety of the water traffic – theft of small boats and external engines – poaching – forged documents (crew qualifications, navigation documents, rarely passports) – smuggling of goods (mainly cigarette) – environmental crime (water contamination, damages caused on navigation facilities)
HR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic all year – mainly tankers and goods traffic – significant cruise ship traffic between April and September each year, mainly with EU nationals and USA passengers, mixed crews; – external EU border to Republic of Serbia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – theft of small boats and external engines – poaching – smuggling of cigarettes and tobacco – smuggling of other goods on board – environmental crime (water contamination damages caused on navigation facilities)
RS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic all year – mainly agricultural goods traffic – significant cruise ship traffic between April and September each year, mainly with EU nationals and USA passengers, mixed crews; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – diesel (oil) smuggling – robbery on ships in movement or during the detention hold – not frequent detection of forged documents of passengers and crew member
RO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic all year – destination: Hungary, Austria, Germany – mainly bulk carriers (ore, coal, natural phosphate, timber, agricultural goods) and tankers traffic – significant cruise ship traffic between April and September each year, mainly with EU nationals and USA passengers, mixed crews; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – illegal border crossings of migrants coming from Turkey via Bulgaria or direct from Turkey – crimes against safety of the water traffic – poaching – smuggling of cigarette in tugboats – environmental crime (water contamination, damages caused on navigation facilities) – theft of goods from cargo ships;

Country	Main characteristics of the vessel traffic	Main criminal features of the river sections
BG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic all year; – mainly bulk carriers (ore, coal, agricultural goods) and fuel tankers traffic; – significant cruise ship traffic between April and September; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – smuggling of cigarettes and fuel; – stealing of small boats and outboard engines; – poaching; – fishing offences; – most of the cases related to document offences are: not having the necessary qualification and navigation documents
MD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – significant cargo traffic all year – mainly tankers and goods traffic – significant cruise ship traffic between April and September each year, mainly with EU nationals and USA passengers, mixed crews; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – theft of small boats and external engines – poaching – smuggling of cigarettes and tobacco – smuggling of other goods on board – environmental crime (water contamination damages caused on navigation facilities)
UA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – medium flow of cargo all year (mostly coal –52 %) ; – significant cruise ship traffic between April and August each year, mainly with EU national passengers but the staff is mixed; – significant transit, mostly tankers ; – about 8 % – repairment from RF; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – smuggling of cigarette – hidden persons in the ships – forged documents (crew qualifications, navigation documents, rarely passports) – environmental crime (water contamination) – fuel smuggling


STATISTICS

Authorities and officials involved (daily average)




	1 st JO	2 nd JO	3 rd JO
Authorities involved	34	34	45
Officials involved	218	290	291

Duty boats and cars involved (daily average)




	1 st JO	2 nd JO	3 rd JO
Duty boats involved	31	37	38
Cars involved	28	39	51

Total searches



	PASSENGER CRUISE SHIPS	CARGO SHIPS	BARGES	BOATS	CONTAINERS	CARS	DESTINATION PORTS
1 st JO	57	189	180	52	2	196	94
1 st JO	91	341	373	99	187	119	179
1 st JO	55	697	691	45	20	8	67

Persons and documents checked




	1 st JO	2 nd JO	3 rd JO
Number of persons checked	4755	8513	8787
Number of documents checked	5392	10 067	7937

Offences detected during JOs by types (case)



- 68 Illegal migration/ stay/employment
- 3 wanted person
- 5 smuggling
- 9 criminal offences
- 65 Petty/ administrative offences

Distribution of citizenship of apprehended persons



- 5 Romanian
- 2 Hungarian
- 4 Indonesian
- 27 Philippines
- 16 Serbian
- 4 Bosnian
- 1 Macedonian
- 1 Bulgarian
- 8 Moldovan
- 3 Syrian
- 7 Croatian
- 3 Ukrainian
- 1 Turkish

“The ministers consider cross-border cooperation and the effective exchange of information to be essential to achieving the common objectives. For this reason, the long-term perspective to set up a network of contact points along the Danube and the further upgrade of the centre in Hungary (Mohács) as coordination centre is regarded as a strategic project with an added value in that field.”

Final Communiqué

*Danube Security Conference within the Framework
of the European Danube Region Strategy, Munich, 7 May 2013*



“The question emerges, whether the coordination centre is a subject of major importance. I am fully convinced that it is, because we have just got over a crisis after which the transport of goods and passengers will be increased on the Danube and we hope that tourism will play a major role too. And not only will good people and tourists appear, not only will the economy-boosting transport of goods increase, but organized crime groups will obviously also be more active.”

Sándor Pintér

*Minister of Interior
DARIF Kick-Off Conference, Budapest, 17 September 2013*



“The newly established cooperation platform Danube River Forum will contribute to reducing crime by enforcing police cooperation along the river. Exchange of information is key to fighting crime successfully, in particular when it comes to cooperation between different national authorities. Co-operating cross-border under the Danube Strategy is making a real difference.”

Johannes Hahn

*Commissioner for Regional Policy
2nd Annual Forum of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region,
Bucharest, 28 October 2013*